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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: What is the most appropriate basis for solidarity 
among citizens of diverse societies? Members of such societies do not only have different 
belief systems and different individual and collective commitments, but may also command 
different resources and occupy different positions in the social world. What, then, are the 
necessary conditions for citizens such as these to care for each other and act together in order 
to solve collective problems? The answer to this question is developed in four steps. I begin 
by establishing the most appropriate conception of personhood for the project of citizen 
solidarity. After examining and rejecting both comprehensive liberal and communitarian 
conceptions of personhood, I defend a political conception of personhood which 
distinguishes between our public and private identities, and which could form a basis of 
citizen solidarity regardless of our private conceptions of personhood. In light of this political 
conception of personhood, I go on to argue that any notion of a common national identity, 
whether “thick” or “thin”, fail to provide a basis for solidarity precisely because it comes at 
an unreasonable cost to individual citizens’ autonomy. Next, I turn to equal rights as a 
possible basis for solidarity. Here I show that, while equal rights are an important condition 
for citizen solidarity in so far as they promote and protect the equal dignity necessary for 
citizens to trust and cooperate with one another, formal equal rights are not sufficient for 
addressing power imbalances between different social groups. In the fourth and final step, I 
demonstrate that political participation in the form of deliberative democracy can provide a 
basis for solidarity in diverse societies in so far as it is inclusive of diversity, purposefully 
orientates citizens to mutual understanding and viable even in expansive political 
communities. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
4 
Abstrak 
 
Hierdie tesis beoog om die volgende vraag te beantwoord: Wat is die mees geskikte 
grondslag vir solidariteit onder burgers in diverse samelewings? Lede van sulke samelewings 
het nie net verskillende oortuigingskemas en verskillende individuele en kollektiewe 
verbintenisse nie, maar beskik ook oor verskillende hulpbronne en posisies in die sosiale 
wêreld. Derhalwe, wat is die nodige voorwaardes vir burgers soos dié om vir mekaar om te 
gee en saam te werk om gesamentlike uitdagings aan te pak? Die antwoord op hierdie vraag 
word ontwikkel in vier stappe. Ek begin deur die mees geskikte begrip van die persoon vir 
die projek van burgerlike solidariteit te vestig. Nadat ek beide die omvattend-liberale en 
kommunitêre opvattings van die persoon ondersoek en afgekeur het, verdedig ek ‘n politieke 
begrip van die persoon wat tussen ons openbare en private identiteite onderskeid tref, en wat 
as ‘n grondslag vir burgerlike solidariteit kan dien ongeag ons private opvattings van 
menswees. In die lig van hierdie politieke begrip van menswees, voer ek aan dat enige 
konsep van ‘n gemene nasionale identiteit, hetsy “dik” of “dun”, nie daarin slaag om ‘n 
grondslag vir solidariteit te bied nie, juis omdat dit onredelike eise aan die individuele burger 
se outonomie stel. Daarna kyk ek na gelyke regte as ‘n moontlike grondslag vir solidariteit. 
Hier dui ek aan dat, alhoewel gelyke regte ‘n belangrike voorwaarde vir bugerlike solidariteit 
stel deur gelykwaardigheid - wat nodig is vir burgers om mekaar te vertrou en saam te werk - 
te beskerm, is formele gelyke regte nie genoeg om ongelyke magsverhoudinge tussen 
verskillende groepe aan te spreek nie. In die vierde en finale stap, demonstreer ek dat 
politieke deelname in die vorm van deliberatiewe demokrasie die grondslag vir solidariteit in 
diverse samelewings kan voorsien in soverre dit inklusief is van diversiteit, wedersydse 
begrip onder burgers aanwakker en ook prakties haalbaar is in uitgebreide politieke 
gemeenskappe. 
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Introduction 
 
There are many social challenges that cannot be solved purely through individual initiatives, 
by the spontaneous workings of the market or through the sole agency of the state. These 
challenges include climate change, systemic inequality, organised crime and any other 
structural problems that are entrenched in society due to historical injustice, institutional 
failures, vested interests or similar reasons. Broadly integrated, cross-sectoral, purpose-
driven, coordinated action is needed to address these kinds of problems on all levels of 
society. Only when all relevant stakeholders act in unison together would these problems 
effectively be addressed. 
The question that this thesis will attempt to answer is how to mobilise the diverse inhabitants 
of a society to care for each other and act together to solve collective and each other’s 
particular problems. In other words, how does one achieve solidarity in diverse societies? 
This question belongs to the field of political philosophy and I will specifically look at 
liberal, democratic citizenship within the nation-state as a vehicle for binding people to a 
common purpose and convincing them to make necessary sacrifices along the way. This 
focus is relevant, for many societies in the world, including my own home country South 
Africa, has subscribed to liberal democracy and struggle to establish solidarity among its 
diverse citizenry in order to address its wide range of serious problems. One of the reasons 
why South Africa and many similar states have difficulty to use citizenship as a tool to 
establish solidarity may be due to an understanding of citizenship that is unsuitable for the 
practical realities facing these societies. 
The conception of citizenship as a binding force faces at least two major challenges.  
In the first place, the liberal model of citizenship as the grounds for solidarity is being 
challenged by internal diversity that may be experienced in the nation-state as a whole, sub-
national regions, municipalities, neighbourhoods or even households. This diversity is not 
only a function of culture, ethnicity or religion, but also of belief systems in general and 
social groupings that may transcend any of the aforementioned markers of diversity. 
Solidarity is not only threatened by conflicting value systems but also by unequal power 
relations between social groups. Unequal relations maintained over long-periods of time may 
have influenced institutional cultures, spatial demography, economic structures and/or 
common beliefs to such an extent that, even where all citizens are equal in law, they may not 
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experience equal dignity in their day-to-day lives. This, in turn, impacts on social cohesion 
because it undermines mutual understanding and trust between citizens. 
Second, the traditional concept of citizenship is also being challenged by increasing 
transnational interdependence. National economies have not only been restructured globally 
by steady increases in final product trade, but also by the emergence of global value chains. 
The comparative advantage of labour costs and other conditions between states have 
prompted corporations to spread the value chains of their products across states. Each 
component of a product is produced in the state that provides the best resources, least costs 
and shipping options for the particular component. One could argue that economies are thus 
not merely interdependent, but “enmeshed” (Womack, 2016: 1474). This degree of 
interdependence makes it nearly impossible for states to address major problems rooted in the 
economy by themselves. 
Given these challenges, if the notion of citizenship is to have any role in binding large 
populations into a political will-formation, it needs to be reconceptualised. 
One of the main criticisms levelled against the liberal conception of citizenship is that it is 
based on a flawed conception of personhood. Liberal citizenship, so the argument goes, 
underestimates the degree to which personhood is imbricated in social relations (Bell, 1993; 
MacIntyre, 1981; Taylor, 1991). The liberal conception of personhood places a premium on 
individual autonomy – an autonomy that is itself predicated on rationality – and hence posits 
a self that is prior to social relations. Critics of liberalism (ibid.) argue that the liberal reason 
and its attendant conception of autonomy are themselves to a significant degree socially 
constituted and that there is no necessary, inherent value in exercising choice and/or being 
original. A citizenship based on a comprehensive liberal conception of personhood will 
involuntarily impose particularistic values onto persons and/or discount the significance that 
person’s social embeddedness may play in their ability to exercise their citizenship and 
pursue their ideas of the good on an equal footing with their fellow citizens. 
Nationalistic conceptions of citizenship, on the other hand, appeal to the notion of a shared 
background culture (Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 1989). The concern here is with the creation or 
maintenance of a national identity. Liberal nationalists attempt to negate the contradiction 
between the citizen’s individual autonomy and the expectation of conforming to a national 
identity, by advocating a “thin” national identity, one that is perhaps based on language, 
specific traditions and/or universal values and not on more substantive content like religion or 
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a specific lifestyle (ibid.). However, it might be difficult to distinguish between thin and thick 
identity in an impartial way. Moreover, regardless of the thinness of the national identity, the 
tension between the citizen as an individual autonomous person and the citizen as part of a 
pre-political national community remains and will inevitably antagonise and alienate those 
citizens who do not identify with the national identity. 
Within the liberal model, it is often assumed that a scheme of equal rights that is blind to the 
social particularities of a citizen will provide citizens with the necessary political and civil 
powers, material circumstances, education and other basic services to have a fair opportunity 
in pursuing their life-projects and experience equal dignity as a result. Any differentiation in 
rights would undermine people’s equal dignity (Taylor, 1994: 26-27). However, there is 
overwhelming evidence that an equal distribution of rights does not provide a comprehensive 
answer to all the structural problems in society obstructing the equal dignity of citizens, 
especially when it comes to unequal power relations between social groups and the catering 
of particularistic interests of social groups (Waldron, 1992).  
When it comes to political participation, in terms of the liberal aggregative model of 
citizenship, the citizen is substantially depoliticised (Habermas, 1996a). The aggregated 
interests of citizens are represented by political parties, leaving citizens to largely focus on 
their private lives. Little room for mutual understanding is built in the political process. 
Bargaining between aggregated citizen interests, delegated to a handful of representatives, is 
the order of the day. The negative freedoms of the citizen are, however, not up for voting and 
therefore stand apart from the democratic, decision-making process. These freedoms are 
strictly guaranteed by a constitution whose legitimacy lies in a “social contract” usually 
rooted in natural rights theory that holds that individuals are born with inalienable rights. This 
model is problematic as well. Without a mechanism for fostering mutual understanding and 
solidarity between citizens beyond their private interests, the social problems undermining 
the necessary citizen solidarity for collective will-binding will remain unresolved. Moreover, 
without any mechanism for collective will-formation to begin with, the coordination and 
sacrifices necessary to address the major challenges facing society may not be achieved at all. 
It is clear that the liberal conception of citizenship has several weaknesses which hamper 
attempts to establish solidarity among members of diverse societies. My aim in this thesis is 
to re-examine citizenship along all of the above-mentioned dimensions – identity, rights, 
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participation, as well as the conception of personhood – in order to work out the necessary 
and sufficient grounds for citizen solidarity. 
In this thesis, I will focus on the challenges that internal, national diversity poses to 
citizenship, but I will always keep the challenge of increasing transnational interdependence 
in the background in so far as it is relevant to the discussion. While the focus is on internal 
diversity, it is important that our solution is open-ended to the possibility of generating 
improved transnational solidarity and thus dealing with a diverse polity on an infinitely larger 
scale. 
Many of the abovementioned topics and challenges concerning citizen solidarity intersect. 
For the sake of structure, I will need to separate some of these discussions while keeping the 
reader aware of the connections. The structure of the thesis will more-or-less follow the 
discussion sequence above, looking at the conception of personhood and the dimensions of 
citizenship each in a separate chapter. 
Chapter 1 deals with the genesis and manifestations of the liberal conception of the 
personhood underlying the liberal model of citizenship. I demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
theory as a comprehensive view on personhood by scrutinising its own logic and discussing 
criticisms by communitarians. In light of these criticisms, I then defend a Rawlsian political 
conception of personhood that allows a distinction between our public and private identities, 
and which could form a basis of citizen solidarity regardless of our private conceptions of 
personhood. This chapter sets the parameters for the inquiry into the grounds for solidarity in 
the subsequent chapters. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the identity dimension of citizenship, starting with a discussion on 
the relationship between the concepts of ethnicity, nation and states. I then lay out the 
argument for a national identity as a basis for solidarity, comparing perspectives from ethical 
universalism and ethical particularism. In criticism of this position, I look at the authoritarian 
background and continuing nature of national identity and conclude that national identity 
cannot be reconciled with the political conception of personhood in a diverse polity. The aim 
here is to show that national identities are fundamentally manufactured and maintained at the 
cost of individuals’ autonomy. I then briefly consider the arguments for constitutional 
patriotism and liberal nationalism as an alternative to a “thicker” or more substantive national 
identity. I show that the debate between constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism is 
merely a matter of degree as long as constitutional patriotism is based on the particularistic 
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content of a political culture. I argue that regardless of the thickness of the national identity, 
the integrity of the political conception of the citizen will still be in a precarious position. The 
chapter concludes that we need to turn to other dimensions of citizenship in order to find a 
basis for solidarity.  
Following the analysis of the identity dimension of citizenship in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 deals 
with the rights dimension of citizenship. Relying on the work of T.H. Marshall, I argue that 
there is a connection between rights and solidarity, for rights contributes to the experience of 
equal dignity among citizens. However, this connection is only valid if rights do not violate 
the political conception of personhood. Turning once more to Rawls, I demonstrate that rights 
can and ought to find their basis in an overlapping consensus in order to enjoy legitimacy 
among a diverse population and thus comply with the political conception of personhood. I 
then look at how the scope of rights needs to expand in order to ensure equal dignity in all 
relevant spheres of citizens’ lives. I examine the arguments for the inclusion of differentiated 
rights to solve the problems related to the particularistic needs of social groups and the 
unequal power relations between them. I conclude that such rights cannot adequately deal 
with the problems posed to solidarity by a diverse citizenry. The chapter concludes that, 
while rights do play an important role, they are not a sufficient basis for citizen solidarity in 
diverse societies.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, I turn to the participation dimension of citizenship. Guided by 
Habermas, I briefly survey the classical republican and the Lockean or aggregative model for 
political participation, arguing that both of them are an inadequate foundation for solidarity in 
diverse societies, in so far as the republican model asks too much and the aggregative model 
too little of citizens. I then turn to deliberative democracy as a model for participation, as 
developed by Habermas, Benhabib and others. Here I show that deliberative democracy 
accommodates both liberal and communitarian viewpoints on personhood by arguing that 
individual autonomy is fundamentally relational. It thereby gives right from the outset due 
recognition to the social embeddedness of individuals, attuning itself for the challenges 
facing solidarity posed by cultural diversity and power relationships. It will be argued that 
locating the legitimacy of our legal order in consensus-driven discourse instead of people’s 
personal comprehensive doctrines, forces us to commit to mutual understanding. Following 
this, I address the criticisms that discourses often privilege certain groups and ways of 
speech, and that consensus would always exclude or suppress others. My aim here is to show 
that that difference is surmountable, at least to the degree that meaningful cooperation and 
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consensus on most problems can be achieved. It will also be explained and argued that the 
issues related to the ability of less dominant groups to fully participate in discourse and raise 
any type of concerns in whichever manner they prefer can be addressed by a decentred view 
of the public sphere and the institutionalisation of communication presuppositions that need 
to regulate the discourse process. A decentred view will also allow for bargaining when 
particularistic needs are concerned and make it easier for citizens to politically participate in 
the polis. 
In light of the above, the conclusion of the thesis is that citizen solidarity should not be based 
on any pre-political substance, but rather on a commitment to deliberative processes that 
enable us to understand each other and ensure that we institute and maintain constitutional 
arrangements, rights, laws and policies that will guarantee citizens equal dignity in all spheres 
of our lives and mobilise us for collective action against the challenges facing our societies. 
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Chapter 1: A political conception of personhood 
 
Introduction 
Any given conception of citizenship entails some conception of personhood, which can be 
either explicit or implicit in the theory of citizenship. In order to work out the basis on which 
citizen solidarity in diverse, interconnected and complex societies can be built, we need to 
interrogate the conception of personhood which it entails. If the assumptions of this 
conception prove to be controversial, it is important that we understand these controversies 
and make the necessary adjustments to the conception before appraising the possible citizen 
basses for solidarity in the subsequent chapters. In this chapter, I will look at the development 
of the conception of personhood that underlies the liberal conception of citizenship, 
interrogate its logic, look at the communitarian criticisms against it and make a preliminary 
suggestion for a workable alternative in light of these criticisms. 
In the first part of section 1, I will explain how the shift from monarchy to popular 
sovereignty in Europe has attributed every individual with equal dignity and autonomy. I will 
explain the two sides of autonomy, namely rationality and authenticity, and how autonomy is 
seen as an individualistic quality. In the second part, I will demonstrate the difficulty of this 
individualistic conception of personhood by looking specifically at the foundation of 
authenticity. In section 2, I will show how liberal theorists have significantly undervalued the 
role of social factors in the constitution of a person’s identity by looking at the 
communitarian critique of individual authenticity and choice. In the final section, I will argue 
that we need a political conception of the person, sensitive to both individual choice and a 
person’s social embeddedness. I will also argue that his conception must stand apart from a 
citizen’s personal identity or conception of him/herself, for the sole purpose of peaceful and 
fair cooperation among citizens. 
1. The liberal conception of the person 
1.1. Origins of the liberal conception of personhood 
The liberal concept of the person has played, and continues to play, a significant role in the 
justification of popular sovereignty from the seventeenth century onwards. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the source of sovereignty in many European countries 
shifted from the monarchy to “the people” (Schnapper, 1998: 3). With this shift came a new 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
14 
understanding of the person and his/her relations to his/her fellow citizens. Charles Taylor 
(1994: 26-27) explains that under the ancien régime, in which sovereignty was vested in the 
hands of the few, society was fundamentally hierarchical. The monarchy was constituted by 
various titles and ranks. In order to obtain these positions, one had to have “honour”. 
Therefore, honour was in a sense the social currency of the time. However, while everyone 
aspired to have honour, this currency was only available to a few. As with any currency, the 
value of honour depended precisely on the fact that only a few could have it. Thus, the 
system of honour was one of préférence and inequality (Montesquieu, 2001: 42; Taylor, 
1994: 27). 
With the shift towards popular sovereignty, however, the state’s rule became dependent on 
the consent of the people over which it ruled. The state ruled in their name. The people were 
no longer “subjects” but “citizens” (Habermas, 1998: 111), agents who give the state the 
power to rule. In order to justify this new source of legitimacy, the individuals constituting 
the citizenry had to be seen as entities deserving respect. In other words, each individual had 
to be imbued with a specific moral quality. This moral quality was ascribed to the individual 
by conceptualising him/her as someone who is “autonomous” and someone who has 
“dignity” (Taylor, 1994: 27-28).  
Being in the possession of dignity means that someone has moral worth and is therefore 
entitled to rights. In contrast to honour, dignity is a quality that every individual is born with 
and possesses in equal measure. Dignity cannot be negotiated or measured (ibid.). Taylor 
(ibid. 27) provides an illustration of the shift from honour to dignity by referring to the titles 
that people used to address each other. Before the shift to popular sovereignty, people in 
society who possessed a substantial amount of honour, like aristocrats, were addressed as 
“Lord” or “Lady”. The rest of the people were addressed by their first name or surname. With 
popular sovereignty, under which moral worth is distributed equally, everyone, no matter 
what their social standing, received the titles “Mr”, “Mrs” or “Miss”. In the mid-twentieth 
century, when people became aware that the differentiation between Mrs and Miss 
perpetuated a system of unequal moral worth (in this case through patriarchy), Mrs and Miss 
was collapsed into “Ms” (Erickson, 2014: 40; Taylor, 1994: 27). 
Another telling and more recent illustration of the distinction between honour and dignity can 
be seen in the shift from racial colonialism towards popular sovereignty under which all 
races, and not only white people, came to be considered to have equal dignity. As in the case 
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with the spread of equal dignity among the sexes, people arrived at the conclusion that the 
same principle applied to race. Under Apartheid in South Africa, white people were 
considered to be morally superior to black people. It was generally expected that white men 
should be addressed as “master” or baas (Afrikaans for “boss”) by all people that were not 
white (Goduka et al. 1992: 513). Even white boys were entitled to this honour as they had to 
be addressed as “young master” or kleinbaas (“small boss”). The starkness of this inequality 
could be seen when fully grown black men, including those that were well advanced in their 
senior years, addressed white boys, who have barely learned to walk, as klein baas. Under the 
new dispensation of South Africa, every person, regardless of his/her identity, is considered 
to have equal dignity. In fact, equal dignity is guaranteed by sections 9 and 10 in the Bill of 
Rights of the South African Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The violation of 
the principle of equal dignity would be considered as a serious infringement of the 
Constitution under the new regime. 
The other side of the moral quality ascribed to individuals is autonomy. Immanuel Kant 
played a significant role in developing the concept of individual autonomy. Charles Larmore 
(1996: 44-46) explains that, during the eighteenth century, which is dubbed the Age of 
Enlightenment, the conviction that the authority of moral laws was vested in a superior being 
was increasingly challenged. The objective of the Enlightenment Project was to find an 
alternative source for the authority of morality. Kant suggested that our rationality should be 
the source of our moral laws. Our rationality gives us the moral autonomy to determine 
whether an action is right or wrong. The individual does not need anybody else to tell him/her 
what is permissible or not, as long as his/her capacity for rational thought and self-control is 
not compromised (Christman, 2015). It is for this reason that Kant (1996a: 17) writes that we 
should “dare to be wise” and emancipate ourselves “from other people’s direction.” If we do 
not use our own rationality to determine moral conduct, we remain “minors”. 
Since this rational capacity is the same for everyone, it follows that the judgments of right 
and wrong must also be universalisable. What is right for me, must be right for everyone, 
because everyone shares the same rationality. Hence the categorical imperative espoused by 
Immanuel Kant (1983: 30). For our purposes, the most important aspect of Kant’s moral 
theory is that our rational moral judgments may not be based on contingent factors. Thus, the 
fact that one has a certain gender, language or religious preference is irrelevant. Only those 
attributes that are shared universally by all people may enter one’s moral determination. 
Moreover, right and wrong cannot be derived from the consequences that actions produce – 
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which are similarly contingent factors – but can only be determined by turning to one’s inner 
self – one’s intrinsic moral sense – and applying the categorical imperative using one’s 
rational faculties before any actions are taken. 
Taylor (1994: 28) argues that this notion has brought about an individualistic conception of 
identity in society. If we must cut away external influences and delve into our inner selves in 
order to determine what is right and wrong, we must do the same in order to determine our 
true identity. The inner feelings of the individual have therefore obtained significance in itself 
and became a compass for everything that matters to the individual. Taylor (ibid. 29) claims 
that this development is part of the “massive subjective turn of modern culture” in the 
eighteenth century. This turning inwards is exemplified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
conception of morality as “a voice within” (ibid. 28). Rousseau (1992: 218-221) argues that 
this voice can be drowned out by our dependence on others, especially by our drive to be 
esteemed by other people. The greatest obstruction to this inner voice is therefore “pride” or 
amour propre. We need to rid ourselves of this pride if we want to have contact with our 
inner selves. The idea that universal moral laws are found within ourselves is also captured in 
Kant’s (1996b: 269) famous dictum “the starry heavens above and the moral law within.” 
Kant clearly draws a distinction between the sources of physical science and moral laws. The 
former is empirically discerned outside of oneself, while the latter can be discerned by 
applying one’s rationality “within” oneself. 
A choice must therefore not only be rational, but also individually chosen in line with the 
person’s true self; in other words, the choice must be “authentic”. John Stuart Mill, one of the 
prominent role-players in the development of liberalism, affirms that there is an inherent 
value in authentic, individual choices (Appiah, 2005: 5). Mill (1956: 82) disapprovingly notes 
that people who guide their actions by tradition do not make use of their ability to choose. On 
the other hand, a person who uses “his own mode of laying out his existence is best, not 
because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode.” In fact, individual choice is a 
quality that makes us human. “He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his 
plan of life for him, has no need for any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation” 
(Mill, 1956: 71). 
The individual’s autonomy is therefore not only characterised by his/her rationality and moral 
sense but also his/her “authenticity” in terms of who he/she is. When an individual’s dignity 
is respected, respect must be given to both his/her rationality and authenticity. Kant’s and 
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Mill’s individualist conception of personhood implies that a person is constituted prior to any 
social influences. We should and are capable, due to our rational faculties, to retain a 
contingent loyalty to any idea of the good (Larmore, 1996: 128). These attachments to goods 
can be revised upon critical reflection. 
This individualistic – some would say atomistic – conception of the person has been 
challenged by various theorists, not least by those who could loosely be described as 
communitarians. In order to obtain a better appreciation for the controversy concerning 
individual autonomy, I will first review the argument for autonomy in relation to the 
conditions for rationality and authenticity, focussing on the latter, before turning to the 
common criticisms levelled against these ideas. 
1.2. The foundation of authenticity 
John Christman (2015), a liberal thinker who has authored various works on the subject of 
individual autonomy, argues that individual autonomy requires two conditions: “competence” 
(or rationality) and authenticity. He argues that only “minimal internal conditions” for 
rationality is required (ibid. 1991: 14). No external or objectively verifiable evidence is 
necessary, otherwise it may open the door to paternalism, by which one person can unduly 
rule over another person in the name of the latter person’s “real” or “true” self. Isaiah Berlin 
(1969: 133) illustrates this danger: 
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or 
societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name of their ‘real’ selves, in the 
secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, the performance 
of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom – 
the free choice of his ‘true’, albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self. 
Paternalism would be a contravention of the belief that every person has equal dignity. In 
order to maintain respect for people’s equal dignity, the requirements for rationality must be 
less stringent. Therefore, only internal factors can be included. It merely needs to be obvious 
that a person does not follow inconsistent beliefs and act on clearly mistaken inferences 
(Christman, 1991: 15). 
In terms of the authenticity requirement, Christman (2001: 203) explains that choices, desires 
and values of a person are authentic if the person has endorsed those choices upon critical 
reflection. This reflection must take place under conditions of “normal self-awareness,” i.e. 
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when self-awareness is not compromised by debilitating or distorting factors such as drugs, 
torture and intimidation. However, upon reflection, how does one know whether a certain 
decision is truly one’s own? If the individual is constituted prior to his/her social ties, what is 
the foundation of the endorsement, where is this foundation located and how was it formed? 
In order to answer these questions, Harry Frankfurt (1988: 12) proposes a hierarchical model 
to determine whether a decision is authentic. A “first-order desire” must be sanctioned by a 
“second-order volition,” which endorses “the first-order desire” (Dryden, 2010; Frankfurt, 
1988: 12-25). A first-order desire is a desire to do or not do something, while a second-order 
desire is a desire whether or not to act on the first order desire. For example, a person’s 
decision would not be authentic if he/she eats a piece of cake in contravention of his/her 
desire to lose weight, which prohibits him/her to eat that piece of cake. The desire to eat the 
cake would be a first-order desire and the desire to lose weight would be a second-order 
desire. According to Frankfurt (1988: 12), most animals are considered to have first-order 
desires. Only humans have second-order desires. 
The hierarchical account poses a number of problems, however. The most significant 
challenges to the hierarchical account are the problems of “regress” (also known as 
“incompleteness”) and ab initio. Both of these problems relate to the ultimate source of 
authenticity in the hierarchy of desires. If the first-order desires rely on second-order desires, 
what do the second-order and subsequent order desires rely on? We here face the problem of 
an infinite regress, which leaves us unable to locate the proper ground of authenticity (see 
Dryden, 2010). In order to evaluate whether a decision is authentic or not, we would be 
asking whether a desire to desire to desire to desire is authentic, uncertain whether we have 
stopped the chain of inquiry prematurely. Frankfurt (1982: 91) acknowledges this problem by 
conceding that “there is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and 
higher orders.”  However, he suggests that this seemingly infinite regression of endorsement 
can be validly terminated if a person identifies with or endorses one of his/her first-order 
desires “decisively”, in such a way that “this commitment ‘resounds’ throughout the 
potentially endless array of higher orders.” Needless to say, this answer is not satisfactory. 
The termination is arbitrary if no reason for this “decisive commitment” can be given 
(Ekstrom, 1992: 602). 
Perhaps one could avoid the infinite regress by simply arguing that second-order approval is 
sufficient for authenticity (Christman, 1991: 7). Therefore, no higher-order approval beyond 
the second-order is needed. This explanation is also problematic, however, for then a person’s 
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actions could be considered authentic even if his/her higher-order desires were not authentic. 
This problem is called the ab initio problem, which states that authenticity has no foundation 
if the search for its source is arbitrarily terminated (ibid.). Authenticity must be underpinned 
by something, precisely because one’s second-order desires could have been induced by 
manipulation. A person may believe that he/she has a desire to lose weight and therefore 
he/she should not be eating the piece of cake, but actually this desire to lose weight has been 
induced by weight standards propagated by lifestyle magazines or friends making fun of the 
person’s weight. In truth, the person likes the extra flesh around his/her belly and may not 
even mind gaining a few extra layers! Acting upon the influences of media companies and 
friends without endorsing these influences at a higher level of desire are surely not in line 
with the person’s “true” desire and should therefore be considered as inauthentic behaviour. 
Christman (ibid. 7) affirms, “[A] desire cannot be autonomous if it was evaluated by a desire 
that was not itself autonomous.” Therefore, as long as we are unable to identify a source of 
authenticity other than a desire that is higher up in the hierarchy of desires, the hierarchical 
account of authenticity must be considered as incomplete. The absence of an ultimate source 
conferring authenticity upon desires has dubbed the problem of regress as the problem of 
incompleteness. 
In order to solve the problem of regress, some theorists, including Christman, suggest that 
one cannot only look at the second-order volition behind an act at a specific point of time to 
determine whether it was committed autonomously or not. One must look at how the desire 
for that act developed over time and therefore one has to add a historical condition to the 
theory. Christman (ibid. 1991: 10-12) and Joseph Raz (1986: 371) go so far as to argue that 
the condition of identification with a first-order desire in order for a higher-order desire to be 
authentic can be completely eliminated if one focuses on the processes involved in the 
formation of a desire. According to Christman (ibid. 11) the formation of a desire, and 
therefore by default the desire itself, can be considered to be authentic if the person was 
aware of the development of this desire and the reasons for its development, the person did 
not resist or would not have resisted the development of the desire (upon being aware of the 
development and its reasons), and this self-awareness and lack of resistance occurred in a 
manner that was rational and free from influences that would have inhibited this self-
awareness. This model of authenticity is therefore focused on the participation of the 
individual in the desire-formation process instead of the particular point in time when the 
individual acts upon his/her desire (ibid. 10). This allows a person to confirm the autonomy 
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of his/her actions retrospectively or hypothetically. Furthermore, there is a mere negative 
duty on the individual. His/her action can be deemed authentic if he/she did not feel alienated 
by the desire upon reflecting on the process of its formation and did not resist this formation 
as a consequence (ibid. 11). 
In Christman’s view, this model avoids the problem of regress, because it is not the 
identification with – or approval of – a desire that is important, but the way or manner by 
which the desire was developed (ibid. 18-19, 21). There is no threat of regress because there 
is no need to search for where the desire has come from. True, one might not have had 
control over the ultimate source of one’s desire, but the nature of the source is irrelevant. 
Instead, authenticity is determined whether one decides to continue to act in accordance with 
the desire upon reflection. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the replacement of active identification with non-
resistance solves the problem of regress. As Quante (2012: 11) points out, there is no real 
structural difference between identification with a desire or process and alienation from – or 
resistance to – a desire or process. Both actions require critical reflection against some value 
framework. Similarly, whether one reflects about a desire at a particular point in time or 
about the formation of a desire over a period of time, the volition behind the feeling of 
alienation or action of resistance must still stem from somewhere. 
The coherentist account of authenticity provides an alternative solution to the problem of 
identifying the ultimate source of authenticity. As a prelude to the explanation of the 
coherentist account, it is important to emphasise that we do not only have higher order desires 
about first-order desires, but also higher order desires about other higher order desires 
(Ekstrom, 1992: 605). For example, I decide to participate in the neighbourhood watch (first-
order desire) because I want to be a good citizen (second-order desire). However, being a 
good citizen may not be true to myself and thus gratifying if I did not have another desire to 
have the desire to be a good citizen. It is at this point where a coherentist theorist would argue 
that one’s “character” kicks in. 
Laura Ekstrom (1992: 608), a proponent of the coherentist theory, suggests that a way to 
address the problem of infinite regress is to acknowledge that some higher order desires can 
be distinguished from others in that they form part of a person’s character. A person’s 
character is a subset of all the desires that a person “retains in her attempt to believe what is 
true and to desire what is good” (ibid.). A person’s “true or more essential self” is therefore 
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the subset of desires that cohere together. “Cohering elements fit together; they hold together 
firmly, displaying consistency and mutual support” (ibid.). Ekstrom (1992: 608-609) argues 
that there are three reasons why cohering desires can be considered to form a person’s true 
and essential self. They are desires that a person is (1) comfortable owning, (2) resilient to 
change and (3) long-lasting. Being part of a network of congruent desires provides a natural 
pull or gravitation between these desires, making them resilient to change and therefore long-
lasting. Given that these desires fit with each other, one does not feel conflicted when one 
acts upon them. In other words, one is comfortable owning them. 
To illustrate: Shaun is approached by a friend that presents a plan to rob a store and implores 
Shaun to help in the execution of the plan. If Shaun’s character consists of beliefs, desires and 
preferences that are reconcilable with committing theft then he will be comfortable in helping 
his friend with little internal struggle. However, if his character is also comprised of beliefs, 
attitudes, desires and the like that do not fit with robbing the store – e.g. he believes that 
stealing is inherently wrong, he loves the area in which the store is located, he wants to 
contribute to the sustainable development of that area, he has a good relationship with the 
storekeeper and wants to retain it, he knows that the store is a buyer of the fresh produce 
distribution company that employs him and therefore does not want to endanger his job, etc. 
– he will have a severe internal conflict and be profoundly uncomfortable with helping his 
friend. 
The coherentist account may also provide us with a more “realistic” understanding of how a 
person makes decisions. An autonomous individual need not be someone who is constantly 
caught-up in deep, rigorous self-reflection whenever he/she has to make a decision. Instead, if 
a given decision fits in the established character of a person, little or even no reflection is 
required. Ekstrom (1992: 609) writes, “[The reflection] process need not be conscious; [the 
person’s] evaluations may be incorporated into patterns for governing his conduct that have 
been automatic.” If being truthful is engrained into my character, I do not need to be engulfed 
by an identity crisis each time that I am faced with the choice of either telling the truth or 
telling a lie. It is possible, however, that certain situations might cause a conflict between 
desires that are part of one’s character. For example, if truthfulness and love for a particular 
person are both part of one’s character, some reflection may be needed if one is placed in a 
situation where one needs to lie in order to protect the person one loves. In such a case there 
might be a few considerations that one will have to seriously reflect upon before making a 
decision. 
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It is important to note that one’s character can change over time (Ekstrom, 1992: 607) and 
may even be considered to be in a process of constant development. Inevitably, the desires 
that have been the longest engrained in one’s character and are the most connected to other 
desires will be more resilient to change than desires that are nascent and/or less connected to 
the other desires of one’s character. If one has been a Buddhist for a significant proportion of 
one’s life and one’s belief in Buddhism has formed the foundation of many of one’s other 
desires, it will be highly improbable for a person to stop being a Buddhist. If one does 
eventually reach a point at which one gives up one’s belief in Buddhism, perhaps because of 
certain other desires that are even more tightly connected to one’s character, then it will most 
likely be a traumatising experience. It will feel like a “rug has been pulled out underneath 
one’s feet”, and it might take an extensive period of time for one to revaluate, discard and/or 
reconnect a great proportion of one’s character that was formerly easily justified by one’s 
belief in Buddhism. 
Coherentist theory is a promising augmentation of the liberal concept of autonomy. If one’s 
intellectual faculties and ability to self-reflect are unencumbered and one applies them to a 
decision-making situation, one should be able to reach those decisions that are in one’s best 
interest. Applying one’s intellect repeatedly over the course of one’s life, one will inevitably 
establish and archive proven patterns of decision-making behaviour that will guide (or even 
automate) future decisions without the necessity of continued, vigorous intellectual self-
reflection. This archive of patterns is one’s character. The question still remains, however, 
what was the reason for picking the first building blocks of one’s character and what 
determines the rules by which one’s character coheres? Perhaps, when a basic character is 
already in place, one may be able to convincingly provide grounds for one’s decisions by 
citing one’s character. But how do we judge whether the initial phase of selection of desires 
was “authentic”? Without a comprehensive and convincing account for the foundation of 
authenticity, the liberal conception of personhood cannot guide us in finding a basis for 
citizen solidarity. If we do not know how people’s actions are ultimately authentic, it is 
impossible to understand the challenges facing citizen solidarity and how citizenship needs to 
be reconceptualised in order to address these challenges. For example, we would not be able 
to understand the root reasons for why and why not certain social groups succeed in 
identifying with a national identity. Consequently, we would not know whether or not we can 
justifiably expect citizens to fully embrace a national identity. The same uncertainty would 
shadow questions concerning the nature and distribution of citizen rights and obligations. On 
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the other hand, if the foundation of an individual’s authenticity is not completely pre-social, it 
could have significant consequences for how citizen solidarity can be achieved. In the next 
section, I explore the arguments for the social embeddedness of the individual. 
2. The communitarian perspective 
2.1. The individual is socially embedded 
If the liberal, individualist concept of personhood is a product of the Enlightenment Era in the 
eighteenth century, the communitarian concept of the person finds its origin in the Romantic 
Era of the nineteenth century. There are ideas of the Romantic Era from which 
communitarian thinkers have distanced themselves, but they still share a central commitment 
to the valuing of traditions and belongingness, strongly reacting to the individualism lionised 
during the Enlightenment (Larmore, 1996: 129-130). However, the adherents of Romanticism 
did not reject individualism as such, nor did they assume that tradition and belonging were 
necessarily superior values to that of autonomy and individuality (ibid.). They simply took 
issue with the supreme value ascribed to individualism above any other consideration, and 
contended that this prioritisation of individualism could in fact destroy the basis of morality, 
which, so they argued, were grounded in traditions and not in a universally shared rationality. 
Most of us learned to keep our promises and refrain from harming others not because of 
calculated, rational decision making, but because of the customs and traditions in which we 
were raised (ibid.). The Hegelian idea that a person is “historically conditioned” in this way is 
foundational to Romantic and therefore to communitarian thinking (Gutmann, 1985: 308). 
Communitarians also found inspiration in Aristotle’s belief that the members of a community 
should share a common understanding of the goods that should govern both the community 
as a whole and that of its individual members (ibid.). In fact, it is impossible for individual 
members to pursue any form of “substantial” goods, like culture, individually, because 
substantial goods are not private property in the sense that it can be owned by one person 
(MacIntyre, 1981: 229). Substantial goods can only be defined, maintained and pursued by a 
community as a whole. For example, a crucial part of the value of a cultural tradition, like 
dancing in a century-old sequence and wearing clothes of a bygone era, depends on other 
people also endorsing, partaking and/or recognising the tradition. 
It should be clear, therefore, that communitarians are particularly critical of the individualist 
fixation on the source of authenticity (discussed in the previous section), which must be 
original and independent of social influences and interaction. It has become popular in many 
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liberal societies to assume that people can distance themselves from and become independent 
of their social particularity and that a person should follow his/her “own path” according to 
principles and values that he/she has endorsed upon critical reflection (Appiah, 2005: 38). 
Communitarians argue that these assumptions, and the liberal advocates who promote them, 
are removed from reality and undervalue the important, if not decisive, role that social 
interaction and attachments play in the lives of people (Kukathas, 1992: 106). Therefore, 
from a communitarian perspective, the ideas of a “disengaged rationality”, “will before 
obligation” and an “original true self”, advocated by many liberal thinkers and bolstered by 
our contemporary media are highly dubious (Bell, 1993: 32). Contrary to the liberal ideal, 
personhood is formed from one’s earliest age by society. One’s identity or character is 
formed by the rules of behaviour, symbols and narratives taught to us by our parents, family 
members, peers, neighbours, teachers, religious leaders and all the social actors that serve as 
mediators between society and us. Personhood is therefore not a pre-social entity. The source 
of authenticity cannot be found in some mysterious inner depth of ourselves that transcends 
what we were taught. Instead, our personhood is a product of our social environment 
(Appiah, 2005: 20). 
In this vein, Charles Taylor (1991: 33) argues that identity formation is not monological, but 
dialogical: it is a conversation that we have with others. In fact, it is not only the content of 
our identity but also the structure of the content that we acquire from others. We learn the 
ways meaning is connected and communicated through words and other mediums, like art, 
gestures, and touch, from others (ibid.). More: one’s ability to think and the possibility of 
thoughts that one can have develops and expands with the step-by-step acquisition of 
language. Thoughts cannot be imagined without language, for then they would be “nonsense” 
(cf. Foster, 2015). Therefore, our personhood is, at its very bottom foundation, socially 
constructed. 
Some liberal theorists, including the coherentists discussed in the previous section, may 
acknowledge that as children and adolescents we learn most of our concepts and values from 
society. However, once we have developed the necessary thinking abilities and basic 
character, we become free from these social bonds and define meaning by ourselves (Taylor, 
1991: 34). This argument, however, underestimates the scope and dynamic nature of our 
dependence on our social environment. Many, if not most, goods can only be enjoyed with 
others, or at least, they can only generate a greater joy and satisfaction in us if they are 
experienced with others (ibid.). Moreover, the maintenance of our identity depends on its 
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continued recognition by others. A self exists only within a network of people that 
participates in this dialogue or identity formation/reaffirmation, which Taylor (1989: 36) calls 
“webs of interlocution.” Taylor (1991: 35)1 explains, 
I am a self only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those 
conversation partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another 
in relation to those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-
understanding – and, of course, these classes may overlap. [Therefore] the making 
and sustaining of our identity [...] remains dialogical throughout our lives. 
However, the liberal notion of individual autonomy does not necessarily discount the 
influence and value of an individual’s social environment and attachments. Liberal thinkers 
do not necessarily believe that the self is created “ex-nihilo” or before or independent of a 
social context and that humans can be happy without interaction with others (Bell, 2016). 
Appiah (2005: 18) notes that Mill purposefully uses a tree as a metaphor when illustrating an 
individual, to make the constraints of self-creation apparent. Mill (1956: 71) writes, “Human 
nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for 
it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency 
of the inward forces which make it a living thing.” Appiah (2005: 18) explain this metaphor, 
suggesting that a tree cannot simply remake itself as something completely different, like a 
“legume, a vine, or a cow.” It may create new branches and leaves in new directions and 
become taller or bigger, but it remains a tree, which is also rooted in a certain location, 
subject to the climate, topography and weather of the area. Likewise, a person’s identity must 
“make sense.” It must be relevant to the context and functional in the environment in which it 
is crafted. Taylor (1991: 40) affirms, “I can define my identity only against the background of 
things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, 
everything but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters.”  
                                               
1 Although I largely rely on Western scholars for the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that this view is 
also strongly advocated by proponents of so-called “African philosophy”. In African philosophy personal 
identity is defined as “being-with-others” and is deeply dependent on community (cf. Molefe, 2017: 6-7; Louw, 
2004; Metz, 2007: 323). If significant segments of the demographics of African states do not only experience 
but celebrate their identities as such, citizenship that presupposes an atomist conception of personhood will fail 
spectacularly as a mechanism for solidarity. 
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Nevertheless, liberals may contend that one still has a will, independent of these 
circumstances and materials, which  binds one's character into a coherent whole. As Mill 
(1988: 584) points out, even though a person’s character is formed by his/her circumstances, 
his/her will is one of those circumstances and one of the most influential. However, 
communitarians argue that liberals may still be overestimating the degree to which 
individuals exercise independent choice in their lives. David Bell (2016) writes that the idea 
of the individual who has a decisive choice in his/her identity sketches an inaccurate picture 
of a person who “impinges his will on the world.” In fact, a great deal, if not the largest 
proportion, of what we do each day is not original or critically endorsed at all. Bell (1993: 32) 
argues that the rules and social practices that we learn from others control most of our 
actions, most of the time, without us noticing. Bell (ibid.) defines “social practices” as 
“everyday coping skills into which we’ve been socialised and which tell us what should be 
done in a given situation.” Social practices include the way we eat, dress, communicate to 
each other in different situations and settings and basically anything we do in spaces which 
we share and in which we interact with other people. Contrary to the impression created by 
proponents of individual autonomy, unreflectively following these social practices is our 
“normal mode of existence.” We spent very little time in the “deliberate, effortful choosing 
subject mode” (ibid. 32-33). 
In fact, we seem to actively buy into this unreflective mode of existence, for we are complicit 
in reaffirming existing social practices. Although social norms are frequently violated, there’s 
a tendency to conform to these norms and to encourage others to conform to these norms as 
well. As an example, one can point to how we are all engaged in the subtle task of ensuring 
conformity to the rules of language (Bell, 1993: 35). Bad spelling, grammar and 
pronunciation are frowned upon and people often take great effort in pointing out one’s 
linguistic mistakes. Consequently, the majority of people try to strive towards perfecting their 
mastery of the standard rules of language. 
We only really exercise critical reflection when our social practices are insufficient to deal 
with a certain situation or when we become aware of a conflict/contradiction in our social 
practices or between our social practices and our biological predispositions (Bell, 1993: 33). 
We tend to notice these instances and not our day-to-day conformism to social practices, 
because these instances force us to become self-aware (ibid.). This accentuated awareness of 
our individuality may be the reason we believe this mode of living is or should be 
predominant. 
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2.2. Even our strongly evaluated goods are socially determined 
Some liberal thinkers, like Gerald Doppelt, recognises that a great portion of our lives may be 
determined by unchosen social practices and that the times we critically evaluate decisions 
are exceptions rather than the rule. However, Doppelt (1989: 282) argues that the main 
argument for the individualistic conception of autonomy is not necessarily concerned with 
trivial day-to-day social practices. Instead, the exercise of individual autonomy matters only 
when it comes to normative or so-called “strongly evaluated goods.” Bell (1993: 38; 2016) 
defines “strongly evaluated goods” as those goods that “we should feel committed to, those 
that generate moral obligations on us,” such as whether a certain action is right or wrong. 
These goods include religious convictions, personal values and our life aspirations. It 
includes the goods that are the closest to the core of our characters. 
Communitarians insist, however, that even these goods are not untainted by the influences of 
society and remain sceptical of the liberal idea of normative self-determination. The society 
and tradition in which we are embedded do more than impart trivial day-to-day norms like 
table manners. Society provides strongly evaluated goods as well. None of our ideas 
concerning our life plans and values are original and independently created. On the contrary, 
society provides an “orientation in moral space” and sets “the authoritative moral horizons” 
in which we decide what is right and wrong and what is worth doing or achieving (Bell 1993: 
36-37). Communication between individuals about strongly evaluated goods would be 
impossible if these goods did not have a common source located outside of the individuals’ 
selves. Taylor (1991: 32) compares the moral frameworks in which people operate to the 
laws of the natural sciences: “A person who accepted no moral demands would be as 
impossible to argue with about right and wrong as would be a person who refused to accept 
the world of perception around us be impossible to argue with about empirical matters.” 
However, given that the social environments in which we grow up and the social agents with 
whom we engage differ from each other, this orientation is not necessarily universally shared. 
Therefore, in direct contrast to Kant’s moral universalism, communitarians contend that our 
moral orientations are contingent to a particular time and place and may not be easily 
justified to people who grew up and lived in different times or places (Bell, 1993:38). 
The important point is that there is no “an unencumbered self” who can distance itself from 
“self-constituting commitments” and reflectively choose which commitments to drop and 
which to maintain. Society does not merely influence but also constitute one’s identity and 
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attachments. The means by which one exercises revision is itself provided by that which one 
wants to revise. 
2.3. What about the desirability or possibility of choice? 
However, the possibility that both our trivial and strongly evaluated goods and moral outlook 
are socially conditioned does not yet eliminate the idea of individuality. Society might 
provide all the necessary materials, guidelines and best practices for our self-creation. Society 
might even assist us in our self-creation. Nevertheless, there is still room for individual 
choice within these sets of possibilities and parameters. Therefore, even if we are limited to a 
certain array of possibilities, the best life is one where we choose by ourselves from these 
options. Will Kymlicka (1989: 164) endorses this position and describes this array of 
possibilities as a “context of choice”, clearly implying that we have an active role in choosing 
from this array given to us. Therefore, authenticity or individuality does not require 
originality. One’s individuality does not necessarily need to contribute to diversity. One could 
choose a plan of life that is similar to another’s. The only requirement is that the choice is 
one’s own (Appiah, 2005: 6). I could decide to follow in my father’s footsteps and become a 
pastor. Even though my decision is not awfully original, the fact that it is my decision makes 
it autonomous. 
Communitarians dispute, however, whether choice is intrinsically valuable. The liberal 
insistence on the importance of choice seems to imply that if an action or belief was not 
reflectively endorsed, it must have been coerced somehow upon the person. However, on the 
communitarian view, this assumption is false. One could implicitly or even automatically let 
one’s obligations or life be guided by social commitments without being coerced to do so. 
Bell (1993: 39) illustrates this point as follows: “[I]f I ‘implicitly’ commit myself to the good 
of my family, ‘automatically’ let myself be guided by the obligations which arise from that 
commitment, such as caring for my ill mother, can I really be condemned on the grounds that 
I never paused to reflectively endorse that commitment?” Moreover, the idea that unchosen 
goods somehow have less value in our lives than those that were chosen seems to be at odds 
with the actual understanding of ourselves (ibid. 2016). Many of our identities, such as being 
born and raised in a certain town, being a citizen of a certain country, a native speaker of a 
certain language and a member of a certain family, may have profound value to us regardless 
of the fact that these identities were unchosen (ibid. 2016; Sandel, 1982: 179). 
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In fact, Bell (1993: 41) argues that it is “the height of arrogance” to suggest that a life which 
is critically unexamined is necessary inferior to a life in which critical examination has been 
exercised. Most of us have family members or know people who do not question their faiths 
or moral convictions but have a deep compassion for people and engage regularly in 
philanthropic and altruistic deeds. It is doubtful that these lives deserve less respect or should 
be considered to be less worthy than people who have “exercised their normative powers of 
self-determination” (ibid.). Bell (2016) provides us with another illustration, suggesting that it 
is completely counter-intuitive that “someone who performs a good deed following 
prolonged calculation of pros and cons is morally superior than a Mother-Teresa type who 
unreflectively, spontaneously acts on behalf of other people’s interests.” 
Some liberals suggest that it is the possibility instead of the desirability of choice which is the 
real issue. One does not need to critically endorse any of one’s social ties, beliefs and 
customs. But one has the ability to review these social goods and should be able to do so if 
one wishes. Kymlicka (1989: 50) writes that there is no social practice beyond our 
“individual judgement and possible rejection”, while Christman (2001: 186) explains that 
even if we accept all the communitarian arguments made above, we still have good reason to 
protect and promote the individual’s ability to reject a social practice if he/she wishes to do 
so. 
Communitarians argue, however, that we do not necessarily have this ability and even in the 
cases where we do have this ability, reviewing and altering a certain aspect of one’s character 
could come at a great psychological cost to the person (ibid. 2001: 195-196; Bell, 2016). 
These aspects include items such as long-standing emotional ties, deep affective connections 
and cultural, ethnic and racial identification (Christman, 2001: 190-193).  
Ronald Dworkin (2000: 220), who is a proponent of the liberal viewpoint, concedes that it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, and surely devastating to the person, if he/she has to 
distance him/herself from all his/her attachments and critically review them. However, one 
should surely be able to review a certain belief or attachment “while holding others in place” 
(ibid.). For example, it would be unreasonable to expect that a man who has been a profound 
follower of a faith his entire life would suddenly be able to question whether his faith as a 
whole is important to him. But he should surely be able to question certain aspects of his 
devotion one tenet at a time (ibid.). Christman (2001: 202) affirms this position, suggesting 
that deep attachments can be reviewed in a “piecemeal manner.” 
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However, communitarians argue that even under piecemeal review, there are attachments that 
cannot be set aside. Bell (2016) argues that a psychoanalyst would point out that at least in 
some cases it would be impossible to discard the deep connection to one’s mother and that 
such an attempt would have negative consequences. 
Before we conclude this section, it is important to note that communitarians like Bell do not 
deny the importance of respecting the dignity of a person. In fact, it is because a person’s 
dignity is so dependent on his/her social attachments that communitarians take issue with an 
individualist conception, which could undermine the social basis of a person’s dignity. 
If we search for the basis of citizen solidarity that assumes only an individualist concept of 
personhood, we are bound to fail. We will struggle to understand the challenges facing the 
use of a substantive national identity or the distribution of equal rights as mechanisms to 
establish citizen solidarity. If people are largely constituted by their social environments, it 
may be unreasonable to expect them to simply adopt a new identity or to expect that all issues 
related to people’s differences will disappear if only everyone share the same rights. It is 
therefore paramount that we need a conception of the person that allow us to fully appreciate 
the possible implications of the citizen’s social embeddedness. 
3. The need for a political conception of the person 
The elusive source of individual authenticity suggests that the individualist account of 
personhood is in no small part controversial. Furthermore, communitarians offer a number of 
convincing arguments that a person might not only be influenced by his/her social 
attachments but might also be constituted by these attachment to a significant degree. We 
therefore cannot assume that a person can maintain a distance from his/her commitments to 
any kind of goods, nor can one assume that a person is in some sense morally superior if 
he/she has critically endorsed the beliefs to which he/she adheres. A good can have 
significant value to a person irrespective of it being chosen by the person, and therefore 
choice does not necessarily have value in itself. 
That said, it is clear that at least some people do exercise choice over their life-spans that 
diverge from established traditions, either adjusting existing beliefs and practices or adopting 
completely new beliefs and practices (Rawls, 2005: 30-31). If choice was not frequently 
exercised, society would not be and continue to be diverse today. It is also true that 
divergences are not necessarily inherently bad and therefore something to be resisted, for no 
doctrine or culture today had an immaculate birth and remained unchanged over the course of 
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history (we will explore the hybrid nature of culture in more detail in Chapter 3). Deeming 
divergence from tradition and existing social norms as inherently bad would undermine the 
right to existence of one’s own belief system. 
Jürgen Habermas (1991: 202; 1996a: 324) provides another understanding of individuality 
and social embeddedness, and thereby offers us a promising alternative to both the view that 
individual personhood precedes society and the view that personhood is wholly determined 
by society. He argues in this regard that one’s “lifeworld” and one’s autonomy are mutually 
interdependent. “Lifeworld” here means the totality of one’s social environment, including 
communication mediums or forms, beliefs, relationships, attachments and skills (ibid. 1996a: 
22). Habermas agrees with the communitarians that people grow up learning behaviour, 
language, deeper meanings and the entire array of goods from others. All these goods are 
maintained and reproduced collectively and communicatively, and therefore people’s 
identities are indeed interdependent (ibid. 1991: 199). As our lifeworld grows and becomes 
more sophisticated, and thereby differentiated, our roles in the lifeworld and therefore also 
our identities may become more distinct, giving rise to a sense of individuality. However, the 
more distinct our identities become, the more dependent we become on others, for the web of 
actors needed to maintain our identities becomes more entangled and complex (ibid.). It is 
also true, however, that while people are significantly influenced and constituted by their life-
worlds, they are not at the mercy of their life-worlds. For the life-worlds themselves are 
communicatively produced and maintained through reaching understanding and agreements 
that can only be achieved through people “responding with yes or no” to validity claims (ibid. 
1996: 324). We should therefore keep in mind that a lifeworld is not an independently created 
system with a purpose apart from serving its adherents. A lifeworld is essentially a “problem-
solving system” (Habermas, 1996a: 319) that people created for themselves, a suite of 
mechanisms that we have been devising (and hopefully progressively improving) over 
generations to address the wide array of our human needs, whether it may be moral, ethical or 
purely practical. The system is not complete and never will be, given the number and 
consistent multiplication of variables. The system need not only to be developed and adjusted 
to deal with new problems, but also with old ones, due to continuous changes in 
circumstances. Whenever the system proves inadequate, we need to apply our minds, for if 
we do not, we risk our survival, happiness or whatever we hold dear. We can therefore 
imagine that, while there might be many people who feel comfortable in abiding by the 
existing structures and content of their life-worlds regardless of its ability in addressing new 
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or old problems, there will also be many who may justifiably seek to change their life-worlds. 
Therefore, we cannot accept a particular belief system’s take on personhood in our 
conception of citizenship. Citizenship needs to be built on what John Rawls (2005: 15, 29) 
calls a “political conception of the person” if it is to enable a “fair system of cooperation” in a 
pluralistic society. A political conception is built on presuppositions that can be accepted by 
all the parties implicated by this conception. Given that we want to conceptualise a 
citizenship that can promote solidarity and cooperation among individuals in a diverse 
society, the political conception of the person must be able to accommodate both people who 
consider themselves deeply embedded in different social contexts and want to maintain 
existing norms and practices, and people who wish to exercise choices that may diverge from 
established traditions. 
A political conception is therefore a conception that people will be able to agree to for 
political reasons, namely in order to establish a just and functioning society in which they can 
pursue their conceptions of the good, given the diversity and complexity of the people and 
structures of society. To the extent that people are capable of being rational (i.e. capable of 
devising their own ends and the most effective way of achieving them) and reasonable (i.e. 
prepared to keep to agreements provided that others do the same), they would realise, given 
the diversity and complexity of society, that it is in their best interests to come to an 
agreement on a conception of personhood that all affected parties can accept (Müller, 2008: 
79; Rawls, 2005: 49-50). The characteristics contained within a political conception of 
personhood are therefore “functional,” their justifications do not rest on a metaphysical or 
any other basis but on their ability to bring about a certain political result (Campbell, 2014: 
160). For the purpose of this thesis, the function of the conception of personhood must enable 
citizen solidarity in a diverse society. It must enable all citizens to subject themselves to the 
authority of the state and make sacrifices for one another. As a starting point, since the 
chances are that no group within the populace would willingly accept to be morally subject to 
another group, it makes sense to incorporate the liberal principles, that all people should have 
equal dignity and that sovereignty is vested in the people, into the political conception of the 
person. It is then important that any other characteristics of this conception avoid claims to 
what is “intrinsically valuable” (ibid. 165), in other words claims that may apply to some 
people’s belief systems but not to the belief systems of others. If characteristics are specified, 
people who do not identity with them will be alienated from the conception of personhood 
underlying citizenship. At the same time, given that characteristics related to intrinsic value 
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are essential to persons, they must nevertheless be accommodated within the conception. The 
characteristics must therefore be defined specific enough to make the conception of 
personhood functional (i.e. enable people to act as citizens in solidarity with each other) but 
also general enough to not prejudice certain segments of the population (ibid.). Catherine 
Campbell (ibid. 168) suggests this balance can be accomplished by defining characteristics as 
“determinable properties”. A determinable property needs a “determinate property” in order 
to be instantiated but is not limited to one specific determinate property. It could have two or 
more determinate properties. For example, if the determinable property is “education” there 
are a number of possible determinate properties that can instantiate “education”, including 
“primary”, “secondary” and “tertiary education”. Likewise, if the determinable property is 
“gender” it can be instantiated by “male” or “female”. The political conception of the person 
therefore does not need to describe a person comprehensively in detail but only capture the 
characteristics that are necessary for a person to act and collaborate as a citizen. 
Rawls (2005: 29) lists characteristics that provide us with a political conception of 
personhood that can serve as a basis for our conception of citizenship. He suggests that the 
political conception of the person must assume that a citizen is “free” in three aspects. Firstly, 
citizens have the ability, or “moral power,” to have and change their conceptions of the good 
(ibid. 30). One’s conception of the good includes the ideas by which one structure and 
appraise beliefs, desires and actions. People do not need to change their conception of the 
good, but if they do, such a change does not affect their status as citizens. Rawls uses the 
example of Saul who became Paul the Apostle on the road to Damascus when he converted to 
the teachings of Jesus Christ (ibid. 31). Such a change, while having a profound impact on 
the self-conception of the person concerned, does not take away any of their dignity or affect 
any of their entitlements or obligations as citizens. Secondly, citizens are “self-authenticating 
sources of valid claims” (ibid. 32). Since all people have equal dignity, every person must be 
considered to act, voice opinions and make claims autonomously, without needing the 
permission or ratification of another person for those claims to be treated with due respect. If 
individuals are not respected as self-authenticating sources of claims, persons may become 
unduly subjugated and oppressed and the society will not be a system of fair cooperation. 
Thirdly, citizens are responsible for the pursuit of their life-projects (ibid. 33-34). They can 
tacitly or expressly enter into agreements with others to pursue their ends collectively, but 
ultimately, they have to take responsibility for pursuing their goals and the decisions they 
take in line of these pursuits. Therefore, the claims made by citizens to society must be 
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reasonable in the light of what each citizen can and would be willing to contribute while 
bearing the responsibility for his/her own life (ibid. 34). 
A citizen is therefore considered to have two types of identities, namely a political or public 
and a non-political or private identity (ibid. 31). A person’s non-political identity may be 
deeply embedded in social traditions and demonstrate little individual choice or be a hallmark 
of Kantian or Millian individualism and be rife with critical reflection and unconventional 
decisions. However, in order to ensure that all are treated fairly in society, in the eyes of the 
public when matters of justice are to be determined, a person is understood to have moral 
power, be a self-authenticating source of claims and be responsible for pursuing his/her own 
aims. The liberal conception of personhood, as redefined by Rawls above, is therefore 
expected from the public and not the private identity of the person. 
A political conception of personhood defined by the characteristics above is superior to both 
the comprehensive liberal or communitarian perspectives, for it allows proponents of both 
viewpoints to collaborate and structure the rules and policies of their shared public spaces 
while at the same practicing the type of personhood with which they identity the most. In 
other words, the personhood that assumed to underlie citizenship does not prioritise choice 
over tradition or vice versa, but contains those characteristics functionally necessary for 
people of diverse beliefs to live in harmony with each other while at the same time respecting 
their life preferences. 
Since citizens as a whole only share their public identities, the question is therefore how 
should a citizen’s public identity be constituted in order to be an effective source of 
solidarity. Besides the freedoms ascribed by Rawls, what other content or structures are 
needed to ensure that citizens experience solidarity and how should the relationship between 
an individual’s public and private identities be mediated and where should the boundary 
between these identities be drawn. These are the questions that we will be answering in our 
quest for the basis of citizen solidarity in the subsequent chapters. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the origin and rationale of the liberal individualistic conception of 
the person, the communitarian critique of this conception and the alternative of a political 
conception of personhood. It is my contention that, at least in some liberal democracies, the 
comprehensive liberal conception of personhood has been extended to both our public and 
private identities, and that this might be one of the reasons why these societies fail to nurture 
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solidarity among a diverse populace of citizens. As communitarian thinkers have 
convincingly illustrated, a person may not only be influenced by his/her social attachments 
but – to a significant degree – also constituted by it. One can therefore not assume that a 
person can maintain a distance from his/her commitment to substantial goods nor can one 
assume that a person is in some sense morally superior if he/she has critically endorsed the 
beliefs to which he/she adheres. A good can have significant value to a person irrespective of 
it being chosen by the person. Therefore, it would be wise to follow the lead of Rawls and 
others, who suggest that, instead of accepting liberalism as a comprehensive account of our 
personhood, one that explains our human nature, we need to use liberalism as a political tool 
(Larmore, 1996: 13) that provides us a useful political conception of the person that can serve 
as a starting point in our quest in crafting a polity in which all citizens, regardless of 
background, can experience solidarity. Such a conception assumes that most people are 
reasonable in that they realise they need to cooperate in order to secure common goods that 
will enable them to pursue their own ideas of the good. Consequently, each person, in his/her 
capacity as citizen, is conceptualised to have the ability to freely choose an idea of the good 
he/she wishes to pursue, be a self-authenticating source of claims and be responsible for 
pursuing his/her own aims. This view of the underlying personhood of citizen creates the best 
possibility for a stable and cooperative co-existence between diverse people in today’s world. 
Given this understanding of personhood, let us now take a closer look at the basis for 
solidarity between such a diverse body of citizens.  
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Chapter 2: National identity as basis for solidarity? 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have established that we cannot assume that a comprehensive 
liberal personhood underlies citizenship. Instead, we need a political conception of 
personhood that has the function of enabling a just and harmonious society among people 
who may have different beliefs about personhood. That means, the conception of personhood 
must accommodate people who value individual choice as well as people who value their 
social embeddedness while at the same enabling peaceful political collaboration between 
these people. Therefore, citizenship must allow people to maintain their own personal beliefs, 
or personal identities, while at the same time embrace a public identity with the necessary 
characteristics to collaborate on terms of mutual respect and fairness. Given these 
preconditions, we must now determine whether we can attach a substantive national identity 
to this public identity in order to encourage stronger solidarity among citizens. 
Historically, one of the most powerful ways for solidarity to be created is through a shared 
“national” identity among citizens. Margaret Canovan (1996: 3) writes that “the most 
significant feature of nationhood is its role in generating collective power, its capacity to 
create an ‘us’ that can be mobilized and represented, and for which a surprising number of 
people are prepared to make sacrifices.” Nationalists are sceptical as to whether it is possible 
at all to expect citizens to make sacrifices for each other in the absence of a common national 
identity. It is therefore no surprise that in the history of the modern state, the identity 
dimension of citizenship has played a decisive role in establishing solidarity among citizens. 
However, post-nationalists argue that a common national identity is not feasible under the 
conditions of heterogeneity today, unless we are willing to repeat the authoritarianism and 
violation of dignity committed by states in the past to create and maintain these identities. 
Instead, according to this view, a common identity should be built on the political culture of 
the state which is based on more abstract and universal constitutional principles that can 
transcend cultural difference (Leydet, 2014). The identity dimension of citizenship needs to 
be based on common principles rather than a common background culture, if it is to serve as 
a basis of solidarity. 
The broad outlines of the debate concerning national identity as a basis of solidarity therefore 
concern the disagreement between nationalists arguing for a common substantive identity, 
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basing their justification on the motivational powers of ethical particularism superimposed on 
existing cultural bonds, and post-nationalists arguing for a solidarity generated by a political 
culture constituted by universal principles, basing their arguments on the realities of diversity 
and increasing global interconnectedness. I begin the analysis of this debate by looking at the 
definition of a nation and its conceptual relations to the state and ethnicity. I then focus on the 
ethical argument for a substantive national identity, as developed by David Miller. I will, 
however, demonstrate that nationalism comes at an unreasonable cost to individual citizens 
due to its authoritarian roots and a contemporary example of its continued authoritarian 
character. I will argue that there is a tension between nationalism and the political conception 
of personhood which seems to disqualify national identity as a basis of solidarity. Against 
this background, I then turn to constitutional patriotism, as promoted by Jürgen Habermas, 
and “liberal” nationalism, as promoted by Miller, as candidates for solidarity. The chapter 
concludes that neither candidates is a practical and justifiable basis for citizen solidarity in 
plural societies, in so far as the end-focus of constitutional patriotism remains on the political 
culture of the state. 
1. The definition of the nation 
1.1. Nation, state and ethnicity 
Miller (1995: 19) defines a nation as “a community of people with an aspiration to be 
politically self-determining.” The term “nation” should not be confused with or used as a 
synonym for the term “state”. A state refers to the set of political institutions that a nation 
occupies or may aspire to occupy for themselves (ibid.). Political institutions could include a 
legislature, an executive and processes for determining who makes up these bodies. 
Furthermore, the state is an entity that successfully claims and maintains legitimate power or 
sovereignty over a particular, geographic territory (Miller, 1995: 19; Weber, 1946: 78). States 
are therefore geographically bounded and demarcated. In addition, the state’s sovereignty can 
be understood to extend to both a spatial and a social level: the state is sovereign over a 
“clearly delimited terrain” and over a citizenry that belongs to the state. A state can only 
remain sovereign as long as it can successfully enforce law and order among the people 
within its territory and ensure that external actors respect its borders (Habermas 1998: 107-
108). 
On Miller’s (1995: 19) account, it is possible that a state may contain more than one nation, 
e.g. the former Soviet Union included Russians, Ukrainians, and Georgians among many 
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other nations. Alternatively, a nation may be split between more than one state, e.g. the 
Koreans in North and South Korea or the Germans in West and East Germany (before the 
Fall of the Berlin Wall). A nation can also be a minority in a single state, e.g. the Palestinians 
in Israel, or scattered across multiple states, e.g. Afrikaners in South Africa and Namibia or 
the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
Miller argues that two terms that are closer related to each other are nation and “ethnicity”. 
Both terms refer to people grouped by “common cultural characteristics and mutual 
recognition” (ibid.). An ethnic group is constituted by shared ancestry and/or cultural 
practices, like language, religions and tardyons, which differentiate it from other groups. 
Nations are typically born out of ethnic groups. The majority of ethnic groups, on the other 
hand, are not nations. Ethnic groups only become nations when they express aspirations to 
become self-determined, i.e. obtain their own state. This expression is embodied by 
“nationalism”, which has the aim of combining ethnicity or culture with a state (Gellner, 
1983: 1; Murai, 2010: 5). However, Miller (1995: 21) adds a qualification to the candidacy 
for nationhood, suggesting that the circumstances of an ethnic group must also be evaluated, 
considering the empirical likelihood that the group could become a nation. Miller’s 
qualification seems to leave room for debate in determining whether or not a particular group 
can be considered a nation. For example, some might argue that the Afrikaners constitute a 
nation, as implied earlier, while others may contest this view. There are Afrikaners who 
aspire to establish a so-called “volkstaat” (an Afrikaans term that directly translates to 
“nation-state”). Afrikaner towns in South Africa like Orania and Kleinfontein are seen as 
projects of this endeavour. On the other hand, it could be argued that the Afrikaners are not a 
nation – at least not since the abolition of Apartheid – given that the majority of Afrikaners 
consider themselves as part of the new multi-ethnic South African nation and do not pursue 
aspirations for national self-determination. Moreover, irrespective of people’s aspirations, the 
creation of an Afrikaner nation-state is impractical and unlikely. By virtue of these 
circumstances, regardless of nationalist aspirations asserted by some Afrikaners, the 
Afrikaners may not qualify as a nation. 
Miller stresses the point that nations, which were originally born out of a particular ethnic 
group, may over time come to embrace different ethnicities. Members of such a nation could 
maintain separate but compatible ethnic and national identities. Miller (ibid. 20) cites the 
“American nation” as an example, which was originally formed by so-called “Anglo-Saxons” 
(or people from Britain) but now Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Asian-Americans and 
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other similarly hyphenated groups. Given that many Afrikaners, as already mentioned, along 
with multiple other ethnic groups, e.g. the Zulus, Xhosas, Sothos, consider themselves as part 
of the South African nation, South Africa could possibly also qualify as an example of a 
multi-ethnic nation. Depending on one’s view, however, the concept of the South African 
nation may be more “problematic” or in an earlier stage of consolidation compared to the 
American nation. Furthermore, an ethnic group’s aspiration to become a nation on its own, 
separate from the multi-ethnic nation to which it belongs, depends on whether the ethnic 
group feels sufficiently accommodated and secure within the national identity and 
corresponding political institutions of the multi-ethnic nation it belongs to (Miller 1995: 21). 
It is perhaps on this point where the South African nation differs most explicitly from the 
American nation. Given the nascency of the post-Apartheid South African nation, the many 
socio-economic challenges and perpetuating ethnic or racial friction, it seems more likely that 
Afrikaner South Africans or Zulu South Africans may decide to pursue self-determination 
than Italian Americans or Irish Americans would. In fact, it is extremely unlikely that 
American ethnic groups (besides native Americans) would even consider such a project, 
while the idea of self-determination is not uncommon among some South African groups 
given their well-documented unease with the South African project (Muthien & Khosa, 1995: 
308-309). 
That said, the American nation has its fault lines. Native Americans have vocally lobbied for 
increased self-determination. African Americans, although they have not necessarily 
mobilised for self-determination (notwithstanding those who resettled in Liberia) have rallied 
against the discrimination committed against them by the political institutions of the 
American nation (Miller, 1995:20). A recent manifestation of African Americans’ discontent 
with the institutions of the American nation is the Black Lives Matter movement that has 
protested against the systematic abuse and killing of black people by the police in the United 
States of America (Barbaro & Alcindor, 2016). One could therefore draw the conclusion that 
instability is probably inherent to any national identity, although to differing degrees. 
1.2. The characteristics of a nation 
Having delineated the conceptual relations between nation, state and ethnicity, I now turn to 
the specific characteristics of national identity. Miller (1995: 22-27) argues that a nation has 
certain characteristics that distinguish it from other identities, like one’s religion or 
occupation. He identifies five characteristics that set nations apart. 
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Firstly, a nation is “a community constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment” (ibid. 
27). The existence of a nation depends therefore on the members’ recognition of each other as 
fellow nationals and the belief that they have relevant attributes in common. This 
characteristic of a nation cannot be objectively verified by, for example, looking at whether 
people have the same race, religion or language (ibid. 22). For example, the people of 
Germany and Austria speak German, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ivory 
Coast speak French and a great part of South America speaks Spanish, but none of these 
clusters consider themselves constituting single nations. There must be a subjective belief and 
recognition by others of nationhood. For example, I may consider myself as a member of the 
Japanese nation, but if other Japanese people do not see me as Japanese, then I am not part of 
the Japanese nation. Therefore, there must be a shared belief by the members of the nation 
that they belong together and should share some form of common life. Ernest Renan (1939: 
190) affirms this idea, defining a nation as “a daily plebiscite.” The identification and 
demarcation of a nation is a continuous and (mostly) tacit referendum by its members. 
Secondly, a nation is a community extended in history: “It is an identity that embodies 
historical continuity” (Miller, 1995: 23). Members of a nation identify with and 
“reappropriate” the actions committed by their fellow nationals in the past (ibid.). The most 
significant of these events are often memorialised with public holidays. In South Africa, 16 
June commemorates the Soweto uprising, when young learners protested against the 
Apartheid government’s enforcement of Afrikaans as medium of instruction in black schools. 
A number of these learners were shot and killed by police officers who attempted to stop the 
protests. One of the most iconic images of the Soweto uprising is that of 13-year-old Hector 
Pieterson who was shot by the police and desperately carried away in the arms of another 
student. This image became a powerful symbol for the new South African nation and is today 
commonly used at commemorative events on June 16. Renan (1939: 203) argues that 
tragedies often play a more important role in a nation’s history than glories because “they 
impose duties and demand common effort.” Miller (1995: 23) explains, “Because our 
forebears have toiled and spilt blood to build and defend the nation, we who are born into it 
inherit an obligation to continue their work, which we discharge partly towards our 
contemporaries and partly towards our descendants.” The Soweto uprising is used today to 
remind South Africans of the sacrifices that their forefathers made to bring about a 
democratic society in which the dignity of all people is valued, but it also “imposes a duty”, 
as Renan suggests, to continue the struggle to build a better life for South Africa’s youth and 
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be wary of continued or new faces of oppression. In this way, the nation’s history “stretches 
forward into the future too” (Miller, 1995: 23). 
Thirdly, a nation is a community that is active in character. Miller (1995: 24) writes, “Nations 
are communities that do things together, take decisions, achieve results, and so forth. Of 
course, this cannot be literally so: we rely on proxies who are seen as embodying the national 
will – statesmen, soldiers, sportsmen, etc.” For example, when a South African rugby or 
netball team plays against another nation’s team, South Africans see their team as a 
representation of themselves and take ownership of the team’s performance. We feel proud of 
our national identity when the team wins and disappointed in – or even ashamed of – 
ourselves when it loses. People usually use the pronoun “we” when referring to deeds 
committed by their nation in the past, even though they may not have personally been 
involved in the deed or even alive at the time. For example, one often hears people use 
phrases like “when we invaded that country,” “when we committed war crimes,” “when we 
defeated Apartheid” or “when we travelled to the moon,” taking ownership of those deeds 
committed by their nations with little hesitation. In fact, the link between members of a 
nation and their representatives stretches deeper. “The nation becomes what it is by the 
decisions that it takes – some of which we may now regard as thoroughly bad, a cause of 
national shame” (Miller, 1995: 24). A part of being German today is feeling shame for the 
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. For example, the words “never again” are 
embedded in German foreign policy, committing the entire German nation to not repeat the 
military expansions and genocide committed by the Nazis (German Missions in the United 
States, 2016). Similarly, the identity of white South Africans today is deeply embedded in 
their own or – in the case of millennials – their forebears’ complicity in the maintenance of 
Apartheid. When engaging in public discourse, behaviour of white people is carefully 
scrutinised for signs of racial chauvinism and many white people have become hesitant or 
uneasy to publicly criticise institutions and organisations operated by black people in fear of 
being branded as racist. The history of Apartheid has therefore contributed to defining 
acceptable decorum for white people in South Africa (Matthews, 2015: 113). 
In the fourth place, a nation is a community that is “connected to a particular territory” 
(Miller, 1995: 27). It must have a “homeland” which it desires to control as a nation (ibid. 24-
25). This is a characteristic where nation as identity differs clearly from religion or even 
ethnicity as identities. Although visiting Mecca plays an important role in Islam, it is not 
expected that one should live in and have/desire political control over Mecca in order to be a 
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Muslim. Similarly, even though certain regions may feature prominently in the folklore of 
ethnic groups, being a member of a certain ethnic group is not dependent on one living in and 
having/desiring political control over that particular territory. For example, people of Indian 
descent are spread all of the world and citizens of multiple states. Being a member of the 
Indian nation, however, connects one to the Indian subcontinent in Asia and one is expected 
to live, have lived there in the past and/or have the intention to live there in the future. It is 
also possible that some people living in the Indian community in South Africa could consider 
themselves as members of the Indian nation, feeling a strong bond to the Indian subcontinent, 
while others may consider themselves as members of the South African multi-ethnic nation 
or even members of both. It is also possible that the territory to which a nation feels 
connected may not be under the management of a state controlled by the nation. However, by 
merely being committed to the desire to control the territory qualifies the group as a nation. 
The Kurdish nation cited before serves as an example. 
Finally, a nation is a community that is “marked off from other communities by its distinct 
public culture” (ibid. 27). This public culture contains certain characteristics that the 
members of the national community share. These characteristics can vary and be inclusive. 
Therefore, as mentioned already, it is entirely possible that a nation may not require one to be 
of a specific ethnicity. In fact, most if not all nations accept members from various ethnic 
backgrounds. Examples of common characteristics of public cultures include commitment to 
the underlying philosophy on which the nation is built, e.g. liberal democracy or communism, 
and a specific language, e.g. the French language in the case of the French nation. 
In summary then, a nation is a community of people who is characterised by a shared belief, 
extended in history, active in character, connected to a territory and a distinct public culture. 
A nation is differentiated from an ethnic group in that it has an expressed intention to be self-
determined in a particular territory. Furthermore, a nation is differentiated from a state in that 
the latter is a collection of political institutions that exercise and have a monopoly of power 
(at least formally) over a demarcated, geographic territory. In order for a nation to become 
self-determined, they must control a state. A state that is controlled by a nation is understood 
as a nation-state. 
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2. The ethical foundation for (liberal) national identity: universalism versus 
particularism 
Now that I clarified the definitions and conceptual relations of nation, state and ethnicity, I 
will look at whether a national identity can serve as basis for citizen solidary in a diverse 
society. Nationalists argue that a common national identity is necessary for the citizenry of a 
state to function as an ethical community. If ethics is concerned with the principles that 
govern the obligations and entitlements that people have toward each other (cf. Miller 1995: 
50), the ethical framework of a citizen is what motivates his/her commitment to his/her 
fellow citizens qua citizens. If this ethical framework is weak, the commitment to citizen 
duties will be weak, thereby undermining solidarity among members of a state. The ethical 
framework of citizens is therefore central to the question of citizen solidarity. 
There are two opposing accounts of ethical thought that can be used to justify the 
prioritisation of one’s ethical commitments to a national community, namely ethical 
universalism and ethical particularism. The division between the two accounts is not rigid. 
One can use any of the two as a point of departure and move considerable distance to 
accommodate the concerns of the other (ibid. 49). I will start by outlining ethical 
universalism. 
Ethical universalism holds that the principles of ethics must be universal in form, and 
therefore only general facts (i.e. facts that are not contingent) can be used to determine what 
one owes to other people (ibid. 50). For example, if one believes in the principle “help the 
needy,” one is obligated to help all those in need regardless of the person’s particular identity. 
It is based on the Kantian conception of the self, discussed in Chapter 1, namely that a person 
can separate him/herself from social ties when he/she makes ethical decisions (ibid. 50). The 
fact that person A has a certain relationship with person B, e.g. person B is his/her mother, 
may not play a role in determining his/her duty to person B. 
Miller (1995: 52) names two possible avenues through which the universalist account can 
accommodate particularist or non-general concerns. The first avenue, called the “useful 
convention” approach, is based on purely practical considerations. If one believes in the 
principle that one needs to help those in need, it makes sense that one focuses on those people 
who are closest and most familiar to oneself. It may simply be easier and more efficient to 
care for those that are geographically nearest to a person. Furthermore, one might be able to 
allocate resources more accurately if one “knows” the person who is in need. By being able 
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to understand or identify with the person’s background and thinking, one may be able to 
know how to best help the person. In other words, as a point of departure, one must aspire to 
help all people in need. But because one will be more successful in helping others who are 
nearby and familiar to oneself, one may prioritise helping them before helping others.  
In the case of nationality, this approach can be used to argue that nations are useful 
conventions to fulfil our general obligations to humanity (ibid. 62). However, Miller 
questions whether one’s fellow nationals would always be the most competent persons to 
undertake the task of serving the welfare of humanity. For example, it does not necessarily 
make sense to assign the responsibility for the welfare of South Africans to other South 
Africans. Firstly, the political boundaries of South Africa are arbitrary in the sense that it has 
roped together a motley assortment of communities which do not necessarily have any prior 
relationship with one another. Secondly, South Africa may not be in a position to look after 
its own people or serve their citizens’ interests as thoroughly as wealthy nations. South 
Africans have significantly fewer resources than many other states to ensure that their fellow 
compatriots have the necessary opportunities to flourish. The useful convention approach can 
therefore not be used in all cases to justify the nation as an ethical community. 
The second avenue, called the “voluntary choice” approach, is that every person, by virtue of 
being an autonomous being, has the ability to create special relationships or contracts with 
others that establish certain rights and obligations (ibid. 52). Moreover, it is valuable for 
individuals to enter such relationships. Examples of such relationships include family 
membership, business contracts or membership of associations (ibid.). In the case of medical 
treatment, for example, one should offer medical treatment to anyone who is sick as a point 
of departure. But because one is contracted by an employer that requires that one treat those 
who can pay for the treatment, one may prioritise the treatment of people who can afford it. 
If one is to apply this approach to nationality, the nation would be considered to be an 
association, like a fraternity or a book club, that one enters into by consent. The obligations 
that one feels towards the nation are justified, because one voluntarily entered into a 
“contract” to have those obligations. In line with the communitarian critics discussed in 
Chapter 1, Miller (ibid. 59-60) however claims that this approach is problematic, because it is 
based on an unrealistic conception of the person. The feelings that one experiences towards 
one’s nation are not something that one can simply contract into or out of. Those feelings are 
inculcated into one as one grows up and/or is influenced by various social actors in a national 
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community. In most cases, therefore, it is not even a voluntary process. One cannot simply 
summon or even dismiss the emotions associated with national identity.  
Furthermore, belonging to a nation-state cannot really be considered a voluntary association 
to which one has consented. One is born with citizenship of a specific nation-state and for the 
majority of citizens, especially in low-income countries, it is difficult, if not nearly 
impossible, to emigrate. One can attempt to circumvent the problem of voluntariness by 
considering the nation as a “quasi-contractual” arrangement (ibid. 61). A nation is not 
justified in that one has consented to it, but by the fact that it is a scheme that facilitates a 
mutual exchange of benefits, from which one has already benefitted and continuous to benefit 
tremendously and to which one owes obligations as a result. But this argument does nothing 
to justify why this particular scheme is optimal and should continue to exist (ibid. 61-62). For 
example, why should the scope of the scheme not be limited or enlarged (e.g. 
devolution/transnationalism). 
Ethical particularism, on the other hand, is simply the opposite of ethical universalism. 
“Fundamental principles” can be attached to one’s relations with others because relationships 
constitute “the basic subject-matter of ethics” (ibid. 50). Ethical particularism is therefore 
based on the communitarian perspective of the self, building on the premise that people are 
socially embedded and constituted beings. Because a person is socially constituted, his/her 
ethical reasoning does not begin from a clean slate but from the social ties that he/she already 
possesses (ibid. 50). 
The particularist account, therefore, has a “pluralistic” view on one’s ethical duties. Miller 
(ibid. 53) explains: 
[W]e are tied in to many different relationships – families, work groups, voluntary 
associations, religious and other such communities, nation – each of which makes 
demands on us, and there is no single overarching perspective from which we can order 
or rank these demands. In case of conflict – say, where I have to decide whether to use 
my resources to help my brother or my colleague at work – I simply have to weigh their 
respective claims, reflecting both on the nature of my relationship to the two individuals 
and on the benefits that each would get from the help I can give. 
If a person considers him/herself to be tied to the human race, the particularist account does 
not prevent him/her from feeling and discharging an ethical obligation to humanity at large. 
However, this tie and accompanying obligations do not necessarily trump other ties and 
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obligations that a person may have. There is no necessary uniform hierarchy of duties. One’s 
ethical duties can vary in their “complexity and closeness” (ibid.). When considering my 
obligation towards humanity as a whole, I would have to determine from which existing tie 
does it stem and how heavy does it weigh compared to my other commitments (ibid.). 
It would be an over-simplification, however, to assume that the universalist account promotes 
impartiality while the particularist account promotes partiality. The particularist account 
holds that one should be impartial within a specific community, to which one is bound, if that 
community requires it and if it makes sense within one’s particular arrangement of ties. The 
only difference between the universalist and particularist accounts, in terms of impartiality, is 
that the universalist account requires that one should be impartial to all of humanity as a point 
of departure, while the particularist account allows one from the onset to be impartial in only 
specific communities to which one has a bond (Miller 1995: 53-54). For example, South 
African government officials are obligated to pay basic income grants impartially to all South 
African citizens below a certain minimum income level. However, grants to non-citizens 
living under the same minimum income may not be paid. While the universalist account has 
to attempt to justify this obligation by either using the useful convention or voluntary choice 
arguments, the particularist account need merely to state that this arrangement makes sense 
from the particular emotional ties that these government officials may have to the citizens of 
South Africa. 
Nevertheless, the universalist account argues that there are two dangers to ethical 
particularism. The first danger is that of moral conservatism. If ethical ties cannot be 
evaluated against a universal standard, traditional beliefs based on ignorance, vested interests 
of dominant groups or outdated practices can remain justified and unchallenged (ibid. 56). 
For example, in a society with entrenched gender relations, the idea that the man should, as a 
general rule, be the head of the house could be justified. The other danger is that of 
incoherence. If there are demands from multiple loyalties on a person, the person has no 
grounds for deciding which loyalty carries the greater obligation. A person might appear to 
be acting inconsistently if certain conditions prompt her to act in one way towards a 
compatriot and other conditions prompt her to act in a different way (ibid.). For example, on 
one day, I might not help the neighbour living on the one side of me but I may help the 
neighbour living on the other side, merely because “I feel like it”. 
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The universalist account, on the other hand, provides the individual with an ethical system by 
which loyalties can be rationally evaluated and ordered. Rational reflection will inevitably 
lead one to a guiding principle or set of principles that can be made applicable to a universal 
scope of ethical ties (ibid.). All of one’s ties can be evaluated and ordered against this 
principle or set of principles. For example, if the principle to which I am committed is “help 
people in need”, I know that I must help those nearest to me and then work from there 
outwards to all people (ibid). 
However, proponents of the particularist account claim that ethical universalism relies on an 
assumption of moral agency of the citizen that is implausible. Miller (ibid. 57) explains that 
ethical universalism “draws a sharp line between moral agency and personal identity on the 
one hand, and between moral agency and personal motivation on the other.” In terms of 
personal identity, ethical universalism, based on the Kantian conception of the person, 
assumes that one can discover one’s duties and act out of pure rational reflection and that 
one’s identity plays no role in defining these duties. In the words of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(1984: 12): 
[L]iberal morality requires of me to assume an abstract and artificial – perhaps even an 
impossible – stance, that of a rational being as such, responding to the requirements of 
morality not qua parent or farmer or quarterback, but qua rational agent who has 
abstracted him or herself from all social particularity, who has become not merely Adam 
Smith’s impartial spectator, but a correspondingly impartial actor, and one who in his 
impartiality is doomed to rootlessness, to be a citizen of nowhere. How can I justify to 
myself performing this act of abstraction and detachment? 
In terms of personal motivation, universalism requires that one only acts “out of a rational 
conviction” when acting according to ethical principles. One’s sentiments or the expectations 
of those people to which one is emotionally tied may not be the driving force for one’s 
actions. For example, the fear that one might disappoint one’s family if one makes a certain 
decision may not enter one’s judgement (Miller, 1995: 57). We might suppose, therefore, that 
if rational conviction were the only motivation allowed for ethical behaviour, few people 
would be able to sustain an ethical life: 
For the mass of mankind, ethical life must be a social institution whose principles must 
accommodate natural sentiments towards relatives, colleagues, and so forth, and which 
must rely on a complex set of motives to get people to comply with its requirements – 
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motives such as love, loyalty, pride, and shame as well as purely rational conviction 
(ibid. 58). 
The ‘natural’ eagerness of people to help those with whom they share an identity should not 
be suppressed in favour of unrealistic, heroic expectations of people. Instead institutions 
should be built taking these loyalties into consideration, purposefully striving to optimally 
canalise people’s willingness to make sacrifices for each other. 
Ethical particularism has less trouble defending nationality as an ethical community 
compared to ethical universalism. Miller names three advantages of ethical particularism in 
terms of justifying special obligations between compatriots who share a substantive national 
identity. Firstly, there is less conflict in promoting one’s own private interests and fulfilling 
the obligations expected by one’s nation, because one’s own private identity corresponds 
closely to that of the nation. The nation’s interests are aligned with one’s own personal 
welfare. Secondly, there is a “loose reciprocity” between the nation and its members. 
Although one may not always receive an equal return on one’s investment into the nation, it 
“is not a pure loss.” At the very least, one is contributing to the maintenance of an identity 
which one values in itself. Lastly, it is easier to build formal relationships, in which people 
are expected to make sacrifices for one another, in existing cultural communities where 
people are already accustomed to helping each other (cf. Miler 1995: 66-68). When the 
obligations towards a state merge with the obligations to a cultural community to which one 
belongs, the existing ties would be reinforced and any possible contrast between one’s own 
interests and that of the state would be blurred. In terms of the terminology used in Chapter 1, 
Miller is therefore arguing that the contents of one’s public identity must correspond closely 
to that of one’s private identity in order for citizenship to succeed as a basis for solidarity. 
As noted earlier, Miller emphasises that both ethical accounts can make room for the other 
account’s concerns. Relational ties can be accommodated from a universalist perspective and 
duties to humanity at large can be accommodated from a particularist perspective. The 
difference lies in their respective points of departure. Miller (1995: 50-51) therefore argues 
that a compromise between these accounts is possible and necessary, given that there are 
convincing arguments on both accounts and that we as individuals naturally identify with the 
callings of both. For example, it is natural for most of us to want to prioritise our family 
above strangers when they are in need, while also supporting humanitarian aid to foreign 
communities that have been struck by a natural disaster. However, Miller argues that one 
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must adopt a particularist viewpoint in order to accept that nationality has “intrinsic 
significance” (ibid. 59) and thereby consistently tap into a broader range of motives to 
successfully encourage people to act ethically, i.e. to act in solidarity. A universalist point of 
view can only attempt to justify special obligations towards one’s compatriots at a “less basic 
level”; in other words, as a less important imperative derived from a universal ethical 
principle. Miller, however, doubts whether this attempt can succeed. In fact, he claims that 
such an attempt would be “doomed to failure” (ibid. 64). The best a universalist can do is 
concede that for current practical purposes that it is necessary to still draw on the sentimental 
values of a national community given that people are not naturally motivated to behave 
ethically by universal principles. In the long term, as a global consciousness emerges along 
sentimental ties to humanity at large, people’s national ethical ties can be transcended. 
According to nationalists, a substantive, national identity is therefore essential for citizen 
solidarity. If we consider the arguments for the social embeddedness of the individual 
(discussed in chapter 1), it makes sense that a public identity which incorporates as much as 
possible of the citizen’s personal identity would be able to draw him/her emotionally closer to 
his/her fellow citizens. If a person is largely socially constituted, the more citizenship is able 
to tap into the person’s social attachments, the more the person would be motivated to act to 
the benefit of his/her fellow citizens. However, in the next section, we will remind ourselves 
of the requirements of the political conception of personhood and demonstrate how the 
realities of diversity could disqualify a substantive national identity based on these 
requirements. 
3. Criticism against national identity as a basis for solidarity 
While playing to the sentimental values of a shared substantive national identity may be a 
powerful method to establish citizen solidarity in theory, post-nationalists argue that a 
national identity cannot serve as a source of solidarity between citizens in practice if we are 
to heed liberal, democratic values at the same time. Notwithstanding the various attempts to 
demonstrate that nations can be multi-ethnic, post-nationalists contend that the idea of a 
common, national identity as a source of solidarity is incompatible with the realities and 
implications of current and ever-increasing diversity. States simply can no longer rely on the 
existence of an established cultural community that encompasses the entire citizenry on 
which formal ties can be superimposed. There will not necessarily be an existing, common 
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identity shared by all citizens that can serve as source of “natural” motivation for ethical 
behaviour. 
In South Africa, there are eleven official languages and multiple ethnicities. Other African 
states are similarly linguistically and ethnically diverse, if not more so. In Nigeria alone more 
than 500 languages are spoken by the citizenry. Diversity is not an idiosyncratic trait of 
African states due to the weak or non-existent correspondence between their political borders 
and ethnic geography. Most open states connected to the global economy have experienced 
diversification of their populations. Many states have significant numbers of citizens with 
migrant backgrounds. Not to mention the large number of non-citizens living in countries 
who are in the process of being naturalised or whose children will become citizens of the host 
countries (Beuker, 2009: 423-424). The world’s seemingly increasing interconnectedness will 
only intensify cross-state migration. Furthermore, one should not disregard the existence of 
internal “minorities” or less powerful groups that do not agree or feel comfortable with the 
national narrative promoted by the majority members or those who have the most power. 
Diversity is an inevitable part of the future of all – or at least the vast majority – of societies. 
We should not forget, however, that diversity is a part of our past as well. Despite the surge 
in awareness of diversity experienced today, it would be a mistake to render the reality of 
diversity, and the challenges that it poses to governance and citizenship, as phenomena that 
have only recently started to unfold in the world. Diversity has a long history. It is the idea of 
a (homogenous) nation acting as a uniform, political agent that is rather contingent and, 
relative to the span of documented history, a recent phenomenon. From the start of nations, 
diversity was present and has proven to be an obstruction that had to be eradicated, at the 
expense of people’s dignity, in order for nations to materialise. The proponents of 
nationalism are therefore guilty of the same criticism that they lodge against universalists, 
namely that they ignore local social ties in favour of that of a majority national culture 
(Appiah, 2005: 239). 
Therefore, apart from its failure to take into account the practical realities of diversity, 
nationalism suffers from a more fundamental flaw, namely authoritarianism. The imposition 
of a national identity on a diverse populace violates the political conception of personhood 
adopted in the previous chapter. In order to understand this violation, I will demonstrate that 
many national identities that we take for granted today were artificial constructions that came 
at the cost of suppressing the identities and cultures of various people. Moreover, I will 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
51 
demonstrate how this suppression is still a reality today by citing a case-study of nation-
branding. I will explain that there is an inherent contradiction between national identity and 
democratic citizenship, which appears to make a substantive national identity unfit to serve as 
a basis of solidarity in a diverse society. 
3.1. The authoritarian origins of nationalism 
In this section I want to demonstrate that there is nothing “natural” about the origins of 
national identities. Instead, the establishment of a common national identity for political 
purposes usually come at a cost to people’s dignity and autonomy and will therefore 
undermine the prospect of citizen solidarity in a diverse society. 
However, that is not to say that nationalism did not have a role in establishing constitutional 
democracies in the history of many states. In fact, Jürgen Habermas argues that the idea of 
the nation played a fundamental role in establishing constitutional democracies over large 
territories. A common national self-consciousness created a solidarity based on a more 
abstract form of social integration (i.e. the imagined community of a nation) among strangers 
that was needed for popular sovereignty to take hold and convincingly substitute the 
monarchy as the legitimate source of power. “Popular national self-consciousness provided 
the cultural background against which ‘subjects’ could become politically active ‘citizens’” 
(Habermas, 1998: 111). In terms of the previous section, national identity provided the 
foundation for an ethical framework that could convince people that they “belonged” together 
and need to make sacrifices for each other. Therefore, the nation provided a “cogent 
response” to the disintegration of the monarchy and offered an effective replacement for 
social integration (ibid. 106). 
The nation-state is a relatively recent phenomenon. Nation-states started to come into 
existence in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Before then, many European societies 
were ruled by monarchs as city-states, kingdoms and empires (Habermas, 1996a: 491; Miller, 
1995: 29-30). Sovereignty was based on the “divine right of kings,” which meant that the 
legitimacy of the monarch’s rule was derived from a deity. States were created by the 
monarch in which he/she granted power to the nobility and Church to exercise political 
authority over territories in return for their taxes and military support. A limited set of 
political rights were therefore granted to a small group of people (Habermas, 1998: 110). 
There was no necessary correspondence between the domain of the monarch and the culture 
or ethnicity of the people living in it. In fact, many domains incorporated a motley of cultures 
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and languages. The only connection that people in a kingdom or empire had is that they 
swore fealty to the same monarch. They had no necessary loyalty or attachments to each 
other. 
Monarchies did not last, however. Habermas (ibid. 111) explains that the disintegration of the 
monarchical system was mainly due to two reasons. The first is the schism in the church 
which created a pluralism of worldviews which undermined the divine right of kings as a 
legitimate source of sovereignty and created a space for a secular alternative source of 
sovereignty. Prominent thinkers in both the Catholic and Protestant churches started to 
question the absolute rights of the monarchy. This questioning was exacerbated by monarchs, 
like Mary I of England (also known as ‘Bloody Mary’), who persecuted subjects adhering to 
Christian denominations different to their own (Dickens, 1964: 293). The second reason is 
that of “urbanization and economic modernization” which has increased the frequency and 
speed by which people, information and trade moved around. People became dislodged from 
their traditional attachments and constraints, making them both “geographically mobilized 
and isolated” at the same time (Habermas, 1998: 111-112). It is ironic that these social and 
economic reasons are arguably the same factors that are exercising pressure on the nation-
state world order today. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the monarchy was replaced by popular sovereignty. Consequently, 
the identity of “the people” became very relevant. Now that sovereignty was vested in the 
people rather than the sovereign, it became relevant how to define this people and distinguish 
them from people governed by other states. There had to be an explanation for determining 
who and why some belonged to “the people” and others did not. As already noted, the idea of 
the nation offered a simple and convenient explanation. The people constituting the state are 
bound by a common cultural identity which gives them enough of a fellow feeling to form a 
common, representative government while essentially remaining strangers to each other 
(Miller, 1995: 30). Unlike traditional communities held together by face-to-face or direct kin 
relations, the nation was held together by beliefs shared by people who might never even see 
each other, never mind come to know each other. 
There was one problem, however. Upon the arrival of popular sovereignty, the nation only 
existed as an idea that was not yet shared among all the members of the state. There were not 
yet sufficient common beliefs to generate a common cultural identity or fellow feeling among 
the people as a whole. These beliefs had to be created, given to citizens and continuously 
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reaffirmed in order for the nation to come into existence and be maintained. Through various 
media people had to be convinced and reminded of their national membership and identity 
(Habermas, 1996a: 493-494; Miller, 1995: 32). People had to learn what it means to be a 
member of their nation through history books, novels, plays, songs, etc. The nation’s 
dependence on beliefs is what inspired Benedict Anderson (1983: 6) to call it an “imagined 
community”. Miller (1995: 32-33) writes: 
[W]e have no reason to think that the identity so defined corresponds to anything real in 
the world; that is to say, there is nothing that marks off this group of people from those 
around them other than their wish to think of themselves as forming a distinct 
community. National identities are, in a strong and destructive sense, mythical. 
Since national identities do not naturally emerge and have to be purposefully implanted into 
citizens, the question is from where and how national identity with specific content, practices 
and beliefs originate? Habermas (1996a: 493-494) proposes that national identities are 
constructed by an educated bourgeois public, sometimes in an attempt to further their own 
political agendas. However, all aspects of national identity are not necessarily artificially 
constructed, although it may be artificially assembled. Montserrat Guibernau (2007: 18) 
argues that parts of the national identity had to be derived from existing traditions among the 
citizenry in order for the citizens to be successfully convinced that the national identity and 
culture propagated by the elites are in fact their own. They had to be able to recognise 
elements that are already present in their existing customs. As Tom Nairn (1977: 328) puts it: 
“The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and 
the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood.” Existing cultural 
elements were therefore used, but only to the extent that these elements could serve the 
purposes of the elites. Content was bent to the ideas held by the elites, not the other way 
around (Gellner, 1983: 54; Malan, 2011: 142). This bending can be quite radical, as Ernest 
Gellner (1983: 54) writes: “Dead languages can be revived, traditions invented, quite 
fictitious pristine purities restored.” 
Consequently, a great amount of cultural wealth that did not fit into the elites’ conception of 
the nation had to be suppressed or destroyed. For this reason, Walker Connor (1972: 336) 
suggests that the term “nation-building” is a misnomer. In fact, the correct term for the 
construction of a national identity would be “nation-destroying”. Koos Malan (2011: 1) 
argues that the nation-state aspires to be the primary designator of the individual’s identity. 
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An individual may have various other identities due to his/her membership of different 
cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional communities. However, the nation-state 
considers these identities as secondary or rival identities. If any of these identities attempts to 
compete with the national identity, the nation-state actively removes the secondary identities 
from the public or even private sphere, as many states did during the course of their histories. 
Bhikhu Parekh (2000: 184) explains: 
[T]he state expects of all its citizens to subscribe to an identical way of defining 
themselves and relating to each other and the state [...] It can tolerate differences on all 
other matters but this one, and uses educational, cultural, coercive and other means to 
secure that all its citizens share it. In this important sense it is a deeply homogenizing 
institution. 
The containment of other identities is sometimes done implicitly. People who openly 
experience and identify with the heritage, sentiments and interests of their own sub-national 
communities are regarded as “regressive” and “parochial”. On the other hand, people who 
have abandoned or restrained their private identities and instead embraced the national 
identity prescribed by the nation-state are seen as “liberated” and “enlightened” (Malan, 
2011: 143-144). It is not uncommon to hear citizens of South Africa insist that they identify 
as South Africans instead of members of their specific ethnic groups in fear of being seen as 
backward. It is socially more acceptable in public spaces to downplay one’s particular 
ethnicity. In the case of Afrikaners, ethnic pride is especially stigmatised, given the villainous 
role that Afrikaner nationalism plays in the historical narrative of contemporary South 
African identity. 
The forcefully constructed character and destructive nature of national identities can be 
demonstrated by the roles language and historic narratives have played in the formation of 
national identities. At the time of the French Revolution in 1789, only 12% to 13% of people 
could speak French fairly and half of the “French people” could not speak French at all. Yet 
French was considered to be the cornerstone of the French national identity and therefore all 
other languages or variants of French had to be eradicated (Hobsbawm, 1990: 80-81; Nimni, 
1991: 19). During the rule of the Jacobins, communities that did not speak French were 
considered counter-revolutionary. Thus the Jacobins presented a submission to the French 
assembly in 1794 entitled, “Report on the need and means to destroy rural dialects (patois) 
and universalise the use of the French language”. A year later they supported their cause with 
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the slogan, “In the one and undivided Republic, the one and undivided use of the language of 
freedom” (Nimni, 1991: 20). Similarly, although somewhat less successfully, Magyar was 
used to build the Hungarian nation. Magyar was only spoken by half of the people living in 
Hungary (Miller, 1995: 33). In order to expand the use of the language to the rest of the 
population, the government enforced the use of Magyar in public administration and schools 
and harassed newspapers that published in languages other than Magyar (ibid.). 
In South Africa, before Afrikaner nationalists captured the state machinery of South Africa to 
refurbish it into their own nation-state, the Afrikaans language played a pivotal role in the 
construction of the Afrikaner national identity in the early twentieth century in the run-up to 
the National Party’s electoral victory in 1948 (Webb & Kriel, 2000: 27). During the century 
before, Afrikaans was not even recognised as a language. It was predominantly used by 
“slaves, the Khoi, and the unskilled whites” and was belittled as “kitchen Dutch”, and its 
status was so low that many churches did not want to have the Bible translated to it (ibid. 20). 
By the end of the National Party’s rule in South Africa in the early 1990s, Afrikaans was a 
fully-fledged academic language that was used as a medium of instruction at multiple 
universities and it was comprehensively used in all government institutions and exercised 
considerable influence on the larger South Africa population. In 1989 a research report found 
that a significant majority of grade 12 students across all races in the Johannesburg area 
considered Afrikaans as an important language (ibid.) despite it being the home language of a 
minority of students. The elevation of Afrikaans from a creole language with little status to a 
language that is nationally dominant and respected is a good example of how language can be 
promoted for political purposes. The promotion of Afrikaans was necessary for the Afrikaner 
nationalist project to create an Afrikaner nation and consolidate its hegemony over South 
Africa. 
It is important to note that Habermas (1998: 105) draws a distinction between “classical” and 
“belated” nation-states. The classical nation-states already existed as states at the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. In these cases, the state only had to create a nation for itself to which it 
could transfer sovereignty from the monarchy. France is an example of such a nation-state. 
The founders of belated nation-states, on the other hand, first created a nation before they 
created or appropriated an existing state. Habermas cites Italy and Germany as examples. 
Based on the history of the Afrikaners mentioned above, the Afrikaner nationalist project 
could also qualify as an example of where a nation was created before it obtained a hold on a 
state. 
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The historical narrative of a nation that is commonly promoted in education and the media 
usually has a similar constructed character as in the case of national language. Renan (1939: 
190) goes as far as to claim, “to forget and [...] to get one’s history wrong, are essential 
factors in the making of a nation.” Many of the “heroes” in a nation’s history were factually 
often flawed characters. These flaws are often either downplayed or completely erased from 
popular history books. The fact that Winston Churchill was a fervent proponent of white 
superiority (Toye, 2011: 2) and that many of the founding fathers of the United States of 
America were slave-owners (Wright, 2002: 125) are softened or negated in the British and 
American national narratives respectively. 
Furthermore, not all the acts that were committed in a nation’s name or in the process of 
forming a nation were chivalrous. Turkey has consistently denied that the massacre of 
Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire was a genocide, despite there being convincing 
proof that 1.5 million Armenians were systematically killed by the Ottoman government 
during its process of so-called “Turkification” (Akkoc, 2015). The genocide casts a shadow 
on the origin of the Turkish nation. Even events that occurred well before the emergence of 
the nation are filtered because they form part of the historical timeline appropriated by the 
narrative of national identity. So, for example, the Saint Barthélemy and Midi massacres in 
which Huguenots and Albigensians were systematically killed are downplayed in the popular 
retelling of French history before the French Revolution (Renan, 1939: 191; Miller, 1995: 
38). 
Miller (1995: 34) affirms that nations and their states were often established by force and that 
people upon which the new national identity was imposed only later started to consider each 
other as compatriots. It was often nothing more than coincidence that fenced people together 
and made them French, Italian or Japanese. The process of nation-building cared little 
whether national borders were drawn by accident or authoritarian measures, often cutting 
right through long-established communities and coercively banding people of different 
cultures together. Each person, regardless of his/her differences, was subjected and had to 
conform to the elites’ idea of the national identity (Malan, 2011: 147). Hendrik Spruyt (1994: 
34-35) writes: 
Thus the modern state defines the human collectivity in a completely novel way. It 
defines individuals by spatial markers, regardless of kin, tribal affiliation, or religious 
beliefs. Individuals are in a sense amorphous and undifferentiated entities who are given 
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an identity simply by their location in a particular area. Thus one must make 
Acquitanians, Normans, and Bretons into French people. 
The violent and haphazard origins of a national identity are carefully omitted or repackaged 
in the national historical narrative. As explained in Section 1 of this chapter, a nation has to 
extend into history and have a distinct public culture in order to successfully claim 
nationhood. These characteristics are threatened when nationals are made aware of the 
violent and arbitrary nature of their nation’s creation (Miller, 1995: 34). In order for citizens 
to remain committed to their manufactured unity, they need to forget their divided past and 
believe in an alternative historical narrative that legitimises their unity. 
3.2. Authoritarianism in the on-going construction of national identity 
It is clear that the agency of citizens was substantially disregarded in the development of 
many nations that exist today. However, the authoritarian, homogenisation of the citizenry is 
a continuing reality today. A contemporary example of the constructed or artificial character 
of a national identity and the way it is deliberately and continuously transmitted to citizens by 
elites, is the phenomenon of “nation-branding”. Yasuko Murai (2010: 3) defines nation-
branding as enlisting “the advice of private marketing and advertising firms [by governments] 
to create unified, distinct and consumable ‘brands’ for their territories and people, complete 
with logos and slogans, to promote investment and tourism in a competitive global 
environment.” It is a widely used practice and is considered to be a necessary means for 
states to compete in a globalising world where products and services are being homogenised 
and their origins are becoming less important. In order to attract attention, states need to 
demonstrate their uniqueness. Like Apple, Nike or Starbucks, a nation-state must be 
considered a brand whose “products” must be sold to the international community. Products, 
in the marketplace of nation-states, include investment, trade and tourism. 
The official agency tasked to promote South Africa’s “brand” is called Brand South Africa. 
On the Brand South Africa website (Brand SA, n.d.) it reads: 
Brand South Africa was established in August 2002 to help create a positive and 
compelling brand image for South Africa. At that time, the world was unsure about what 
to think of South Africa, with many different messages being sent out by various 
sources. This did very little to build the country’s brand and it was evident that to attract 
tourism and investment there was a need to co-ordinate marketing initiatives to make 
them more effective. This led to the creation of Brand South Africa, whose main 
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objective is the marketing of South Africa through the Brand South Africa campaign. 
There are many benefits to having a consolidated brand image, with the most important 
being that a consistent Brand South Africa message creates strategic advantages in terms 
of trade and tourism for the country in an increasingly competitive marketplace. 
However, this brand must be sold to the citizens of the nation-state as well, because the 
authenticity of the brand depends on citizens’ conformation to it. As Melissa Aronczyk 
(2008: 54) explains, citizens must “live the brand” in order for the brand to be successful. 
Citizens therefore play the role of employees in a corporation who must be ready at all times 
to demonstrate the values and aspirations of the company. But like ordinary employees in a 
corporation who are rarely involved in the design of the corporate’s brand, citizens seemingly 
do not have much say in what constitutes their nation-state’s brand either. The designing of a 
national identity is fundamentally undemocratic and authoritarian. Peter van Ham (2002: 267) 
acknowledges that the coordination of nation-branding inevitably results in an “authoritarian 
system.” The government and marketing agencies, who constitute today’s “elite”, decide 
what it means to be South African and then expect South Africans to live up to this 
construction. Murai (2010: 10) argues, “There seems to be an inherent tension between the 
drive for corporate-style brand consistency and democratic participation.” 
Analysing several campaigns launched by the International Marketing Council (IMC) of 
South Africa to sell the South African brand to South Africans in preparation for the FIFA 
World Cup in 2010, Murai draws several conclusions about the content of the campaigns: the 
South African brand promotes the idea that South Africa is “a society that provides new 
opportunities, has the ability to host FIFA tournaments, and consists of citizens who do good 
deeds [...] [T]he country has emerged from its problems and is on a steady projectile towards 
a new, utopian era” (ibid. 20). The campaigns purposefully promote South African 
exceptionalism, reinforcing the idea that South Africa is different from the rest of the African 
continent because of the peaceful transition from minority white rule to democracy and its 
ability to host the soccer world cup. The idea that the rest of Africa is stuck in perpetual 
warfare and suffers from incompetent governance is implicitly created or reinforced. The rest 
of the continent is therefore seen as “the other” (ibid.). The South African nation is depicted 
as “one harmonious entity, a monolith, that exists in relation to the rest of the world at large” 
(ibid.). Although in reality South Africa consists of various different ethnicities and socio-
economic groups who live in considerable tension with each other, the notion is promoted 
that South Africa is an “already unified whole.” Through the use of rhetorical devices, the 
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assumptions of “intra-national sameness and equality” (Wodak et al., 1999: 44) are 
reinforced. The various complex socio-economic issues facing South Africa are obscured. 
Simplification is a fundamental principle in any brand exercise. A corporation’s image needs 
to be straightforward and easily understandable by customers. Apple, with its fixation on 
simplicity and elegance, is a quintessential example of good branding in the consumer 
market. Therefore, Murai (2010: 9) concludes, “Reductionism is an inevitable outcome of 
any nation branding exercise.” National brand managers will inevitably negate the diversity 
of perspectives and experiences of being a citizen of South Africa and shoot for an image that 
is positive and the easiest to convey to the world community. Other ideas and realities of 
what it means to be South African are dismissed. 
Furthermore, in order to build-up support for the world cup among South African citizens, 
South Africans of all occupations and backgrounds are portrayed in the campaigns as “a vital 
part” of “Team South Africa”. If one does not actively support the hosting of the world cup, 
“one is not playing for the ‘team’ and exists in an antagonistic position to the nation” (ibid. 
21-22). Criticism of South Africa hosting the World Cup or negatively describing the 
conditions in South Africa is in essence “un-South African”. Citizens are the “media of the 
message” (Aronczyk, 2008: 54) and their consistent and loyal adherence to the nation brand 
are crucial to the success of the brand (Murai, 2010: 25). 
The advertisements create a hierarchical relationship between the members and the 
custodians of the South African nation (ibid. 24). Ordinary South African citizens are 
depicted as “passive” and the South African nation is anthropomorphised and presented as a 
kind of saviour who will provide for its citizens if they “believe” in it. People in the 
advertisements are not given much agency, besides expected to work hard and do their part to 
make the world cup a success. Praise given to the ordinary citizen come across as 
“condescending and infantilizing,” which is vividly illustrated by the portrayal of the “ideal 
citizen” as children in one of the advertisements (ibid. 25). 
It is therefore apparent that the act of constructing a national brand is not only undemocratic, 
but the content of the brand itself seems to discourage the voices of citizens. South African 
citizens are de-politicised and a hierarchy is “consistently established between the citizen and 
the state” (Murai, 2010: 26-27). The depiction of the state as a mystical saviour corroborates 
Habermas’ claim that the state becomes an entity in itself that pursues its own interests at the 
expense of the freedoms and dignity of the citizen. Craig Calhoun (2007: 98) draws the 
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following conclusion, questioning the compatibility of a state-sponsored national identity and 
democracy in a plural society: “The decisive question about nationalism, therefore, is whether 
it can thrive with the nation open to competing conceptualizations, diverse identities, and a 
rich public discourse about controversial issue.” As we will explain in the next part of this 
section, it has difficulty to do so, because there is an inherent contradiction between national 
identity and the democratic citizenship based on the political conception of personhood 
established in Chapter 1. 
3.3. The contradiction between national identity and democratic citizenship 
As discussed in Chapter 1, popular sovereignty required that those who governed obtained 
the legitimacy of their rule from the consent of the people. People were therefore no longer 
subjects, who received rights by the grace of the monarchy, but were conceived, at least in 
theory, as having equal political and private autonomy, coupled with fundamental civil and 
political rights. They had to be respected as autonomous beings who give rulers their 
voluntary consent to govern in their name. “The democratic constitutional state is, ideally 
speaking, a voluntary political order established by the people themselves and legitimated by 
their free will-formation” (Habermas, 1998: 112). Habermas (ibid. 113) concedes that this 
“legal-political transformation” would never have been effectively implemented and 
sustained without the creation of a nation. He explains: 
The political mobilization called for an idea that was vivid and powerful enough to 
shape people’s convictions and appealed more strongly to their hearts and minds than 
the dry ideas of popular sovereignty and human rights. This gap was filled by the 
modern idea of a nation, which first inspired in the inhabitants of state territories an 
awareness of the new, legally and politically mediated form of community. Only a 
national consciousness, crystallized around the notion of a common ancestry, language, 
and history, only the consciousness of belonging to ‘the same’ people, makes subjects 
into citizens of a single political community – into members who feel responsible for 
one another. The nation or the Volksgeist, the unique spirit of the people – the first truly 
modern form of collective identity – provided the cultural basis for the constitutional 
state. 
The use of national identity to build and sustain momentum for the new constitutional, 
democratic state, however, meant that citizenship became “double-coded” (ibid.). Citizens 
were not only legally defined in terms of their rights and duties but also as members of a 
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culturally defined community. The attachment of nationality to citizenship presents two 
problems. Firstly, it poses a threat to international peace and stability, and secondly, it 
undermines the political autonomy of citizens or – as I explained in Chapter 1 – the freedoms 
ascribed to the public identity of citizens (Cronin, 2003: 2; Habermas, 1998: 113-115). 
In terms of the first problem, Habermas (ibid. 113-114) argues that external sovereignty has 
always been bound up with the so-called “Machiavellian will to self-assertion” by which 
states promote their own interests through strategic manoeuvring at the cost other states, if 
necessary. The shift from monarchy to popular sovereignty had transformed this strategic 
function of the state into the “existential self-assertion” of nations. In addition to the private 
and public freedoms of citizens that had to be protected, the nation, conceived on the world 
stage as an entity in itself, now also had a freedom that had to be protected. This freedom, 
Habermas (ibid. 114) argues, can be interpreted in two ways. According to the first 
interpretation, the nation can be equated to the democratic conception of citizens. Similar to 
the conception of the individual citizen, the nation-state itself could be considered as an entity 
that cooperates with other states to create and maintain the peaceful balance of interests, 
whereby each state’s respective citizens can freely pursue their own ends. According to the 
second interpretation, the nation-state is conceived in naturalistic terms as a pre-political 
entity that has to compete in a free-for-all with other nation-states to assert its independence 
and promote its interests, using military means if necessary. This latter conception poses a 
significant risk to international security, as vividly demonstrated by the two world wars in the 
20th century. But it also poses a risk to the freedoms of citizens when individuals are 
expected to sacrifice these freedoms for the expansionist or exploitative endeavours of the 
state under the pretext of protecting the freedom of the nation. 
Habermas (ibid. 115) therefore argues that the nation-state is “Janus-faced” in the sense that 
individuals have two identities with conflicting roles. On the one hand, they are “citizens” 
who voluntarily establish or sanction a political association or state of free and equal people 
and on the other hand they are “nationals” who already find themselves - through no choice 
of their own – in a community with shared cultural characteristics, such as language and 
history. There is therefore a tension between “the universalism of an egalitarian legal 
community and the particularism of a community united by historical destiny” (ibid.). The 
legal status of citizens is therefore dependent on their membership in a cultural community, 
the content over which they have at best limited power. A national identity is therefore an 
added characteristic expected of a citizen’s public identity. Unlike the determinable 
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properties provided by Rawls, namely moral power, self-authenticating source of claims and 
responsibility for one’s own life project (see Chapter 1), a national identity tend to be more of 
a determinate property. In other words, it may be too specific and therefore exclude people 
who may not identify with its content. Therefore, the added characteristic of national identity 
to one’s public identity may violate the political conception of personhood if it is not shared 
by all citizens. 
As explained above, at the dawn of the constitutional democratic state, constitutional 
democracy had to climb in bed with the undemocratic concept of the nation in order to take 
hold. However, Habermas argues that, given the challenges posed by increasing cultural 
diversity and global interdependence today, the continued conception of the nation as a 
naturalistic entity endangers the continued existence of the constitutional democratic state. 
Habermas insists that only a concept of the nation that is not rooted in a pre-political or 
naturalistic concept of the nation is compatible with a constitutional democracy that respects 
the dignity and autonomy of all citizens. Solidarity is endangered when the common identity 
of citizens is constituted independently and before their political will formation.  
Thus, in summary, one cannot merely impose the majority or a purposefully manufactured 
culture on minorities or the population at large. It violates the fundamental principles of the 
political conception of the person necessary to establish a fair system of cooperation, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Dictating to a person what he/she should be violates his/her dignity 
and autonomy. Even from an ethical particularist perspective it should be problematic. If one 
cannot contract into the feelings of belongingness necessary to motivate ethical behaviour, 
one can much less be forced into such feelings. Given that diversity, in terms of ethnicity, 
language, culture, religion, philosophy, is not only a current reality in all polities but 
becoming increasingly pervasive, constitutional democracies “must learn to stand on its own 
feet” (1998: 117). There seems to be no alternative. 
4. Constitutional patriotism vs liberal nationalism 
Given the analysis of the link between nationalism and authoritarianism above, Habermas 
proposes “constitutional patriotism” as an alternative to nationalism, which, he alleges, is 
suitable for a diverse polity and does not suffer from the same flaw of authoritarianism. I will 
briefly explain constitutional patriotism, upon which I will look at the criticisms against it. I 
will then look at the arguments for how national identity as a basis for solidarity can be 
salvaged by adopting so-called “liberal” nationalism. However, I will end the section by 
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pointing out inconsistencies in liberal nationalism. I will argue that in so far as the difference 
between liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism is a matter of degree, both theories 
fail to serve as a basis for solidarity. 
4.1. Constitutional patriotism as an alternative to nationalism? 
Given the analysis of the link between nationalism and authoritarianism above, Habermas 
proposes “constitutional patriotism” as an alternative to nationalism, which, he alleges, is 
suitable for a diverse polity and does not suffer from the same flaw of authoritarianism. At 
the same time, it heeds the discussion on ethical particularism. It recognises that the ethical 
motivation of citizens must be tied into something particularistic about the state in order for 
citizens to experience solidarity. Every political community develops distinctive ways of 
institutionalising universal principles in its constitutional arrangements and political practices 
(Habermas, 1991: 144; 1998: 117-118). The unique way each state institutionalises these 
principles constitutes the political culture of that state. Under certain conditions, this 
distinctive political culture can give rise to constitutional patriotism. Habermas argues that 
this constitutional patriotism should replace nationalism, which is based on more substantive 
cultural content, as the basis on which solidarity can be built. 
Constitutional patriotism can be generated through the rituals, ceremonies, memories and/or 
celebrations attached to political processes and constitutional principles. Ivor Chipkin (2007: 
213) explains that rituals and ceremonies help individual citizens to see and realise in practice 
that, despite their differences, they have similar concerns, are equal in worth and share a 
“deep solidarity”. He cites South African election days as examples where this deep solidarity 
is felt among South Africans of different backgrounds: “It is there, even if only for a short 
moment, that they became beautiful to each other, fell in love, and developed a deep 
horizontal solidarity” (bid.). This feeling has been relived with every election since and to a 
certain extent on public holidays or commemorative days, like Nelson Mandela Day or 
Heritage Day. These national days form part of the political culture of South Africa, for they 
celebrate the founding of the South African Constitution and principles enshrined in it. Even 
though they do not include any substantive cultural content, they are acts of patriotism that 
effectively promotes national solidarity (Habermas, 1998: 115). Chipkin (2007: 214) further 
suggests that these types of encounters should be regularised so that they can be experienced 
in the ordinary day-to-day rituals of people and not only on special occasions.  
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There is a distinction between the majority culture of the people inhabiting the state and the 
political culture of the state and the two must be separated. The political culture is based on 
the constitutional principles agreed to through democratic processes while the culture of the 
majority or dominant group is based on substantive and inherited cultural content, such as 
language and social customs.  In many countries with an established institutional culture, the 
political culture and majority culture have become entangled (due to the cosy historical 
relationship between nationalism and the legal dimension of citizenship). Habermas (1991: 
146; 1998: 118) argues that this “fusion must be dissolved” if one is to accommodate people 
that value different forms of life and allow them to participate in the political community on 
an equal footing. The strength of constitutional patriotism lies in that it needs no common 
background culture, e.g. ethnicity, language, religion and history (Habermas 2001: 73). 
Habermas suggests that since constitutional patriotism does not depend on specific cultural 
premises, it can be responsive to the actual composition of the citizenry and effectively 
maintain a common political culture despite demographic changes (Habermas 2001: 73-74). 
Constitutional patriotism does not suffer from authoritarianism because it is based on the 
principles that have been democratically agreed upon and can be shared by all. The political 
conception of personhood is respected because the principles are general enough so that all 
people can identify with them. 
However, as briefly noted, constitutional patriotism can only arise in certain conditions. 
Habermas (1998: 118-119) is aware that constitutional patriotism alone, due to its more 
abstract nature, may not be sufficient to sustain solidarity among citizens. He therefore adds 
two requirements for constitutional patriotism to succeed, namely that citizens actively 
participate in the deliberative processes of the constitutional state and that these processes 
and constitutional arrangements produce fair results to the extent that the basic needs of 
people are at least addressed. As explained, participation is necessary, for it is the 
participation in the rituals, ceremonies and celebrations related to the political culture of the 
state that generate a sense of solidarity. The basic needs of citizens need to be met in order 
for them to have the ability to participate but also be reassured of the value of the 
constitutional principles that they are proud of. Freedom of speech may mean little to 
someone who is struggling to survive. 
Constitutional patriotism seems therefore to be an attractive alternative to nationalism for it is 
intended to accommodate the realities of diversity in a way that respects the autonomy and 
equal dignity of citizens. However, in the next sections I will look at the arguments that the 
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conditions of constitutional patriotism are not feasible and that a more substantive national 
identity can perhaps be salvaged if we adopt “liberal” nationalism instead. 
4.2. Political participation not a viable basis of solidarity 
Nationalists are doubtful whether the political participation necessitated by constitutional 
patriotism can substitute nationality in today’s complex, populous and territorial states. Only 
certain forms of political participation provide a source of solidarity (Leydet, 2014). These 
forms include the ancient Greek city-states and Rousseau’s ideal republic where face-to-face 
relations of cooperation can produce solidarity (ibid.). The scale of today’s states and the 
complexity of our societies have made it nearly impossible for this type of political practice 
to occur at the necessary depth and frequency to generate sustainable solidarity (ibid.). In 
most countries the participation of regular citizens in the formal political process is usually 
limited to mere voting in elections. In South Africa voting happens every second or third 
year. This rare engagement cannot nearly be compared to the democracy of ancient Athens, 
where the citizenry met multiple times a month to deliberate and vote on issues (Hansen, 
1977: 43). Furthermore, most countries have enormous (relative to ancient city-states) 
populations of citizens. It is impossible to assemble the amount of people living in today’s 
democracies in one space where they can interact with each other. According to the 2014 
census, South Africa’s adult population was nearly 50 million people at the time (Statistics 
South Africa, 2014). During the fifth century B.C., the adult male population of Athens (only 
males could participate in political processes and vote) was between 30 000 and 50 000 
people (Thorley, 2004: 74). 
Moreover, today’s states are typically territorial and not city-states, i.e. they cover large areas 
of land. The distance between the cities of Cape Town, which is in the one corner of South 
Africa, and Louis Trichardt, which is in the opposite corner of the country, is 1833 km. The 
majority of South Africans will not even see each other’s cities or even provinces in their 
lifetimes, let alone get to know each other. Taking all these factors in mind, citizens in states 
like South Africa will remain unfamiliar strangers to each other with whom they have little 
reason to cooperate beyond strategic purposes. Mill (1946: 292) argues that democratic 
institutions cannot function in a state whose citizenry is composed of different nationalities. 
“Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different 
languages, the united public opinion, necessary the working of representative government 
cannot exist.” It is unrealistic to expect that political participation can be a source of 
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solidarity in today’s modern societies. A source for solidarity is necessary that is not 
dependent on active political participation (Leydet, 2014). Historically the nation has proven 
to be an effective source of solidarity for members regardless of how populous or widely 
spread the nation may be and therefore it should not be abandoned. 
Nationalists are in any case doubtful whether the link between political practice and the 
nation could be severed (ibid.). It may be possible to dislodge some substantive elements of 
institutional political culture, e.g. ending special treatment to certain religious denominations, 
but other elements, e.g. a historical narrative, symbols, language, etc., may not be so easy to 
remove. People ascribe significant value to these elements and some political practices may 
be dependent on them. There may not be a clear distinction between the political practices of 
a state and the majority culture that cultivated it. One cannot simply draw a line between the 
two and surgically remove the former from the latter, believing that it will survive unscathed 
and independent (ibid.). 
Moreover, even if it was possible to dislodge the political culture from the majority culture, 
nationalists believe that one cannot achieve a sustainable welfare state, in which the basic 
needs of citizens are met (which Habermas has indicated is necessary for constitutional 
patriotism to succeed), without a common identity. For them it “seems like putting the cart 
before the horse” (ibid.). Welfare policies require that one gives a significant amount of 
personal resources away to strangers. Such a policy is not sustainable if there is not sufficient 
trust and a sense of camaraderie between citizens. One needs a common background culture 
before one can establish welfare policies. Miller (1995: 71-72) suggests it foolish to assume 
that dropping nationality from citizenship will have no effect on certain practices because 
those practices are already in place. “The bonds of nationality give the practice a different 
shape from the one that it would have without them.” Without nationality, Miller (ibid.) 
suggests that citizenship will become a strictly legal arrangement and citizens will 
consequently expect “strict reciprocity” for their sacrifices, expecting a proportional return on 
their contributions. The benefits they receive in return for their contributions will always be 
measured against the baseline of the hypothetical scenario in which there is no state 
involvement. People will only contribute greater proportions of their personal income to the 
state if they know the state would provide better support to them than private insurance. 
Rigorous redistributive taxation would receive little support (ibid.). Strong bonds between 
citizens are therefore necessary to gather sustainable public support for welfare policies. 
Nationalists believe that only a nation can provide these strong bonds.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
67 
4.3. National identity and democracy need not to be mutually exclusive 
Moreover, nationalists like Miller, who consider themselves to be liberal nationalists, insists 
that post-nationalists rely on a false opposition between national identity and democratic 
principles. Liberal nationalism can be differentiated from other forms of nationalism in that it 
claims to be compatible with liberal values (Abizadeh, 2004: 231), such as equal dignity and 
autonomy. Maintaining a background culture while at the same time ensuring inclusivity to 
minorities or differences of opinion are not mutually exclusive. Liberal nationalists contend 
that the content of one’s national identity can be “thin” enough to be inclusive to minority 
groups while “thick” enough to generate sufficient sentiment and trust to serve as a basis for 
solidarity (Leydet, 2014). There are different opinions on what constitutes the appropriate 
amount of thickness of a national identity in order for it to serve as an effective source of 
solidarity while also being inclusive enough to different groups of people. Miller argues that 
the national culture can include social norms, e.g. “honesty in filling tax returns,” and the 
preservation of a national language. However, Kymlicka, also a proponent of liberal 
nationalism, argues that the conception of the nation should be thin enough to exclude 
expectations that citizens should share similar life-styles (ibid.). What most liberal 
nationalists agree on, however, is that the process to determine the thickness of the nation 
should be inclusive, flexible and continuous. All citizens must be allowed to participate in 
discussions, which are frequently held, to affirm, reinterpret or make new contributions to the 
national culture. Immigrants, however, must first show a “willingness” to adopt existing 
political practices and norms and to collaborate with the existing citizenry before they can 
contribute to these processes to forge a new common identity (Miller, 1995: 129).  
In response to charges against the truthfulness of national identities, Miller argues that the 
mere fact that the beliefs on which nationality is based may be false, is not a strong enough 
reason to discard nationality. If these beliefs contribute to solidarity, it does not make sense to 
abandon them (ibid. 36). They play a significant role in sustaining a nation-state as a 
functionally ethical community. In any case, Miller contends that in most cases, when a 
national narrative is created, the authors are “filling in the blanks” and not necessarily 
fabricating history to the extent that claims could be rejected by historical evidence (ibid. 37). 
Therefore, constructing a national identity is not always a matter of concealing the evidence 
of bad deeds committed in the past. Instead, bad deeds committed in the name of the nation 
are often merely omitted out of the national narrative. In many cases they are even 
acknowledged, but they are considered to be contradictory to the values of the nation. They 
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therefore serve as examples of when the nation or members of the nation did not act 
according to its true image. Examples that should not be repeated. Miller explains that, for 
example, in the cases of the massacres of the Huguenots and Albigensians mentioned earlier, 
these events are not denied “but they do not form part of the story that the nation tells itself” 
(ibid. 38). 
It may be less important whether the history or customs promoted by a national identity are 
true or not or that a certain depiction (as in the case of nation-branding) or custom may be an 
over-simplification of the complexity of the current populace. What matters is to what degree 
citizens are allowed to contest that narrative and make adjustments or contributions (Miller, 
1995: 39; Archard, 1995: 479-481). It would therefore be important for a nation-state to 
maintain inclusive and critical public dialogue. Liberal nationalists, like Miller, believe that 
such a commitment to robust dialogue is compatible with upholding a national identity. 
Likewise, one’s national identity does not necessarily need to be one’s primary identity and a 
state does not necessarily have to forcefully impose it onto its citizens (Miller, 1995: 45-46). 
As there are examples of states that have authoritatively and ruthlessly forced citizens to 
subscribe to an all-encompassing, monolithic national identity, such as Germany during the 
Third Reich or China during the Cultural Revolution, there are also nation-states that have 
allowed spacious room for contesting ideas about the national identity. Miller (ibid. 40-41) 
cites the emergence of the British national identity during the eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth centuries as an example, “which involved competition between a number of 
groups – tradesmen, women, the Welsh and Scots, as well as the English aristocracy – each 
seeking to establish themselves as citizens, and offering contrasting images of British identity 
to support their claims…” Miller argues that embracing a national identity may even coincide 
with protesting against the state apparatus. He cites the example of South Africa in which 
“being a good South African” has been understood by some to mean opposition to apartheid 
(ibid. 44). Even though certain nation-states and their proponents may try to exercise a 
monopoly on one’s identity, in practice people do not experience or consider their national 
identities as “exclusive and overriding” (ibid.). Citizens should rather resist attempts by the 
state to exercise a monopoly on the national identity than abandoning the national identity 
completely. 
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4.4. Neither liberal nationalism nor constitutional patriotism are adequate 
In summary of the discussion above, continuity is of crucial importance to nationalists in 
general. They contend that a great deal of the strength of a political culture is its anchoring in 
a history as a distinct political community that can be retold with a rich narrative. A political 
culture, in which people can experience sufficient solidarity to be willing to make sacrifices 
for each other, cannot be sustained without such continuity. In fact, the participation 
necessary to enable constitutional patriotism to replace national identity as a basis of 
solidarity will not be possible, for citizens will not be willing to provide the necessary 
resources to address the basic needs of their fellow citizens enabling them to participate. The 
type of political participation that is necessary to promote constitutional patriotism is in any 
case not viable in today’s states, given their geographic and demographic sizes and the 
lifestyles of citizens that are predominantly orientated to economic activity and private life. A 
more substantive identity is needed in order to capture the imagination of people and enable 
them to feel solidarity with people who remain strangers to them. 
Liberal nationalists insist that sticking to a common national identity as a basis for solidarity 
is not such a problem as their critics make it out to be. The content of the national identity can 
be thin enough to accommodate a diversity of cultures and not encroach on the private 
identities of citizens. The historical accuracy of the identity’s narrative is irrelevant as long as 
it is open for contestation. This possibility of contestation is in fact what makes a national 
identity completely compatible with a constitutional, democratic state. As long as the content 
of the national identity can be defined and redefined by the citizenry through fair, democratic 
processes, there need to be no tension between the democratic principles and the national 
identity of the state. 
However, there is an inconsistency in this line of reasoning. On the one hand, liberal 
nationalists believe that present-day circumstances do not permit the type of political 
participation necessary to generate citizen solidarity. Yet on the other hand, they also believe 
that political participation can still be sufficiently robust, despite these circumstances, to 
ensure that a national identity is democratically contended and shaped. Therefore, liberal 
nationalists will have to advance arguments explaining why political participation is possible 
for the one purpose but not for the other, or they will have to concede that the difficulty of 
political participation is a valid challenge to their arguments as well. 
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But even if they offer good arguments, it is difficult to imagine how members of minority or 
less dominant social groups would succeed in the negotiation of a more representative 
national identity in the absence of superior numbers or power. When it comes down to a vote, 
they will most certainly be defeated. But even if decision-making is driven by consensus or if 
more weight is given to the voices of minorities through constitutional arrangements, the 
national identity will be pulled to a common denominator, namely the universal rights and 
obligations that each one of them carry as citizens. It is therefore likely that the debate on the 
appropriate thinness or thickness of a national identity among liberal nationalists will 
gravitate to the political principles enshrined in the state’s constitution and their 
accompanying practices and commemorations. In effect, the distinction between liberal 
national and constitutional patriotism will collapse. Consequently, liberal nationalism will 
become susceptible to its own criticism, namely that the national identity it offers is not 
substantive enough to truly motivate citizens to make sacrifices for each other. Furthermore, 
if it can be shown that citizens will provide taxes to cover the basic needs of their fellow 
citizens without the motivation of a shared background culture and that political participation 
that can generate sufficient solidarity regardless of the practical challenges is in fact feasible, 
liberal nationalism would lose its raison d’être. 
One still gets the impression that liberal nationalists underappreciate the existing and 
increasing diversity in societies and the increasing interdependence and fluid relations 
between societies. Maintaining a substantive identity with whom everyone can identify is 
already untenable in many states, and will only become more so. The speed of cultural 
change in societies outpaces, or at least will soon outpace, the processes needed to craft a 
substantive national identity with whom everyone in a particular polity can wholeheartedly 
identify. By the time there would be agreement, the agreement would be outdated. In this 
instance, constitutional patriotism is undoubtedly superior, for its universal nature makes it 
more easily adoptable across a diverse spectrum of people. But even for constitutional 
patriotism the task might be daunting. Any measure of particularism, even if it is only the 
political culture of a state, will be susceptible to change and therefore provide a shaky 
foundation for solidarity. Therefore, even if it can be proven that a political culture alone is 
sufficient to motivate citizen solidarity, the debate on the appropriate thickness of the shared 
content on which solidarity is to be built becomes irrelevant if the settlement of the content of 
a national identity, regardless of its thickness, cannot be guaranteed. 
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Constitutional patriotism can perhaps be salvaged if political participation is conceptualised 
as a basis of solidarity in itself and not merely a means to experience a solidarity based on the 
constitutional principles and processes of the state. However, political participation will then 
have to be proven to be possible in today’s circumstances in order to deflect the criticisms by 
nationalists. I will look at the feasibility of, as well as the argument for, political participation 
as a basis of solidarity in Chapter 4. However, given the alleged difficulties facing political 
participation, it is an open question whether solidarity can be effectively realised if it relies 
less on the political participation of citizens and more on the rights and benefits provided by 
citizenship. I will therefore first evaluate the rights dimension of citizenship and determine 
whether it can serve as a sufficient basis for solidarity in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the conceptual links and differences between ethnicity, 
nation and state, the ethical arguments for national identity, the authoritarian character of 
nationalism, the alternative of constitutional patriotism as a basis for solidarity and the 
possibility that nationalism can be salvaged by its liberal rendition. I have demonstrated that 
even though a substantive, national identity may summon strong motivational forces for 
citizen solidarity in theory, it fails, and will increasingly fail, to do so given the increasing 
diversity of the citizenry and their freedoms as defined by the political conception of the 
person in Chapter 1. I have also demonstrated that in so far as the difference between 
constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism is the degree of abstraction, both will fail as 
solutions for solidarity. In the next chapter, I turn to another possible candidate as a ground 
for citizen solidarity within and across borders, namely rights. I will demonstrate that a 
distribution of rights is possible without a shared substantive identity and that rights can 
contribute to a feeling of shared dignity, which can be a basis for solidarity. However, rights 
are not adequate and therefore we will need to investigate whether participation can be an 
additional basis for solidarity. 
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Chapter 3: Rights as a basis for solidarity? 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we established that a substantive national identity cannot be a basis 
for solidarity in so far as it violates the equal dignity and autonomy of individuals. 
Constitutional patriotism, which is conceptualised as solidarity based on a more abstract 
national identity, is not ideal either, for its foundation will still be subject to perpetual change 
given the diverse, fluid and dynamic nature of today’s society. Constitutional patriotism may 
be salvageable, if political participation is conceptualised as a basis for solidarity in itself 
instead of a means to experience solidarity based on constitutional principles and traditions. 
Before I investigate this possibility, however, I will first survey citizen rights as a possible 
basis for solidarity. Rights are also relevant to a citizen solidarity based on political 
participation, for it enables citizens to participate in the political process in the first place. 
I will start by briefly establishing a direct link between rights and solidarity, demonstrating 
that there is reason to believe that rights could be a basis for solidarity if they can guarantee 
the equal enjoyment of dignity among citizens while respecting their autonomy. I will look at 
Rawls’s model for determining the content of rights in a diverse polity in a way that ensures 
that the autonomy of all individuals, or the political conception of personhood as established 
in Chapter 1, is respected. Following this, I will look at whether rights can ensure equal 
dignity among citizens in all relevant spheres of their lives by broadening the scope of rights. 
I will briefly look at how the scope of rights developed over the centuries to include social 
rights. Given that this thesis focusses on the challenge that diversity poses to citizen 
solidarity, I will then thoroughly examine the arguments for and against the necessity of 
group rights over and above equal civil, political and social rights. I will demonstrate that an 
expansion of rights cannot guarantee all the necessary outcomes for equal dignity among a 
diverse body of citizens. Although rights are an important component of the basis for citizen 
solidarity, rights by themselves will not enable citizen solidarity. 
1. Equal rights as a basis for solidarity 
1.1. The connection between rights and solidarity 
In Chapter 1, I discussed how the shift of sovereignty from the monarchy to the people 
brought about a new concept of the person in his/her in relation to the state and his/her fellow 
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citizens. In contrast to the hierarchical structure of the monarchical society, under popular 
sovereignty, every citizen was considered to have equal dignity and autonomy. Therefore, 
since the dawn of constitutional democracy in the 18th century, liberal constitutions have 
required that every citizen be entitled to the same protection and benefits from the state. Any 
differentiation in rights would be a violation of the citizenry’s dignity, undermining the 
foundation on which popular sovereignty is built (Taylor, 1994: 26-27). The concept of rights 
only really became a political issue during the rise of nation-states in the 17th century. It 
barely existed in Roman Law and was merely a concept for discussion among scholars during 
medieval times (Riddall, 2010: 168). A right is essentially a claim or entitlement that a citizen 
has against the state (ibid. 177; Dworkin, 1977: 90). If a person has a right to something, the 
state has the obligation to either protect the citizen’s ability to enjoy that something (e.g. 
freedom of speech) or pro-actively provide the citizen with that something (e.g. access to 
education). 
The notion of equal rights for all citizens makes a fundamental contribution to solidarity in 
the absence of a common background identity, because they contribute to the citizenry’s 
common dignity both instrumentally and intrinsically (Cruft, 2010: 441-442). One feels a 
solidarity with someone with whom one shares an equal set of rights, because those rights 
create the conditions in, set the terms by and provide the status with which one can cooperate 
with that person on an equal footing and with mutual respect. Besides empowerment in terms 
of pursuing one’s life project, rights position a citizen in a relation to another citizen in which 
he/she cannot use that citizen as a means to an end. He/she cannot pursue his/her conception 
of the good at that citizen’s expense. He/she has to respect the citizen’s dignity at all times. 
Rights, therefore, bestows intrinsic worth upon citizens (Kamm, 2007: 254). This relationship 
creates the trust and fellow feeling that are important constituents of solidarity. If one’s rights 
were not equal, one would have difficulty in trusting and/or relating to the other and 
establishing solidarity with him/her. Thus, rights provide one with the means, e.g. political 
power and civil liberties, to interact with others on an equal footing but it also constitutes 
dignity in itself. In other words, having equal rights, even before exercising them, gives one 
dignity (Cruft, 2010: 449). 
Solidarity can be achieved through equal rights despite the diversity of citizen desires and 
beliefs, because even though people’s desires may differ greatly, the basic needs in order to 
pursue those desires are more or less the same and can therefore be generalised (Rawls, 
1999b: 373-774). The shared status of dignity and the common experience of enjoying the 
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fruits of rights create a common identity and solidarity that are empty of pre-political, cultural 
content (Keating, 1996: 40). Therefore, T.H. Marshall (1964: 111-114) argues that equal 
rights can generate a solidarity that overcomes any difference in the background cultures or 
private identities of citizens and can serve as the basis of solidarity among citizens. 
Furthermore, a solidarity based on a background culture need not to exist before the 
institution of rights. Hibbert (2003: 181) argues that historically the institutionalisation of 
rights, including social rights, has often preceded the existence of solidarity. If the institutions 
in society effectively deliver on these rights, enabling citizens to pursue their desires and be 
politically active, the rights foster “political virtues”, like fairness and toleration, that 
encourage cooperation and help entrench solidarity (Hibbert, 2008: 173; Rawls, 1999c: 460). 
In other words, taxpayers who do not share a common background culture would give the 
state the benefit of the doubt for as long as institutions work effectively. The argument by 
liberal nationalists, discussed in the previous chapter, that substantive identity is necessary in 
order to mobilise taxpayer support for social rights is therefore untrue. The enforcement and 
enjoyment of rights creates a common identity and solidarity by itself without the help of a 
common background culture (Hibbert, 2008: 177-178; Marshall, 1964: 96). 
1.2. Reconciling the content of rights with diversity 
If we accept that equal rights can serve as a basis for solidarity, how do we determine the 
content of the package of rights given the diversity of normative belief systems in society and 
the political conception of the person we assumed in Chapter 1 (which requires us to respect 
the dignity and autonomy of every citizen equally)? If we rely on a specific cultural authority 
or even concepts of “natural law” and “natural rights” based on a priori reasons, we would 
have the same problem we had with a substantive national identity (as discussed in Chapter 
2), namely that the determination of rights would be pre-political and would therefore 
struggle to resonate with citizens who do not agree with its normative content. “Natural 
rights” claim universal applicability in so far as it is argued that these rights are revealed to 
people through reason alone. However, as we have seen in Chapter 1, our social environment 
does not only decisively influence our day-to-day customs and choices, but also our deepest 
convictions. Our reason is not untainted by these particularities. Natural rights, that are 
neutral and can be universally applied without controversy, do not exist (Walzer, 1983: 314). 
Given that even our strongly evaluated goods, such as our principles and moral frameworks, 
are constituted by society, any arrangement of rights or account of justice will inevitably be 
particular to a certain culture, place and time. Therefore, the problem is not only that the idea 
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of natural rights may be limiting or inapplicable in specific circumstances, but may also be 
enforcing a particularism onto people that does not fit into their private, strongly held belief 
systems (Gozdecka, 2015: 306). Rights discovered through a priori reason or any other pre-
political background culture endangers democracy for their authority lies outside the political 
process. 
In order to respect the political conception of the person discussed in Chapter 1, rights in a 
diverse society must be seen not as the result of a pre-political idea of justice, but instead as 
the result of a political arrangement in which fairness and other relevant values have been 
agreed to as conditions for cooperation (Rawls, 1999a: 3-6). Using a political agreement as 
basis, citizens can then determine how democratically chosen values can be actualised 
through rights that are relevant and applicable in the particular circumstances of their society. 
As Hibbert writes (2003: 182, emphasis added), “[e]qual respect is a political virtue and its 
institutional demands are connected to the expectations and needs of citizens in an evolving 
institutional context.” Thus, the search for social unity should be limited to the political 
sphere. A political arrangement in which citizens are expected to respect and make sacrifices 
for each other must generate “its own support” (Rawls, 1999a: 154). 
Rawls (2005) provides a method and a terminology for devising such a political arrangement, 
dubbing it “political liberalism”. He calls the set of beliefs that a person is committed to a 
“comprehensive doctrine” (ibid. 59). In his view, a scheme of rights is legitimate if citizens 
can be reasonably expected, in light of their own comprehensive doctrines, to endorse the 
arrangement (ibid. 137). A reasonable citizen cannot expect that every other citizen 
subscribes to his/her comprehensive doctrine, since he/she would not want other citizens to 
expect or coerce him/her to subscribe to their comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, a 
reasonable citizen will seek a political arrangement that is acceptable to all citizens and not 
only to him/herself. This means no one’s comprehensive doctrine can serve as the 
comprehensive source of legitimacy for the state, and we need a political – rather than 
comprehensive – conception of justice. A political conception of justice is constituted by 
those principles in the public political culture of the society that can be reconciled with every 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine in the state (ibid. 59). A reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine, in turn, is one that accepts the co-existence of other comprehensive doctrines and 
encourages fair cooperation between the adherents of its own and other different doctrines 
(ibid.). The political conception of justice must therefore be freestanding, being able to serve 
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as a generic module of beliefs that fits into any comprehensive doctrine. For example, the 
principle that one should not commit theft can easily fit in the comprehensive doctrines of 
most major religions. 
People will unite and willingly support the state because the principles contained within the 
political conception of justice can be reconciled with their comprehensive doctrines. These 
principles represent, what Rawls calls, an “overlapping consensus” between the 
comprehensive doctrines of all citizens (ibid. 147, 218). Note that the overlapping consensus 
is not a modus vivendi (a compromise or a balancing of powers) between different 
comprehensive doctrines. A modus vivendi is the result of a give-and-take negotiation and 
therefore usually contains terms with which one or more parties are not entirely happy. 
Parties to the negotiation eventually relent because it is the only way the other parties to the 
agreement will accept some of the terms espoused by them. A modus vivendi may work in 
some trivial matters, but may cause serious instability when applied to one’s comprehensive 
doctrine. If anything in the modus vivendi contradicts a person’s comprehensive doctrine, the 
arrangement will inevitably invite fierce resistance. For example, a modus vivendi between 
pork-loving atheists and Muslims which stipulates that all school children should pray in the 
morning and be served pork for lunch will not receive support from atheist nor Muslim 
citizens. While eating pork is a sacrilege for Muslims, praying undermines the fundamental 
convictions of atheists. Consequently, the modus vivendi will not be sustainable. Every 
citizen must be able to accept the political conception of legitimacy wholeheartedly (Rawls, 
2005: 147-148; Christman, 2002: 115). The overlapping consensus must be the citizen’s first 
and not his/her second-best deal, for when conflict pertaining a particular issue arises, it must 
outweigh other values. 
The overlapping consensus constitutes the public reason of the political community 
(Christman, 2002: 114-116), which is the highest authority in terms of which political 
decisions can be made in a democratic society. Reason is the basis on which a political 
community makes its decisions (Rawls, 2005: 212). Not all reasons are public. Non-political 
communities, like a religious institution and other associations, make decisions based on its 
own reason (ibid. 213, 220). Political communities that are ruled by a monarchy or dictator 
functions according to different reasons as well. Only democratic, political communities 
operate according to a public reason, for the sovereignty of its rule lies with the citizenry. 
Public reason is to be applied when deciding issues related to “constitutional essentials” and 
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basic justice (ibid. 214). These issues include the composition and distribution of rights and 
obligations. For example, the requirements that all women should wear a burqa or that all 
babies should be baptised at birth cannot be justified in terms of the Koran and Bible 
respectively. The Koran and Bible are only legitimate sources of justification to adherents of 
Islamic or Christian comprehensive doctrines respectively. If one wants to impose a burqa on 
all women or baptise all babies, one will have to make arguments that is based on public 
reason, i.e. principles shared by all comprehensive doctrines. 
Rawls (ibid. 8-9, 28, 45, 381, 388) suggest that we should use a method called “reflective 
equilibrium” in order to create an overlapping consensus. We all have deep convictions or 
principles that form our own comprehensive doctrines. Every day we try to align our 
judgements with these principles. When all our principles and judgements are coherently 
aligned, we achieve a so-called narrow equilibrium. However, in order to know what is right 
or what we ought to do, we need to compare these principles and judgements in line with 
other moral theories and follow the same reciprocal process of adjustments. When our 
principles and judgements obtain coherency on this broader scale, we have achieved wide 
equilibrium. Naturally, neither narrow nor wide equilibrium are ever fully achieved. It is a 
continuous process to which we need to remain committed to in perpetuity (ibid. 96-97, 388). 
Reflective equilibrium is the same process that we ought to follow in order to establish an 
overlapping consensus. Once we have preliminarily established the principles that overlap 
between all comprehensive doctrines, we need to engage in reflective equilibrium to keep on 
strengthening the coherence between our principles and judgements and the overlapping. 
In Chapter 1 we have established that we need a political conception of personhood for 
citizenship in order to accommodate people with different ideas about their personal 
identities. Likewise, we need a political conception of the arrangement that governs the 
relations between citizens in order to accommodate their diverse life-choices to enable them 
to collaborate on an equal footing. It is only then that citizens can feel that their dignity and 
autonomy are respected by other citizens, trust each other and experience a camaraderie or 
solidarity necessary to effectively address collective challenges. In the next section, we will 
look to what extent rights need to be expanded in order to be an effective basis for solidarity. 
2. The expansion of rights 
Now that I have established a link between rights and solidarity and explained how the 
content of rights could be determined and embraced by a diverse citizenry, we need to look at 
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how rights have developed and whether its further development to include group rights would 
make it an effective basis for solidarity. 
2.1. Social rights 
Over the centuries, the content of citizen rights has expanded. According to Marshall (1950: 
10-11), some citizens in Britain already enjoyed civil rights such as freedom of speech and 
religion before the shift of power from the monarchy to the people. Upon the full transition to 
popular sovereignty, these rights expanded to include political rights, such as the right to 
stand for political office and the right to vote. Citizens were now not only equal in their 
freedom to pursue what they thought was good, but actually had the political power to govern 
themselves. However, with mass industrialisation and the emergence of capitalist society, 
which coincided with the advent of popular sovereignty, significant socio-economic divisions 
eventually formed among the citizenry in constitutional democracies. Socio-economic 
inequality started to threaten the egalitarian principles of equal freedom and dignity on which 
citizen solidarity was built (Hibbert, 2008: 170). 
Numerous studies have shown that there is a direct correlation between income and education 
and election turn-out (Beuker, 2009: 425-426). Those who receive higher income and are 
better educated participate more actively in political processes than those who have lower 
incomes and are less educated. There is therefore “an inverse relationship between income 
inequality and voter turnout [...] [E]conomic poverty translates into political poverty” (ibid.). 
Therefore, material inequality undermines the idea that everyone is inherently equal in their 
dignity by fixing some citizens in a firmer position to participate in the political process and 
exercise political influence than others. As briefly noted in the previous chapter, Habermas 
also argues that basic social and economic needs of citizens must be met in order for them to 
be able to participate in the political process and remain committed to the constitution. “A 
certain level of output legitimacy” is required (Habermas, 2001: 76). His concept of 
constitutional patriotism depends on it. For example, in South Africa, the principles of 
reconciliation and the sanctity of the constitution are seriously being questioned by black 
leaders who have become impatient with the continuous socio-economic inequalities and 
hardships among the majority of black people (Bond, 2016). Constitutional democracy can 
only last so long without delivering economic goods to the unprivileged and disempowered 
members of the state. 
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We can thus conclude that there is a tension between the principle of equal dignity, which 
underpins citizenship solidarity, and scarcity in market societies (Hibbert, 2008: 170; Turner, 
2009: 68). The expansion of rights to include social rights has been a direct response to this 
tension. Social rights include the right to education and the right to welfare benefits. Social 
rights impose an active duty on the state to provide the citizenry with services that are 
deemed essential in creating equality of opportunity. The limitation that social rights may 
impose on the right to property is justified in that the citizenry consent to it, understanding 
that a modest redistribution is necessary for all citizens to be substantially free and experience 
solidarity (Kymlicka, 1989: 163). Thereby, the fracturing caused in solidarity in the private 
domain due to socio-economic class divides is overcome by the status of equal dignity 
provided by citizenship through the combination of civil, political and social rights (Turner, 
2009: 68). In fact, Beuker (2009: 427) emphasises the importance of social rights to the 
degree of arguing that social rights should precede political and civil rights, for without the 
basic means to survival and education, political and civil rights mean little. Marshall (1950: 
35) endorses this position by explaining that, as an example, one’s civil right to free speech or 
participate in political decision-making has little substance if one has “little to say” due to no 
or poor education or the lack of basic necessities to survive. So even though having rights in 
itself may bestow a dignity onto citizens, this dignity can be undermined and lose its value in 
practice if civil and political rights are not supported by social rights (ibid. 40). The actual 
status of citizens cannot be equal if all citizens do not have the means to give expression to 
their civil and political rights. And if citizens cannot enjoy their civil and political rights 
equally, they cannot experience a sense of common dignity on which solidarity can be built. 
The next question is whether rights need to be expanded to include group rights in order to 
address inequalities in the cultural or social (non-economic) spheres of society in order to 
protect the equal dignity of citizens in all aspects of their lives. 
2.2. The case for differentiated rights 
The extension to social rights has been considered to have played an important role in the 
social integration in European states in the wake of World War II (Beuker, 2009: 424; 
Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 354). However, more recent experience suggests that it is 
possible for citizens to enjoy the full range of civil, political and social rights without 
experiencing equal dignity, and that this in turn undermines citizen solidarity (Young, 1989: 
250). For example, two people may have the same right to education, but in practice receive 
very different treatment at educational facilities due to prejudice. These two people may have 
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equal dignity in name, but do not experience equal dignity. In various constitutional 
democracies all over the world, minority or less dominant groups do not flourish. Referring to 
first nations in various former colonies in the world, Jeremy Waldron (1992: 761) writes: 
“Our experience has been that they wither and die in the harsh glare of modern life, and that 
the custodians of these dying traditions live out their lives in misery and demoralization.” The 
same phenomenon applies to various immigrant groups. For instance, there is significant 
tension between minority groups, especially those of Islamic descent, and the dominant 
groups in Europe (Malik, 2015). Many French of African descent may be fully naturalised 
French citizens but they do not feel integrated into French society (Beuker, 2009: 424). The 
same experience is shared by many Germans of Turkish descent. These citizens may have the 
status and the rights, but they do not experience the dignity. They often experience prejudice 
against them or have difficulty practicing their cultural and religious beliefs due to their 
limited resources and limited institutional accommodation for these beliefs. Moreover, many 
members of immigrant communities do not identify with the rights in the constitutions of 
their host countries. When the Muslim community in France was recently surveyed, nearly a 
third of the respondents rejected the laws of France, considering sharia law as more important 
(Stothard, 2016). 
In light of the above, some theorists argue that civil, political and social rights are not 
sufficient in order to secure the dignity of all citizens, and that citizen rights need to be 
expanded to include specific group rights (Taylor, 1994: 38-39). In order to understand this 
argument, we first need some conceptual clarity on the idea of a group. When I refer to a 
group in this chapter, I refer to a “social group” as understood by Young (1989: 259-260). To 
begin with, a social group in this context should not be confused with the concepts 
“aggregate” and “association.” An aggregate is a group of people that may share some 
characteristic, e.g. height, eye colour, home town or date of birth, but does not necessarily 
share an identity because of this characteristic. Although a certain characteristic may be a 
common marker for a social group or even the cause of its formation, a social group is 
determined by a shared identity that is constituted by a shared experience. For example, in 
South Africa it has become common in intellectual circles, and even in affirmative action 
legislation (Republic of South Africa, 2016: 121), to consider “coloured people” as “Black” 
regardless of the lightness or darkness of their skin. The fact that they share the experience of 
being systematically disadvantaged by the Apartheid regime, qualifies them as Black. Black 
is therefore an identity shared by all those who have been the victims of the Apartheid laws. 
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An association, on the other hand, is a group that one usually joins voluntarily, like a sports 
club. Young (ibid. 260) explains that one arrives at an association as an “already formed” 
person. An association does not fundamentally define one’s identity. Membership of a social 
group, however, is usually not voluntary and may play a significant role in defining one’s 
identity. Identity is a relational concept. One’s identity depends to a significant degree on 
how other people perceive you and differentiate themselves from you and vice versa. One is 
usually born or nurtured into an identity and has limited power to redefine this identity, 
because it is relational and therefore dependent on the opinions of a large amount of people. 
Kymlicka (1989: 162, 166) and Young (1989: 258-259; 1990: 175-183) argue that group 
rights can be justified in terms of the promotion of citizen equality if they can be proven to 
satisfy two conditions. Firstly, it must be proven that a group has unique needs and that 
addressing these needs is integral to citizens, i.e. either intrinsically and/or in the instrumental 
value of enabling the pursuit of life projects and participation in the political process as 
dignified citizens. Secondly, the group must be disadvantaged in its ability to address the 
above-mentioned or any other important needs, to the extent that the only way of securing or 
restoring this ability would be by awarding the group special group rights. 
In terms of the first condition, groups must be shown to have a fundamental intrinsic and/or 
instrumental value. Advancing an argument for the intrinsic value of groups, Isaiah Berlin 
(1968-1969: 4) argues that being rooted in and belonging to a group is a basic human need on 
the same level as “food, shelter [and] security.” The experience of belonging to a particular 
group in itself is necessary for citizens to function on an equal basis with other citizens. 
Groups may be constituted by any number of characteristics, including “language, collective 
memories [and] continuous life upon the same soil” (ibid.) This claim that people have an 
inherent need to belong to a particular group stretches as far back as Aristotle’s description of 
people as “political animals” (zoon politikon), suggesting that people are inherently socially 
dependent beings and the least self-sufficient creatures in nature (Waldron, 1992: 767). 
Today, the value of belonging to a community or group, particularly cultural groups, is 
supported by international statutes, requiring states to support cultural groups. Article 27 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966) states: “In 
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
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language.” Waldron (1992: 758) notes that as it stands, the article is unclear to what extent 
this right must be protected or supported. For example, would this right be secured if 
minorities are permitted to congregate freely to practice their traditional rituals and speak 
their language to each other to experience nostalgia, or does the state have to take more 
proactive measures in preserving the cultural group? A subsequent report on the intended 
meaning of Article 27 affirms the latter. The United Nations Human Rights Committee states 
that Article 27 should be interpreted to mean both that minorities should be permitted to 
maintain their cultures and that there is “an obligation on States to take measures to ensure 
protection of these cultures” (Australian Human Rights Commission, n.d.). There seems 
therefore to be formal, international recognition that group membership has a fundamental, 
intrinsic value. 
In terms of the instrumental value of groups, one might argue that cultural groups in 
particular provide one with the ability to pursue one’s life projects and therefore be a 
dignified citizen who can participate with other citizens with equal standing (Waldron, 1992: 
782; Kymlicka, 1989: 162-166). We have already encountered Kymlicka’s claim that when 
we make decisions, we do not start from a blank canvass (see Chapter 1, Section 2.3). We 
select our options from the practices and narratives that have been established by the 
numerous individuals that came before us. We make our life decisions in a “context of 
choice.” Our life choices only make sense because they are part of a larger social structure 
that gives them coherence and meaning:  
The physical movements only have meaning to us because they are identified as having 
significance by our culture, because they fit into some pattern of activities which is 
culturally recognized as a way of leading one’s life. We learn about these patterns of 
activity through their presence in stories we’ve heard about the lives, real or imaginary, 
of others […] We decide how to lead our lives by situating ourselves in these cultural 
narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile ones, as ones worth 
living (which may, of course, include the roles we were brought up to occupy) 
Kymlicka, 1989: 165 
For example, I would not understand what it means to work hard or live an honest life if these 
virtues had not been presented to me in various children’s stories my mother read to me or 
the real-life examples set by family members, neighbours or other people to whom I can 
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easily relate to. I may not have had such a deep commitment to the conservation of the 
environment if I was not exposed to folklore and music romanticising nature and a rural life. 
Alasdair McIntyre (1981: 201) emphasises the importance of the role of stories specifically, 
writing that if one deprives children of stories, “you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers 
in their actions as in their words.” Perhaps an even better example is language itself, which is 
probably one, if not the, most foundational framework(s) by and medium(s) through which 
we make sense of concepts, as discussed in Chapter 1. There are many words representing 
concepts that cannot be translated between languages (Blenkinsopp & Pajouh, 2010: 38), 
demonstrating the important role that cultures plays in developing concepts and providing us 
a framework in and medium through which to use them. Kymlicka (1989: 165) therefore 
argues that societies should value cultural structures because these structures build people’s 
character and equip them with the necessary knowledge, tools and moral values to navigate 
and thrive in the world. Failing to receive the necessary nurturing and guidance from their 
culture, members may lose self-respect and start engaging in anti-social behaviour. 
Kymlicka (1989: 166-168) further draws a distinction between the structure of a culture and 
the characteristics or content of a culture and argues that it is the former and not the latter that 
should be protected. The structure of a culture continues to exist even when its character 
changes. For example, a change of character may occur when a single religious denomination 
or political party ceases to enjoy support and loyalty from the majority members of the 
culture. In South Africa’s case, one could use the changes in the character of the Afrikaner 
community as an example. Over the years since the end of nationalist rule and the beginning 
of a liberal, democratic South Africa, the National Party disintegrated and large numbers of 
Afrikaners left the Dutch Reformed Church for other denominations (Leonard, 2012). Both of 
these institutions were considered quintessential to Afrikaner culture. Nevertheless, the 
“structure” of the Afrikaner culture remained arguably intact despite the loss of widespread 
support to these institutions, making it possible for Afrikaners today to still have a context of 
choice. The cultural structure constitutes the context of choice, which is essential to people’s 
ability to choose and pursue their life-plans. When the content of a culture changes, this does 
not necessarily destroy the culture as a context of choice. In the case of the liberalisation of 
the culture’s character, e.g. expanding tolerance and acceptance of minority groups within the 
culture, the context of choice may even be enriched, providing it with new options and 
encouraging increased experimentation. It is therefore this aspect of culture, its structure 
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underpinning the context of choice, that Kymlicka (1989: 166) argues is a “primary good” 
and must be protected by special rights. 
Secondly, the group must be disadvantaged in its ability to address the above-mentioned 
needs, to the extent that the only way of securing or restoring this ability would be by 
awarding the group special group rights. 
I now turn to the second condition for the justification of group rights, namely that such 
rights are necessary to counter-balance the power of the dominant cultural group (Young, 
1989: 258-259) and prevent less dominant groups from being “oppressed” or disadvantaged 
in their ability to address special or general needs. Young (ibid. 261) explains that a group is 
considered to be oppressed if the benefits of their work is allocated to others without due 
reciprocation, they are excluded from or marginalised in social activities such as 
employment, they are subject to the authority of others with little or no power to challenge 
such authority, they are stereotyped and have limited room to express their own needs or 
perspectives, or they are victims of harassment or violence due to their group membership. 
The argument is that even though civil, political and social rights might be impartial and not 
differentiate between people, society is not “blind” and will tend to discriminate against less 
dominant social groups in one or more of the ways listed above (ibid. 268). Due to their 
power (generated by their numbers, economic assets, social capital, etc.), the particularistic 
interests of dominant groups will seep through to public institutions, which will inevitably, if 
only tacitly, give preferential treatment to members of dominant groups. In turn, members of 
dominant groups will, in practice, be treated worthier than those of less dominant groups and 
the equality of citizenship, which underpins citizen solidarity, will be compromised.  
In fact, it might not only be a matter of the elevated worth of the dominant groups whereby 
the relative worth of minority or less dominant groups is diminished. The worth of less 
dominant groups might also be diminished absolutely. Members of less dominant groups 
might be misrecognised, by labelling and stigmatisation, and/or pressured to assimilate into 
the dominant groups (Taylor: 1994: 25). Taylor (ibid. 26) cites the practices and curricula at 
schools as a potential space where this domination can take place. Less dominant groups 
could be implicitly portrayed in an unfavourable light in history books, especially if their 
ancestors were the losers in past conflicts against the dominant group. The culture or identity 
of less dominant groups may even be ridiculed or demonised (Kukathas, 1992: 116). Dorota 
Gozdecka (2015: 306) and Kati Nieminen (2015: 319) argue that the way the right to freedom 
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of religion is interpreted in some Western countries, prohibiting women from wearing 
headscarves in public or socially stigmatising them if they do wear them, is an example of 
how universal rights seemingly intended to protect people’s equal dignity can in effect do the 
very opposite. Despite the rules being equal for everyone, Young (1989: 258) and Gutmann 
(1980: 191-202) cite examples of how the discourse in participatory forums in the United 
States are often unduly dominated by white males because of their confidence and articulacy 
provided by their privileged background and status in society. 
One can imagine that the misrecognition can be further fuelled if the group’s ability to 
provide a suitable context of choice is also limited, confirming the stereotypes in the public 
narrative steered by dominant groups. In turn, such misrecognition can further demoralise and 
undermine the less dominant group’s ability to maintain a healthy context of choice for its 
members, causing a mutually reinforcing downward spiral in the breakdown of the dignity of 
its members. Taylor (1994: 25) points out that members of less dominant groups may become 
imprisoned in a distorted image of themselves. An example of a mutually enforcing 
downward spiral between misrecognition and a dysfunctional context of choice is the 
experience of many coloured people in South Africa. “Coloured” is one of the racial 
categories created by the Apartheid regime to which all people descended from Khoi and San 
tribes, slaves from parts of Asia and people of so-called mixed race were allocated. Due to 
historical reasons and continuing economic deprivation, gang violence and substance abuse 
are rife in many coloured communities today (Kynoch, 2005: 494). Consequently, they are 
being stereotyped by the wider South African society as gangsters, drug addicts, alcoholics 
and unrefined. After Wayde van Niekerk, who is considered to be coloured, won the gold 
medal for the men’s 400 meters in the 2016 Rio Olympics, causing jubilance across the entire 
South African nation, Jason Julies (2016) made the following public post on Facebook: 
I’m sorry South Africa, but right now, just for a bit, Wayde van Niekerk does not belong 
to you. 
Because, 
When we drink alcohol, we are ‘coloured’.  
When we say “awe mase kint”, we are ‘coloured’. 
When we have guns and knives, we are ‘coloured’.  
When we smoke tik, dagga, and have crippling addictions, we are ‘coloured’.  
When we have no front teeth and kroes hair, we are ‘coloured’. 
But,  
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When we smash a 400m sprinting world record that was held for over 17 years, we’re 
‘South African’. 
When we prove that we have greatness inside of us, we are ‘South African’.  
When we have the power to inspire an entire generation to believe in their dreams, we 
are ‘South African’. 
You see, South Africa, when you marginalise and disregard us, you tell us that being 
South African means we must get rid of our colouredness.  
Because you use us when you need us and when we’ve outlived our usefulness, you put 
us back in the Cape Flats. 
But right now we are not in the Cape Flats.  
We are in Rio and we are standing high on a podium with gold around our necks. 
Because right now. Just for a bit.  
Wayde van Niekerk is not South African. Wayde van Niekerk is Coloured. 
This post was shared more than 9000 times by other Facebook users and have received 
widespread affirmation among members of the coloured community. From this we might 
conclude that many coloured people in South Africa feel that an image of them are being 
presented in South Africa that demeans them. This image does not only violate their dignity 
but is mirrored back to them, causing distortion in their identities and possibly psychological 
damage. Children in the coloured community grow up to believe that they are fatefully set to 
become gangsters and drug abusers because of this particular image of their coloured identity 
(Jensen, 2010: 81). One can also connect this argument back to Chapter 2. The Facebook post 
is an example of how misrecognition can be used as an implicit instrument for subjugating 
people’s private identities to the dominant, national identity. People are recognised as South 
African when they display positive characteristics and recognised as members of their 
particular group when displaying negative characteristics, thereby creating the impression 
that positive characteristics cannot be obtained without suppressing or abandoning their 
particular identity. Conversely, precisely due to this lack of recognition, coloured people may 
be justified in feeling themselves excluded from the characteristics attached to the South 
African identity. Both of these factors contribute to the undermining of the dignity attached to 
citizenship. As a result, some coloured people may be unwilling to feel the necessary 
solidarity with the rest of the South African population to embark on common projects and 
make sacrifices in these collective pursuits. 
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In summary, the proponents for differentiated rights argue that groups provide a distinctive 
value to its members and that group recognition is necessary to level the playing field. Given 
the significant impact that recognition has on people, it cannot just be considered to be a 
“courtesy” owed to others, but a “vital human need” which should be actively supported and 
secured by the state (Taylor, 1994: 26). The absence of recognition of particularity promotes 
the very evil that the politics of equal dignity is trying to eliminate. The absence of 
recognition only means that the less dominant groups are not recognised, while the dominant 
groups are, albeit tacitly, recognised (Young, 1989: 267). By virtue of their position of 
power, the dominant groups will inevitably bend the application of universal rights to their 
own favour. Recognition therefore depends on differentiated rights, which implies that people 
will not only be incorporated into citizenship as individuals but also as members of particular 
groups. In other words, citizens will not only be entitled to universal rights but also to special 
rights by virtue of being members of a particular social group (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 
370).  
Kymlicka and Norman (ibid. 372-373) suggest that these special rights can be classified into 
three categories, namely representative rights, multicultural rights and self-government rights. 
The purpose of representative rights is to give less dominant groups a voice in the decision-
making or legislative processes of the political system and/or a larger share of resources (ibid. 
372). Representation is crucial because dominant groups will not seriously consider the 
particular needs of less dominant groups because they do not share the experiences of these 
groups or they might consider the interests and needs of these groups as a threat to their 
privileged position in society (Young, 1989: 262). In terms of the legislative representation, 
designing the electoral system in such a way so as to guard the polity against the dangers of 
majoritarianism is already a widely used practice around the world (Kymlicka & Norman, 
1994: 373). Many liberal democratic states deliberately draw and redraw the boundaries of 
electoral constituencies in order to ensure that a variety of interests are represented in the 
legislature. Legislative representation based on groups instead of geographic constituencies is 
also needed, however, because in many cases minorities are not geographically concentrated 
in large enough numbers in order to stand a fair chance at electing representatives in specific 
constituencies (ibid.). Even in proportional systems they might lack the numbers to gain seats 
in legislatures. Young (1989: 261-262) suggests that mere representation in decision-making 
bodies is not sufficient. Group representatives must also have a dedicated opportunity to 
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express how policies in general may affect them and have veto power over policies that affect 
them directly. 
The purpose of multicultural rights is to help groups to express their identity or have their 
identity protected by either exemption from laws that are otherwise applied universally or by 
integrating their practices or customs in the laws and systems of the state (Kymlicka & 
Norman, 1994: 372-373). An example cited by Kymlicka and Norman (ibid. 374) is the Sihks 
living in Canada. They are allowed to wear turbans, which is an important symbol of their 
religious faith, instead of the standard headgear of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) if they want to join the RCMP’s ranks. Another example is the Afrikaans-speaking 
community in South Africa lobbying for the protection and maintenance of Afrikaans as 
medium of instruction at schools and universities (Bargueño, 2012: 3). Young (1989: 272) 
explains that language rights do not only involve the right of linguistic communities to use 
and promote their language, but also places a positive obligation on the state to provide 
services and education in those languages if the communities are large enough for practicable 
purposes. Besides rights or policies related to the recognition and protection of culture and 
language, differentiation might also be required in policy-formulation to rectify historical 
discrimination and/or prevent continuing discrimination (ibid. 271). Affirmative action in 
South Africa serves as a good example where recognition of particularity is applied to correct 
past discrimination. Given the systematic oppression of black people over the course of 
several generations, inequality in South Africa has become patterned along race. This 
patterning continues even after the abolishment of official racism because of the 
entrenchment of the socio-economic conditions, social attitudes and unequal power relations 
that were caused by official racial policies. In order to level the playing field of opportunity 
for all South Africans, policies are now implemented that favour black people over white 
people in terms of allotment of educational programmes, selection of sport teams and 
employment in government or corporate positions (Republic of South Africa, 2016). The idea 
is that once the pattern of racial inequality is broken, these policies will be abolished. 
Therefore, although it requires differential treatment in practice, the basis and objective of the 
politics of difference is equal dignity. 
The purpose of self-government rights is to give groups political autonomy. The claims for 
these rights are based in a group’s belief that they will promote the interests of the group if 
the group can govern itself (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 372). The call is therefore not for 
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increased representation or integration in the wider polity, but the transferring of legislative 
and executive power from the wider society to the specific group. Examples of groups who 
have successfully lobbied for self-government rights are the Scottish people in the United 
Kingdom and the Québécois people in Canada (ibid.). Groups who are struggling to obtain 
self-government rights include the Kurdish people in Turkey, Syria and Iraq and the Catalan 
people in Spain. It is important to note that while it may be harder to defend self-government 
rights as promoting citizen solidarity across the broader state, the aim of representative and 
multicultural rights is generally to promote improved integration into the wider society and 
thereby stronger citizen solidarity. Hence, proponents of differentiated rights argue that, 
while the institutionalisation of these rights would amount to an unequal distribution of 
rights, the purpose of group rights is to secure citizen equality in the public realm in line with 
the intent of the previous waves of rights. 
2.3. Criticism of group rights 
The majority of criticisms against the notion of group rights are aimed at differentiated rights 
for social groups constituted by a shared culture. Accordingly, I will focus on these 
arguments. Firstly, critics claims that group rights cannot be justified for its intrinsic value, 
since enjoying the feeling of belonging is not essential to be a dignified citizen. Waldron 
(1992: 762) argues that the value of group membership is often overstated by its proponents. 
Belonging to and being rooted in a particular group cannot be considered as important as 
other basic needs, like food for example. People can like and enjoy their culture and derive 
great value from it, but they cannot claim that they need it to the extent that, if they do not 
have access to it, they will be fundamentally undermined. The existence of viable lifestyles 
that are not rooted in particular cultures, such as the cosmopolitan lives of people living in 
and moving between multicultural cities, undercuts the argument that one needs to belong to 
a certain, demarcated cultural group to survive and thrive (ibid. 763). Belonging to a 
particular culture therefore cannot be seen as a fundamental or basic need, according to 
Waldron. 
That said, downgrading the importance of belonging to particular groups does not give one 
license to destroy or neglect groups and their cultures (ibid. 762). As already noted, there is 
value in cultural membership. But the value does not warrant special group rights. At best, 
cultural membership should be protected on the same level as religious freedom, and 
Waldron argues that there are no proponents taken seriously who claim that religious sects 
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should be subsidised by the state in order to preserve them. Although the withering of a 
culture may have uncomfortable and/or disadvantageous implications for its members, it will 
not cause a fundamental undermining of people’s dignity. Waldron equates the dissolution of 
a culture to “the death of a fashion or hobby, not the demise of anything that people really 
need” (ibid.). 
But even if the intrinsic value of culture can be considered to be constitutive of a citizen’s 
dignity, there are other challenges to providing rights to a specific cultural group as well. 
Advocates for differentiated rights, whether appealing to the intrinsic or instrumental value of 
group cultures, base their arguments on at least three false assumptions: (i) that social groups 
are homogenous, (ii) that the world divides neatly into different, independent cultures and 
(iii) that each person only needs one coherent culture (ibid. 781-782). I will deal with each of 
these assumptions in turn. 
In the first place, most, if not all, groups claiming special rights are not homogenous. There 
may not only be differences in opinion about the content or structures of the group’s identity 
and institutions, but significant conflicts between group members about these matters. For 
example, there may be minorities within the group who are oppressed by practices and 
structures of the group favoured by the elite or dominant segments of the group. Chandran 
Kukathas (1992: 113-114) identifies two types of divisions within a group. The first type is 
the differences among sub-groups. Sub-groups can be defined by markers such as gender, 
sexuality, religion, race, region, history, political preferences, etc. Such sub-groups may have 
different interests that are in conflict with each other, and/or there may be a power imbalance 
between sub-groups. The second type of division is that between the elites and the rest of the 
members of the group. The elites are typically that segment of the group that has a 
disproportional amount of access to resources and/or power relative to the rest of the group. 
They may often abuse sentiments attached to the identity of the group to further their own 
agendas, often even at the expense of the majority (ibid.). The construction of a national 
identity, especially at the dawn of the nation-state in Europe, which I discussed in the 
previous chapter, serves as an example where elites coerced the rest of the (imagined) group 
to adopt newly manufactured national identities in order to further their own agendas. In 
South Africa during Apartheid, the various leaders of the Bantustans or homelands were 
considered by many black activists to have collaborated with the South African government 
to pacify their subjects in return for patronage from the South African government (Alao, 
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2013: 73). This collaboration is an example of how the interests of the elites and the masses 
can be directly in opposition to each other.  
The misalignment of interest might also be subtler. Elites may lobby for causes in the group’s 
name that may be important for the group as a whole, but not a priority. In the case of groups 
where the majority is economically impoverished, the elites, who do not share the same 
material struggles, might lobby for causes related to the “symbolic standing of the group,” 
(Kukathas, 1992: 114) while the majority of the group’s immediate needs are basic economic 
opportunities and social services. The group as a whole may benefit from the increased 
esteem bestowed upon the group, but the priority attached to the attainment of esteem may 
differ between the elites and the masses (ibid.). The elites could also conjure issues that do 
not have real substance at all, securing state resources under the pretext of preserving or 
providing fair opportunities for the group. Given that cultural groups are not homogenous and 
cannot be easily demarcated, it is difficult to separate opportunists from legitimate 
representatives. Opening the state coffers and legal system for group claims may therefore 
give rise to a “politics of grievance”, in which leaders of groups may dedicate themselves to 
promote a perception that their groups are disadvantaged and need special treatment from the 
wider citizenry instead of dedicating their energies to solving problems themselves 
(Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 372). 
The differentiation of interests within a group strengthens the case against the 
institutionalisation of group rights. Group rights may only favour a certain section of the 
group, which could in fact strengthen existing power relations between sub-groups or 
between elites and the masses. Less dominant sub-groups or the masses could consequently 
be further limited in their power to reshape the group and, in the case of sub-groups who are 
minorities, become so-called “permanent minorities” within the group (Kukathas, 1992: 114). 
In the case of group rights for increased self-determination in designated areas, the issues of 
recognition experienced in the larger society will not disappear, but will merely be replicated 
on a smaller scale. When a less dominant group obtains self-government rights, it will merely 
take the place of the majority in its autonomous area. Thus, one majority is traded with 
another (Habermas, 1998: 145; 220). Independence only perpetuates the same problems 
under new colours. The same applies to representative rights. How would one ensure that the 
group’s representatives are representing the interests of the group as a whole and not a certain 
portion of the group only? In fact, how would one demarcate a group for the purposes of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
92 
electing representatives and holding them accountable to that group? The cultures of groups 
are not fixed entities. They are fluid, continuously changing. They do not exist before or 
separate of social institutions and the broader environment in which they exist, but are instead 
shaped by institutions and their environment (Horowitz, 1985: 589; Kukathas, 1992: 110). 
Which version of the group does one protect with rights? How does one determine when that 
particular aspect of the culture has become irrelevant and how does one know whether one is 
not obstructing necessary change by cementing an outdated aspect of the culture with special 
representation and statutes? The boundaries and content of a culture are significantly 
influenced by the various variables of its specific context at a specific time, and may shift 
with the politics of the day (Horowitz, 1985: 66, 73). 
For example, the Afrikaner identity emerged in Southern Africa among the descendants of 
settlers (and their slaves) who originally considered themselves Dutch, French or members of 
other European nations. Some researchers suggest the custom of giving the middle names 
‘Africanus’ and ‘Africana’ to the sons and daughters of free slaves is the origin of the word 
‘Afrikaner’ (Muller, 2016). The circumstances in the Cape Colony, especially after the 
British took over the colony from the Dutch, contributed significantly to the development of 
the Afrikaner identity as a separate ethnic entity, and one might wonder whether the 
Afrikaners would ever have come to consider themselves a separate ethnic group if the Dutch 
had remained in power. With the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the eventual imposition of 
Apartheid, identities in South Africa became strictly defined along racial lines. The idea that 
an Afrikaner could be anything other than a white person was taboo. Today, after the 
downfall of Afrikaner nationalist politics in 1994, Afrikaner identity is undergoing change 
yet again. Some members of the Afrikaner group are redefining themselves as “Afrikaanses”, 
which includes any person who speaks Afrikaans regardless of their race (Giliomee, 2003: 
664; Kennelly, 2005: 11-12). Others are attempting to enlarge the boundaries of the definition 
of Afrikaner, arguing that Afrikaans-speaking coloured people can also be considered as 
Afrikaners (Du Plessis, 2016: 11). The boundaries and content of the Afrikaner identity have 
therefore been fluid, influenced by various contingent, mostly political, developments. The 
previous chapter on identity also demonstrates how identities and cultures are influenced and 
constituted by the political needs of the day. The structure and content of cultures are 
therefore too amorphous to be given specific and special recognition in law. 
One may even harm the culture if one attempts to delineate and structure it along specific 
lines and then give that boxed-in version of the culture state support. If the role of a culture is 
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to provide security and a context of choice in which persons can grow and be equipped with 
the skills to pursue meaningful lives, insulating cultures may in fact undermine this function. 
A person can only make real life choices, and effectively evaluate the options at his/her 
disposal, if the culture that enables these choices is open to criticism and comparison, 
including from people outside the culture (Waldron, 1992: 787). Where a cultural community 
has been insulated, the options available to the person’s evaluation may become quickly 
outdated in terms of their applicability in the wider society, which, in contrast to the culture, 
are adapting spontaneously and continuously as changing circumstances demand. Members 
of an insulated culture will therefore not know which or whether the options provided to them 
in that culture will equip them to flourish in the world. Moreover, they would not be able to 
contribute to the strengthening of their own culture without knowing which aspects might 
need strengthening or adjustment in the face of the challenges posed by the real world. That 
said, the individual would not be able to change the culture in any case, for state preservation 
would suppress the possibility of members, who may not have been represented in the 
decision-making bodies, rejecting existing practices (Habermas, 1998: 222). In order for a 
context of choice to hold genuine instrumental value, it must adequately equip its individual 
members to operate in the world beyond the boundaries and confines of their culture. Special 
protection will undermine this function. 
As an illustration of the problems associated with the protection of culture, consider the 
example of a culture that attaches significant value to rigid gender roles, deeming that women 
should be subordinate to men and dedicate their lives to household duties, while men must be 
the sole breadwinners. In order to evaluate whether gender roles provide competitive options 
to individuals, a society must be able to fully experience the impact of perpetuating gender 
roles. If they were to experience the impact, they may find that men raised in gender roles 
find it hard to work with women (and vice versa) from communities in which women are 
considered to be equal to men and are as assertive as them. Similarly, if women have 
internalised the belief that they are inferior to men and are meant for household duties, they 
may find it difficult to deal with the outside world with the necessary confidence to succeed 
in their endeavours. In both these cases, the members of the culture may not be able to 
navigate through the challenges of the wider society as well as their counterparts in other 
communities. Consequently, they may be disadvantaged relative to their compatriots. 
Moreover, the community as a whole may also become poorer as it struggles to compete with 
communities who can tap into the talent and labour of their entire population and not only 
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into one half of it. Therefore, in order to maintain a robust context of choice, the community 
may have to remould its ideas about gender roles. A good example of a society that is 
currently feeling the brunt of entrenched gender inequality on its economy is Japan. Due to 
economic pressure, Japan is currently attempting to restructure its society’s thinking about 
gender in order to increase and activate its labour pool (Inagaki, 2016). However, if a group 
is subsidised and protected to the extent that it may not experience the disadvantages of 
maintaining gender roles, the community would never know what are the disadvantages 
attached to its gender practices until it’s too late. It would never come to know that it might 
be crippling its members in their interaction with the larger society and weakening the 
community’s ability to function and prosper as a whole. The community will never be able to 
become independent of the support given to it by the wider society, and when it may be 
forced to stand on its own feet due to changes in the political climate of its host state, it may 
collapse due to these weaknesses. One can therefore draw the conclusion that “to preserve a 
culture – to insist that it must be secure, come what may – is to insulate it from the very 
forces and tendencies that allow it to operate in a context of genuine choice” (Waldron, 1992: 
787). 
A context of choice that does not reckon with the rest of the world might still be defensible in 
the case of a community completely isolated from the rest of the world. Perhaps the hunter-
gatherer communities hidden in the Amazon are valid candidates for protection. However, 
most cultural groups in the world are not isolated in this way and are, in fact, increasingly 
becoming more interdependent with other groups. Interaction between groups is unavoidable. 
There may be nothing wrong with preserving cultures for sentimental reasons. But the 
argument for sentiment should not be confused with the argument for creating a context of 
choice, the latter giving useful instruction to its people about how its way of life is valuable 
and viable. As Waldron (1992: 787) puts it: “Either people learn about value from the 
dynamics of their culture and its interactions with others or their culture can operate for them 
at most as a museum display on which they can pride themselves.”  
That brings us to the second mistaken assumption on the part of advocates for differentiated 
rights, namely that the world divides up neatly into different, independent cultures. If we are 
really concerned about our context of choice, we need to safeguard all the social structures 
that have influenced and constituted us and are still doing so continuously. We cannot limit 
our attention to only one group culture that may have influenced us. We need to look at all 
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relevant communities and structures. Here Waldron points out that proponents for 
differentiated rights are usually vague about the details of their claims concerning the 
importance of cultural groups or communities. There are no good reasons for thinking that an 
individual’s well-being would be limited to a specific demarcated community only. As 
Waldron (ibid. 755) phrases it: “Are we talking about particular communities, at the level of 
self-contained ethnic groups, or are we talking about the common culture and civilization that 
makes it possible for a New Zealander trained at Oxford to write for a symposium in the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform?” It appears that advocates for differentiated 
rights appeal for protection of group rights on a small scale while relying on evidence of the 
value of groups on a large scale. For example, it is true that our personal identities and the 
culture we value are products of the existence of a “community,” but it does not necessarily 
follow that one particular community must be fenced and protected in order to sustain that 
identity and value. The “community” that in reality produced the identity and culture may be 
as big as a state, a region or an intercontinental civilisation and may include many different 
actual communities that exist in symbiosis. However, since most people do identify with the 
value of community at some scale and do not bother to interrogate how this value is actually 
created and sustained, they become easily convinced by the arguments advanced by 
advocates for differentiated rights. Waldron therefore alleges the vagueness of the claims by 
advocates for differentiated rights are intentional (ibid. 756), and tries to demonstrate, 
instead, that groups function as a part of a larger social system in which all parts are 
interdependent.  
Some first nations, such as the Apache in North America and the Khoi in Southern Africa, 
may argue that they were involuntarily incorporated into larger states and subjected to other 
cultures and ethical systems. They may long for the days when they were “self-sufficient” 
and could operate free from other civilizations. Waldron (1992: 779) argues, however, that 
this resentment and nostalgia are no different from Nozickian individuals or libertarians “who 
yearn for the days when the individual person was not so much at the mercy of the 
community and did not owe so much to the state, and who resent the processes that have 
brought them to this point. Yet here we all are.” Communitarians can pretend that their 
communities may not be dependent on larger social structures and other social groups, but it 
would be dishonest of them to do so (Waldron, 1992: 780). The acceptance of broader 
interdependence is the only appropriate response to the realities of the modern world. It may 
be an enjoyable experience to immerse oneself into the traditional practices and lifestyle of a 
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particular cultural community or pretend that one’s culture can function independently of 
other groups, but it is self-deceptive. Waldron likens living in a minority culture and insisting 
on its protection to living in Disneyland and expecting the wider society to fund it and respect 
its boundaries “while still managing to convince oneself that what happens inside Disneyland 
is all there is to an adequate and fulfilling life” (ibid. 763). The irony is that some people 
living in these “Disneylands” are so delusional about their independence that they do not only 
become indifferent towards the rest of society but actually disdain it. Preserving cultural 
communities may therefore work actively against the establishment of citizen solidarity in the 
wider state. In this regard, Benhabib (2002: 129-130) argues that accommodating claims of 
special groups could lead to a “multicultural cold war,” in which “there may be peace but no 
reconciliation [...] bargaining but no mutual understanding; and [standoffs], dictated less by 
respect for the position of others than by the fear of others.” Without a space for mutual 
understanding there can be no democratic citizenry making up a political community. 
The interdependence between cultures goes even deeper than this, though. Cultures do not 
merely rely on each other, but constitute each other. As Appiah (2007: 113) puts it, 
“[c]ultural purity is an oxymoron.” Cultures are hybrid entities, continuously changing and 
unfinished products of various other cultural influences with no “zones of purity” (Rosaldo 
1995: 15). Therefore, there is nothing new about the interactions between cultures in societies 
today. Globalisation is merely the continuing hybridisation of already hybrid cultures (Wang 
& Yeh, 2005: 176). Moreover, the hybridity of cultures mean that our own identities are also 
hybrid and the result of a mixture of cultural influences, debunking the third assumption, 
namely that each person only needs one coherent culture. That means that even 
differentiating between the structure and content of cultures, as Kymlicka suggests, may not 
be that easy. 
The use of the Bible in South Africa is a good example. The Bible is perhaps one of the most 
popular books from which parents in South Africa read to their children. The Bible forms the 
bedrock of their ethical upbringing. Yet, most stories in the Bible are set in the Middle-East 
more than two millennia ago, a cultural context that is far removed from South African 
families. One would think that the social context in which these stories take place should be 
alien to the majority of South Africa’s people. Yet South Africans of different languages and 
cultures find profound resonance with these stories. Another example of this cultural 
hybridity is the TV series Heidi. Heidi is based on a novel from Switzerland, produced in 
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Japan and translated to various languages including Afrikaans. Despite the significant cultural 
differences between Switzerland, Japan and South Africa, the TV series was and still is 
widely popular among Japanese people and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans (Kirby, 
2001). Most TV programmes and books imported from around the world may be translated to 
languages with which we are familiar, but the narratives remain rooted in the cultures of the 
origin countries. Nevertheless, we are capable of still identifying with the characters in these 
stories, and the lessons or morals portrayed by them make sense to us. They have a universal 
resonance. American movies are exemplars of the hybridity of cultural products, featuring 
“imitation, borrowing, appropriation, extraction, mutual learning” from a multiplicity of 
cultures over the world (Wang & Yeh, 2005: 177). Georgette Wang and Emilie Yeh (2005: 
190) draw the conclusion that “to label a cultural product ‘fake’, ‘in disguise’ or ‘authentic’ 
presumes the existence of a standard prototype that simply does not exist.” 
It may cause a distortion in an anthropological analysis if one separates a portion of a culture 
from its context and surgically attach it onto disparate materials in another context (Waldron, 
1992: 785). For example, one would find it hard to appreciate early Afrikaans literature 
outside the context of Afrikaner nationalism. But in terms of how culture enters our lives and 
influence our choices, the process is much more fluid and messy. Cultural material is 
presented to us from all over the world often as fragmented images and stories (ibid. 783, 
785). They hatch on other fragments and create new meanings that may completely differ 
from the meanings they provided in the contexts from where they were transmitted or 
snatched. The advocates emphasising the importance of culture are correct. We need cultural 
meanings and they need to make sense to us. But these meanings do not need to come from 
one culture nor need they make sense in a single context of choice. As Seyla Benhabib (2002: 
125) remarks, ““it is the mark of human intelligence to learn to deal with [...] [the] 
contradictions and tensions” that might occur through the exposure of multiple, cultural 
paradigms. Or in Waldron’s (1992: 785) words: “To put it crudely, we need culture, but we 
do not need cultural integrity.”  
In light of the above, we can therefore conclude that those advocating for special rights to 
protect the integrity of their cultures are making the same mistake as the individualist liberals 
in Chapter 1, namely basing their argument on an inaccurate understanding of personhood. 
Individualist liberals may be wrong in assuming that people can fully distance themselves 
from their social identity, but communitarians lobbying for special group rights are also 
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relying on false premises by assuming that an individual is socially constituted by one, 
coherent and authentic culture. To cite Waldron (1992: 778) once more: 
We are not the self-made atoms of liberal fantasy, certainly, but neither are we 
exclusively products or artefacts of single national or ethnic communities. We are 
made by our languages, our literature, our cultures, our science, our religions, our 
civilization – and there are human entities that go far beyond national boundaries and 
exist, if they exist anywhere, simply in the world. 
Acceptance of hybridity, fluidity of cultures and our identities seem to be the only 
appropriate response to the world today. One could therefore make a convincing normative 
argument that is the exact opposite to the one for differentiated rights, namely that we need to 
create legal and policy frameworks that reflect our social embeddedness in its entirety and not 
only in a selected piece of it if we want people to have fulfilling lives. 
The expansion of rights to include differentiated or group rights will not solve all the 
problems experienced in the cultural or non-economic spheres of people’s lives. In fact, it 
might even worsen them. Rights can therefore not address all the challenges that undermine 
people’s dignity in diverse society. Nevertheless, these problems still need to be addressed in 
order for citizen solidarity based on equal dignity to be possible. We conclude that although 
some rights are essential ingredients for citizen solidarity, rights alone are not sufficient. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that rights can be a basis for solidarity if they can guarantee the equal 
dignity of citizens. Equal dignity allows citizens to trust each other and collaborate on an 
equal footing. I argued that an important precondition for this role is that rights are 
determined in a manner that respects the political conception of personhood. I offered 
Rawls’s political liberalism as a method to determine rights in a diverse polity. I then looked 
at the scope of rights necessary to ensure the equal dignity of citizens. I looked at how the 
scope of rights has expanded to include civil, political and social rights, and how this 
expansion has promoted citizen solidarity. However, I have shown that equal rights do not 
necessarily address the grievances experienced by less dominant groups in the cultural and 
non-economic social spheres. I looked at whether the expansion of rights to include 
differentiated rights would address these problems, but concluded that special group rights 
may not provide equal dignity and could even undermine it further. 
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Nevertheless, the criticism against group rights do not dispel that unequal power relations 
related to identity threaten the dignity of citizens. The proponents of group rights make us 
aware that there is in fact a need to deal with unequal power balances between social groups 
in order to establish citizen solidarity. The problem is that although rights contribute 
significantly to citizen solidarity, they are not an adequate solution by themselves. In the next 
and final chapter, I investigate whether political participation can resolve these problems and 
serve as a viable basis for citizen solidarity.  
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Chapter 4: Deliberative democracy as basis for solidarity? 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I established that a conception of citizenship that depends on a political 
conception of personhood is a necessary requirement for solidarity among people of diverse 
belief systems. Such a political conception requires us to respect the private and public 
autonomy and equal dignity of individuals. I have further established, in Chapter 2, that a 
national identity, either constituted by substantive cultural content or the particularistic 
institutionalisation of moral principles, undermines both autonomy and equality. In Chapter 
3, I demonstrated that expanding equal rights to include group rights cannot be a sufficient 
basis for solidarity in diverse societies either, in so far as they fail to address unequal power 
relations produced by cultural or other social factors.  
In this final chapter, I turn to deliberative democracy, as a particular form of political 
participation, as a candidate for a basis for solidarity. I will argue that deliberative democracy 
– conceived as a particular kind of political participation that involves citizens actively in 
dialogue with each other about political matters – respects the political conception of the 
person, is a viable alternative to a national identity given the size and complexity of modern 
states, and can address the unequal power relations between citizens, which rights fail to do 
adequately. 
Relying on the assessment of Habermas, the chapter begins with a brief survey of both the 
liberal and republican models of political participation, which renders the conclusion that 
neither model of participation fulfils the requirements set out above. I then turn to the 
deliberative model of participation developed by Habermas, Benhabib and others and 
demonstrate that this model does offer a workable basis for solidarity in diverse and 
interconnected societies. I will further investigate some of the criticisms against deliberative 
democracy, but will show that these criticisms do not invalidate deliberative democracy, but 
only serve as a reminder to remain vigilant about its potential failures. 
1. The liberal and republican models of political participation 
Habermas compares deliberative democracy to the classical, or individualist, liberal model of 
political participation which he attributes to John Locke (Habermas, 1996a: 497; 1996b: 21). 
In line with the individualist, liberal conception of personhood discussed in Chapter 1, the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
101 
citizen is considered comprehensively as an autonomous individual who primarily has 
negative rights (ibid. 22). A negative right is the right not to be subjected to an action of 
another citizen or group of citizens, e.g. violence, theft, gagging of free speech or prevention 
to practice one’s religion and culture or to form associations. In line with Kantian thought, 
individualist liberals ground these negative rights in the “higher law of reason” (ibid. 23). As 
discussed in the previous chapters, reason dictates that we respect the freedom and dignity of 
each person. Rights are natural and above the state and not the outcome of a political process, 
according to this view. Reason alone, without engagement with others, enables us to discover 
the content of these rights. This position differs from the political liberalism of Rawls in that 
it specifically precludes that citizens need to democratically engage with each other in order 
to determine rights that are applicable to the whole citizen body. The foundation of rights is 
the reason found within themselves and not an overlapping consensus established through the 
reason practiced deliberatively with other citizens. 
Habermas (1996b: 21) explains that the citizen is to a large degree depoliticised in the 
classical liberal model. On this view, citizenship and the state apparatus should as far as 
possible not be used as a vehicle to pursue common goods. Instead, the aim is to give the 
individual as much freedom as possible to pursue his/her own idea of the good life without 
the intervention of other citizens or the state. Society is therefore conceptualised as a market-
structured network of interactions among private citizens. The challenges facing society are 
best left to the spontaneous forces of the market. The task of government is only to 
administer this market-structured network to the benefit of the individual (ibid.). 
Given that there are numerous citizens in a polis with diverging private preferences, the state 
can only administer these interests by aggregating them and using this aggregated input in 
policy formation (ibid. 22). However, the danger of a policy based on the aggregated input of 
individual interests is that a given policy may be to the detriment of the individual’s 
particular interest if that interest is not strongly represented in the aggregation. The purpose 
of political participation is therefore to push individual interests against the government’s 
attempt to promote aggregated or collective goals by mediating between the interests of the 
individual and the greater collective of citizens. This mediation is primarily exercised by 
voting and institutional arrangements (ibid. 27). Citizens vote for political parties that 
exercise pressure on the state to consider different value orientations through their contest for 
power (ibid. 23, 27). Institutional arrangements, such as trias politica or the separation of 
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powers and a constitution with a bill of rights, help to ensure that fundamental individual 
rights are protected against majoritarianism. Therefore, the individualist liberal view does not 
seek to eliminate the state apparatus but to “contain” it. The main aim is to prevent state 
interference in “the spontaneous forces of a self-regulating society” (ibid. 27). 
There is little use in the individualist liberal model for the mechanism of a public use of 
reason by which people agree to and attempt to convince each other of the merits of their 
arguments according to the principles found in a shared cultural background or in an 
overlapping consensus, to resolve ethical conflicts and setup common goals (ibid. 23). In fact, 
the possibility of public reason in a plural society with multiple comprehensive doctrines is 
treated with scepticism by individualist liberals (ibid.). Given the primacy ascribed to 
individual autonomy, individualist liberals believe that people merely vote in accordance with 
the values and ideas they have, independently of any engagement with other citizens. In most 
cases, these values and ideas will not change through political participation, even if people 
are exposed to each other’s narratives and arguments. Bargaining and compromises between 
competing interests, instead of consensus, is therefore the goal of the democratic process. 
Society is considered to be an “economic society” that guarantees a  
“nonpolitical common good” by the satisfying private preferences (ibid. 27).  A society is fair 
if everybody has equal voting rights, the voting process proceeds without any tampering, 
everybody’s interests are represented in decision-making bodies and decision-making is 
guarded by rules that prevent the infringement of fundamental individual rights (ibid.). The 
individualist liberal focus is not so much the input of the citizens’ will-formation but the 
output of effective administrative accomplishments (ibid.).  
There are at least three major problems with the individualist liberal model in terms of this 
thesis. Firstly, rights are assumed to have a pre-political, “natural” basis. However, as we 
have already established in Chapter 2 and 3, solidarity cannot be established on any basis 
outside of the democratic process. This is so, because in order to respect the dignity and 
autonomy of every person, regardless of their cultural beliefs, the basis on which solidarity is 
built must be a product of their agreement. Secondly, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, rights 
alone have difficulty in addressing the unequal power relations between social groups and 
therefore fail to promote equal dignity in diverse societies sufficiently. Lastly, the nature of 
many challenges facing the world today, e.g. climate change, security and unequal 
distribution of resources, require coordinated action and cannot be left to the spontaneous 
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mechanisms of the market. Besides having a short-term bias, the spontaneity of the market is 
deeply compromised by entrenched interests and structural inequality. With no mechanism or 
commitment to bring people to an agreement on action, there is little hope that people of 
different groups will come to understand each other and be willing to establish solidarity in 
tackling common challenges. 
I now turn to the republican model of political participation. Habermas (ibid. 24) analyses a 
general concept of the republican model and does not attribute the republican model to a 
specific theorist, except for citing Rousseau in passing. The focus of the republican model, 
according to Habermas, is on the individual’s positive liberties as a citizen, i.e. the ability to 
act according to his/her free will (ibid. 22). In contrast to the classical liberal view, the 
freedom of a person is not primarily exercised as a private individual but as a citizen of a 
political community in which common goods are pursued. Citizens are first and foremost the 
“autonomous authors of a community of free and equal persons” (ibid.). Therefore, the state’s 
legitimacy lies in its ability to enable the political will-formation of citizens to establish 
norms and pursue goals that are in the interest of all, and not merely in its ability to protect 
individuals’ negative rights and aggregate preferences in policy-making (ibid.). In this way, 
the republican model simulates the original idea of democracy, as espoused by the ancient 
Greek city-states, more closely than any other democratic model (ibid. 23). Citizens cannot 
delegate their self-rule to others and must engage in the political will-formation themselves 
(ibid. 29). In contrast to the individualist liberals who ground their rights in natural law, 
republicans believe that there is no higher authority above the deliberative will-formation of 
the citizens through which they author and give legitimacy to rights. Rights are the product of 
the “prevailing political will” in the political community (ibid. 23). 
From the republican perspective, the political will-formation of citizens should encompass 
the whole of society. Everything that matters to citizens can and should in fact be subject to 
the formal legislative process. “Society is, from the very start, political society – societas 
civilis” (ibid. 26). However, the political society is under pressure, on the one hand, from the 
private or market sphere, where citizens are depoliticised, and, on the other hand, from the 
administrative state apparatus in which certain group interests may have become entrenched 
and institutional arrangements’ legitimisation by the will-formation of the people have 
weakened. The objective of republicanism is therefore to reinvigorate the political agency of 
citizens and develop society “into a political totality” (ibid. 26) or “one encompassing 
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macrosubject” (ibid. 27). The citizenry must become “a collective actor” that reflects the 
composition of the entire citizen body and acts for it (ibid. 28). For this reason, democracy 
should include an “ethical-political discourse” (ibid. 26), in which the substantial goods of 
citizens are evaluated. The citizenry must be able to use public deliberation to reach a better 
understanding of themselves and who they want to be. Matters of value must be discussed 
and not merely matters of justice. Therefore, given that ethical issues should be included in 
the deliberative process, the republican view relies on the fact that an ethical background 
must be shared among all citizens. The republican model accommodates the communitarian 
view discussed in Chapter 1 very well in that it ascribes a fundamental value to the social 
embeddedness of individuals’ identities. If one’s identity is constituted by society, it follows 
that society as a whole must be subject of the political deliberative process and participate in 
this process. 
From the above it is clear that, in contrast to the classical liberal model, political participation 
plays a substantial role in the republican model. The purpose of political participation is not 
only to enable but constitute people’s substantial life projects. Through political participation, 
people become deeply aware of their interdependence and shape the relationships between 
themselves to promote their intertwined interests. “[T]he orientation to the common good” is 
seen as the most important, source of social integration in society (ibid. 21). The republican 
model’s aspiration to orientating the citizenry to a collective goal is what is necessary to 
mobilise citizens for collective action. However, besides relying on ethical homogeneity, 
which does not exist in today’s societies, the republican model has unrealistic expectations of 
citizens’ availability and willingness to devote their lives and subject all their pursuits to 
political engagement, not to mention the state’s ability to facilitate such a process given the 
significant geographic and demographic sizes of most states. It is for these reasons that 
Habermas is afraid that the republican model has an “ethical overload” (ibid. 21), in other 
words too much is expected of what can be incorporated into the citizen’s political will 
formation. 
Now that I have established that neither the classical liberal nor the republican model will 
succeed as types of political participation that can be the basis for citizen solidarity in diverse 
societies, I will look at deliberative democracy as an alternative model for political 
participation. 
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2. Deliberative democracy 
Deliberative democracy combines elements of both the individualist liberal and republican 
models of political participation and it provides a method to establish the public reason and 
an overlapping consensus espoused by Rawls that can address the challenges facing citizen 
solidarity posed by diversity. Instead of fundamental rights or the ethical background of a 
community, deliberative democracy is built on the procedures by which deliberation takes 
place and can be our best answer to establishing solidarity in societies that are becoming 
increasingly diverse. I will focus on the theory of deliberative democracy developed by 
Habermas and Benhabib. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Habermas subscribes to the idea of relational autonomy 
(Habermas, 1991: 207), thereby avoiding the communitarian critique charged against many 
liberal thinkers that their theories are based on an atomistic conception of the person 
(Habermas, 1991: 135-138; Hedrick, 2010: 88). He gives full recognition to the social 
embeddedness of people (Habermas, 1991: 135) and therefore argues that one person’s 
freedom is fundamentally dependent on the freedom of others. The fact that our identities are 
constituted by our social environments, makes our identities “fragile” in the sense that we 
cannot maintain them individually by ourselves. We need to reciprocally stabilise our 
identities in order to have identities that are functional in society. Our identities therefore 
depend on dialogue with others (ibid. 199-200).  
As discussed in Chapter 1 Section 3, reason itself is intersubjective. One cannot stand apart 
from society and monologically conjure up standards for society by using one’s reason and 
then apply those standards to society and expect society to live-up to those standards as 
classical liberals might suggest (Habermas, 1996a: 64-65; Hedrick, 2010: 100). Reason does 
not reveal or prescribe substantive principles. Instead, it provides the presuppositions or 
framework through which participants in a discourse can work out principles (Habermas, 
1996a: 4; Hedrick, 2010: 99). Reason does not reside in the cosmos or within the subject but 
among individuals in their attempts to establish mutual understanding through discourse 
(Hedrick, 2010: 99, 103). Deliberative democracy takes these considerations, discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 1, to heart. In fact, it follows that deliberation would be the most 
effective way for us to deal with the challenges in our life-worlds. In other words, it is the 
best way to continuously improve or fix our problem-solving systems when they break-down. 
Given the intersubjectivity of all our understandings, there is no alternative really. Of course, 
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we cannot and do not resort to deliberation all the time. It would be inefficient to repeatedly 
deliberate about every action on which we need to coordinate. Therefore, we develop 
customs to deal with routine problems which constitutes our life-worlds and enable them to 
solve problems without our deliberative assistance. Saying “sorry” or bowing to someone 
after you have wronged him/her is an example. Rights and laws are also methods we have 
devised to resolve problems without our deliberative intervention (Habermas, 1996a: 113). 
Nevertheless, all of these mechanisms have been set in place through dialogue, otherwise 
they would have failed to be meaningful to us, given that all meaning is intersubjective. Even 
mechanisms imposed through authoritarianism must incorporate some form of “dialogue” in 
their design in order for those mechanisms to actually make sense. Discourse takes place 
again when these mechanisms, e.g. customs and laws, fail to provide answers to conflicts and 
either have to be adjusted or supplemented with new norms. 
Given that equal dignity and autonomy are prerequisites for our polis, as established in 
Chapter 1, the connection between our legal institutions and the deliberative process has 
taken on a normative relevance. In other words, in order to establish solidarity among citizens 
with very different personal beliefs, any agreement between these citizens will have to be a 
result of a dialogue. In the absence of a common ethical background, citizens will only know 
if rights and laws would be or how they become reconcilable with the belief systems of their 
fellow citizens, if they engage in discussion. At this point Habermas differs from Rawls on 
the legitimacy of the liberal democratic constitution and the laws and institutions that spring 
from it. For Rawls (2005: 386), the justification of the overlapping consensus, on which 
public reason is based (as discussed in the previous chapter), lies in the comprehensive 
doctrines of each citizen which the citizen takes for granted. In other words, the reasons why 
one citizen endorses the overlapping consensus might be different from the reasons of 
another citizen. Rawls believes this to be a major advantage of his theory, for thereby he 
leaves the task of providing a foundation for public reason to the citizen him/herself, making 
his theory “freestanding” and thus suitable for a diverse citizenry (Hedrick, 2010: 81-85). For 
Habermas, on the other hand, the legitimacy of a legal order cannot depend on the substantive 
beliefs of the citizen (Habermas, 1996a: 108-109; Hedrick, 2010: 85). Given that our 
identities, life-worlds and reason are intersubjectively constituted, it follows that our 
understanding of what is right and wrong must also be intersubjectively validated. Only 
through discussion can we effectively reflect on moral issues and determine appropriate 
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norms (Habermas, 1991: 67). Mutual understanding between people is the source of 
legitimacy of our principles (Hedrick, 2010: 90). 
Habermas has faith in our ability and willingness to reach such an understanding across 
different belief systems, because we as rational human beings are intuitively familiar with the 
experience of entering a discussion, convincing others or being convinced of a viewpoint, 
coming to an agreement and guiding our actions according to that agreement (Hedrick, 2010: 
91). We all expect that a rational agreement is possible (Habermas, 1984: 91; 1996a: 109). 
We are also intuitively familiar with the exact opposite of that process, namely when we are 
coerced or manipulated into agreement. We experience a sense of freedom in the former 
process which is absent in the latter (Hedrick, 2010: 91-92). Given the deep undesirability of 
violence and oppression in a society in which we choose to respect each other’s dignity and 
autonomy, we are considerably motivated to cooperate with one another. Basing the 
legitimacy of our overlapping consensus on our comprehensive doctrines could actually be 
counterproductive. In order to reach an understanding across different cultures, we need to be 
willing to learn from others. Dogmatic worldviews undermine this capacity (Habermas, 
1996a: 324-325). 
Therefore, Habermas (1996a: 107) proposes, what he calls, the “discourse principle” as a test 
for the legitimacy of agreements: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possible 
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.” By “action norms”, 
Habermas means practical norms or rules that govern the interaction between individuals, 
like morals and laws. By “rational discourse”, he means a discourse in which free, uncoerced 
flow of topics and contributes takes place. This discourse principle is a communicative 
rendition of Kant’s categorical imperative. It differs from the Kantian formulation in that, 
since morality is communicative and not found through a priori reason, morality is found in 
what all affected persons can will in agreement to be generalised (Habermas, 1991: 67). 
Moral principles cannot be imposed in an abstract manner onto citizenry, but must be 
“internally related” to the lives and aspirations of citizens in such a manner that they can 
understand for themselves (ibid. 100). 
In line with the republican view, our legal order, including rights and laws, is therefore 
legitimised by the citizens. In other words, rights and laws are functionally and not 
normatively justified (ibid. 1996a: 112).  Their justification does not rest in natural law, 
natural rights or any comprehensive doctrine, but in deliberation. As noted earlier, rights and 
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laws are necessary mechanisms put in place through deliberation in order to deal with the 
complexity of modern society without needing to be engaged in non-stop deliberation in 
perpetuity (ibid. 1996a: 327). They are also necessary, however, to ensure that individuals 
participate on equal standing in the deliberative process (Cohen, 1996: 104-105). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, political, civil and social rights help to enable citizens to 
engage with each other with equal dignity. In this sense too, rights do not have some 
metaphysical basis. They are merely instrumental in ensuring that all citizens are treated as 
equal (ibid. 107). Given that rights are necessary to maintain the integrity of the deliberative, 
legitimisation process but are also products of such a process, Habermas claims that private 
and public autonomy are “co-original” or interdependent (Habermas, 1996a: 107, 314). 
Neither one comes before the other. Each one needs the other at the same time in order to 
function. 
Furthermore, the discourse principle implies that a consensus be obtained on all generalizable 
interests. It is this requirement that introduces deliberation as a candidate for the basis of 
solidarity in diverse and interconnected societies. In the individualist liberal or “aggregative” 
model of political participation, citizens never need to leave their own “private and parochial 
pursuits” and engage with others to pursue collective projects (Young, 1996: 120-121). They 
never need to publicly recognise each other. Citizens need merely hope that their particular 
preferences outweigh that of others. In the deliberative model, on the other hand, the 
consensus requirement forces us to convince others to accept our arguments (Cohen, 1996: 
101). Reason needs to be communicative, in which an argument proceeds by a series of 
arguments and counterarguments in order to reach the “better argument” that can form the 
basis for a consensus (Habermas, 1991: 160). All the parties involved must be convinced that 
it is the best argument, therefore discourses are guided by the “force of the better argument” 
(Young, 1996: 121). All arguments are tested and the bad ones are flushed out (ibid.). 
Citizens cannot merely submit reasons that they personally, as individuals or particular 
groups, believe to be true. One’s reasons must be convincing to others, despite the diversity 
in comprehensive doctrines, cultures and/or other interests among the discourse participants 
(Cohen, 1996: 100). We will discuss the nature of the institutions necessary for this type of 
discourse in Section 4. 
Deliberative democracy therefore respects the autonomy of persons by requiring that 
decisions must be accepted by all affected people for those decisions to be justly imposed on 
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to those people (ibid. 102). In effect, citizens transform their individual preferences into 
“public-minded ends” and discuss together the validity of those ends and how best to 
accomplish them (Young, 1996: 121). Agreements achieved through the deliberative process 
have the result of reinforcing existing shared beliefs or producing new shared beliefs which 
creates “new social fact[s]”. This reinforcement of and newly created social facts generate a 
“motivating force” or solidarity between citizens (Habermas, 1996a: 147). Even when 
dialogue fails to produce consensus, it promotes an “enlarged mentality” by forcing people to 
give good reasons that can be understood by all (Benhabib, 2002: 143). Deliberation is 
therefore not only a basis for legitimacy but also solidarity through facilitating the learning of 
civic virtues, enhancing social knowledge and mobilising citizens behind collective concerns 
(Benhabib, 2002: 115; Cohen, 1996: 112). Discourse allows us to overcome our subjectivity 
and reinforces “the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity” or 
interconnectedness of the life-worlds of the participants (Habermas, 1984: 10). It is therefore 
not an individualist autonomy that is respected, but a relational autonomy, which includes the 
individual and his/her lifeworld. Deliberative democracy restores cooperative enterprise in 
society (Benhabib, 2002: 133) because it requires people to engage with each other and win 
each other’s support in order to promote their political interests. Deliberative democracy is 
therefore not only a basis for solidarity but an active catalyst for it. It does not only ensure 
that all people, regardless of their personal identities, are respected but requires them to 
actively collaborate in order to solve the problems undermining their solidarity and pursue 
collective interests. 
3. Criticism of deliberative democracy 
Despite the cogency of the argument for deliberative democracy, it has not been immune to 
criticism. In what follows, I turn to the criticisms by Iris Marion Young and Chantal Mouffe, 
both of whom set out to show that consensus in a diverse polis is undesirable. I first set out 
the terms of their criticisms, before demonstrating why they fail. I begin with the arguments 
that participants may not share the necessary understandings of each other’s experiences in 
order to convince their compatriots of the validity of their claims and that existing power 
relations between citizens may discourage and prevent them from reaching an understanding 
and advocating their interests. I then outline Mouffe’s agonistic model for democracy, which 
suggest that these differences between people are insurmountable and that we should rather 
aim at achieving temporary agreements between citizens under an arrangement of mutual 
respect. I will however show that Mouffe’s criticism undermines her own model for 
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democracy and that deliberative democracy does in fact provide a more effective way to 
facilitate mutual understanding and collaborative action between citizens. Nevertheless, I will 
point out that Young and Mouffe’s concerns do hold some water. These concerns however 
can be accommodated in deliberative democracy as I will demonstrate in the subsequent 
sections. 
3.1. The challenges to achieving consensus 
Writing in criticism of Habermas’s ideal of deliberative democracy, Young (1996: 125) 
argues that, according to the deliberative model, arguments must be transformed from 
“subjective desires to objective claims” and that the content of these arguments must often be 
adjusted to make these arguments “publicly speakable” in order for everyone to understand 
and relate to each other. Furthermore, each participant’s ideas concerning solutions have to 
be transformed or influenced by listening to the arguments and counterarguments of the other 
participants. However, Young identifies two problems with this model. In the first place, so 
she argues, there are no necessary sufficient shared understandings on which arguments for 
certain concerns can be made. Due to the diverse composition of the citizenry, they will have 
different experiences stemming from different circumstances. A wealthy person living in 
suburbia may have difficulty understanding the problems and interests of a poor person living 
in the countryside. Secondly, the assumption that everyone shares an understanding, or that 
only those interests that can be generalised should be put forward in deliberation, may 
actually discourage participants from trying to transcend their own perspectives and 
understand those of others. In line with the arguments discussed in the previous chapter 
concerning the role of cultural factors in the pursuit of equal dignity, Young (1996: 122-123) 
argues that it is not only economic and political factors that may prevent citizens from 
participating in deliberation on an equal footing. Cultural and other social factors, such as 
internalised beliefs or prejudices concerning the style of permissible speech and profile of 
permissible speakers, may also contribute to unequal power relations. One cannot assume that 
the model of deliberative democracy would be culturally neutral. Norms of deliberation are 
often culturally specific which can function as a form of power that devalue or silence the 
participation of other groups. The deliberative model needs to recognise that power also 
enters speech. 
The dominant group in deliberation often fails to notice these unequal power relations, while 
the groups that are in the weaker positions, are often left frustrated, becoming angry or 
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“losing confidence in themselves” (ibid. 124). Deliberative democrats may agree with this 
claim and argue that unity should therefore not be regarded as a starting point but the goal of 
deliberation (ibid. 126). One can therefore begin a discussion by allowing any kind of claim 
into the discussion, but then gradually deliberate collectively towards claims and arguments 
that can be shared by all. Common agreements are not achieved by finding the least common 
denominators, but by changing the perspectives of others. However, Young (ibid. 126) is 
sceptical about such an approach as well, for it is usually the less privileged who need to 
change their perspectives and leave the most of their cultural particularities behind. 
The unity at the starting point of deliberation is much weaker than what deliberate theorists 
assumes. It is a unity constituted by geographic proximity and economic interdependence and 
not much more. As Young phrases it, “a polity consists of people who live together, who are 
stuck with one another” (ibid.). This fact is illustrated if one looks at how deliberation takes 
place in practice. Deliberation in legislatures is more often than not driven by competition. 
Representatives participate to win, not to achieve mutual understanding. When one submits to 
the so-called “better argument” one is in effect conceding defeat, which is something political 
parties avoid at all costs. Therefore, Young (ibid.) suggests that we should learn from the 
“agonistic model” of democracy, which gives due recognition for the role that - and methods 
by which - power plays in deliberation. 
Mouffe provides such an agonistic model, which she has developed and advocated as an 
opposition to the deliberative model developed by Habermas. Drawing inspiration from 
Wittgenstein, Schmitt, Derrida and Laclau, Mouffe challenges the fundamental assumptions 
on which deliberative democracy is based and proposes an alternative conception of 
democracy called “agonistic pluralism” (Erman, 2009: 1043; Roskamm, 2015: 386-387, 391-
392; Tambakaki, 2009: 105; Wenman, 2013: 4).2 The main thrust of Mouffe’s argument is 
that consensus-driven democratic models such as deliberative democracy do not take into 
consideration the true nature of “the political” and this neglect may in fact exacerbate the 
instability and conflict in diverse societies instead of harmonising it (Wenman, 2013: 181). 
By “the political” she means the power dynamics between citizens. 
Following from Young’s criticism, Mouffe (1999: 751-752) argues that there are obstacles to 
the equal standing of citizens in the deliberative process that are not empirical or even 
                                               
2 It should be noted that Mouffe is not the only proponent of agonistic pluralism. Other notable advocates 
include William Connolly, James Tully and Bonnie Honig (Wenman, 2013: vii). 
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epistemological, but ontological. In other words, citizens’ equal standing cannot be 
guaranteed by improving any of the empirical circumstances of citizens. The very existence 
of a discussion is constituted by antagonism and unequal power relations. In fact, a discussion 
would not be possible if there is no antagonism between people and their belief systems. This 
inherent antagonism on the ontological level can be illustrated by semiotics. Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1961: 116) argues that the nuances in the meanings of the synonyms “dread”, 
“fear” and “to be afraid” depend on their opposition to each other. If one of these words is 
removed from our vocabulary, its particular meaning collapses into one of the other 
synonyms. With the disappearance of each synonym, the remaining words becomes 
increasingly vague. Similarly, in the political sphere, an identity can only exist if there is an 
opposition to it. There can only be an “us”, if there is a “them” (Erman, 2009: 1043). 
Identities are therefore indeed, as Habermas claims, inherently relational, but they are 
relational in that they are constituted by their exclusion of other identities in a hierarchical 
structure. This exclusion and unequal structuring are acts of power. Thus, power is not 
something “external” to our identities which can be eliminated, as suggested by deliberative 
democrats. Power forms the very structure of our identities (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 107, 
115; Mouffe, 1993: 141; Wenman, 2013: 184). 
Mouffe (1999: 749-750) therefore argues that one cannot make distinctions between “moral” 
and “ethical”, or “procedural” and “substantial” in order to contain power. It is a mistake to 
think that procedures can somehow be “above” or separate from substantial ideas of life. If 
language itself, i.e. the medium by which we set and communicate procedures, is already 
constituted by substantial ideas, it is impossible that the procedures that govern the content of 
deliberation can be free of the power dynamics of particular life forms. In other words, even 
before agreeing to a particular procedure, one has already subjugated oneself to a particular 
form of life by accepting a particular language of communication to discuss the procedure. 
Therefore, there is no distinction between “procedural” and “substantial” or “moral” and 
“ethical.” All processes and moral rules, including the language that we use to discuss them, 
“involve substantial ethical commitments” (ibid. 749) and are therefore contaminated by 
unequal power relations. 
The inescapability of ethical commitments has significant implications for how we evaluate 
fairness. If certain life forms may already be excluded at the lingual and procedural levels of 
deliberation, it is problematic to assume that arguments can only be valid if they are 
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reasonable. Stanley Cavell (1990: 38) poses the question, “What if there is a cry of justice 
that expresses a sense not of having lost out in an unequal yet fair struggle, but of having 
from the start being left out.” A voice could be excluded if the language or process of 
deliberation is in conflict with the form of life represented by the voice. If a person or group 
of people feel that their voices are being systematically excluded in decision-making 
processes, they may subvert the political system and resort to physical violence, as we have 
seen in the cases of terrorism (Wenman, 2013: 181). 
Therefore, according to Mouffe, the focus of deliberative democracy is incorrect: “If we 
accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main question of 
democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power that 
are compatible with democratic values” (Mouffe, 1999: 753). There will always be an “us” 
and a “them”. This distinction can only disappear on the surface, when one group has 
subjugated another, rendering deliberation moot. The purpose of democracy should therefore 
not be to remove this distinction by a so-called consensus, which in reality only suppresses 
difference. Instead, the challenge is to establish an “us” and a “them” that is conducive to a 
pluralistic democracy in which people respect each other’s differences (Mouffe, 2000: 101). 
The first step is to see “them” or “the other” not as an enemy, but as an adversary, a 
“legitimate enemy”. In other words, “somebody with whose ideas we are going to struggle 
but whose right to defend those ideas we will not put into question” (Mouffe, 1999: 755). 
This transformation from antagonist to adversary takes place by agreeing to the “ethico-
political principles of democracy: liberty and equality” (Mouffe, 2000: 102), in other words 
by respecting the political conception of personhood. However, we cannot resolve our 
conflicts by rational deliberation. We can only resolve our differences by either being 
persuaded to the position of the adversary or by agreeing to compromises that are understood 
as “temporary respites” in a continuous confrontation. Resolution of differences will 
therefore always be “a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of 
power” which will always entail “some form of exclusion.” The consensus that guides 
deliberation will always be a “conflictual consensus” for it will inevitably be grounded on a 
certain ethical and political belief which can be interpreted differently by every citizen. 
Deliberation should therefore be conceptualised as a “mixed-game” which is partly 
collaborative and partly conflictual (Mouffe, 1999: 755-756). 
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Agonistic pluralism helps us to resist the temptation to oversimplify our interactions and 
become too optimistic about the scope or finality of our agreements (ibid. 757). If we 
acknowledge that antagonism and conflict is inherent to our identities and relations to others, 
we need to arrange our institutions in such a way that there are appropriate channels or 
platforms for dissenting voices, that these voices are brought to the fore and that the contest 
between these voices is facilitated in a constructive manner. Otherwise dissent may erupt into 
violence (Mouffe, 2000: 33-34; 2005: 21, 30; Wenman, 2013: 197). 
3.2. Flaws in the argument for agonistic democracy 
However, there are good reasons to reject Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism and her concomitant 
criticisms of deliberative democracy. In the first place, we might question Mouffe’s claims 
about the insurmountability of difference. Antagonists or adversaries cannot claim that their 
differences are incommensurable and yet be able to compare them with each other. In order 
for a comparison to be possible and for the parties to understand that there is an antagonist 
relationship in the first place, there must be a common frame of reference as a starting point. 
There must in fact be some sort of consensus or “shared symbolic space” present (Erman 
2015: 1046). If there is no consensus concerning the frame of reference, there can be no 
communication between individuals. The communication would amount to nonsense. 
Therefore, even before antagonists accept ethico-political principles of democracy in order to 
transform from antagonists to adversaries, they must share a common understanding in order 
to understand why it is necessary to transform themselves into adversaries and what is needed 
for this transformation. It is clear therefore that the transition from antagonist to adversary is 
a moral choice. But Mouffe cannot ground this moral choice, for that would imply that the 
two individuals share the same moral framework (ibid. 1049). Deliberative democracy seems 
to provide a more accurate account of conflict. Conflict, understood as dialogue in which 
participants make opposing validity claims, is dependent on a “shared idea of what is at 
stake” (ibid. 1047). A dialogue based on a basic consensus is constitutive of conflict, for 
without a basic mutual understanding there can be no conflict. 
Furthermore, Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism proposes no theory for why a decision may or 
may not be legitimate. In the absence of such a theory, agonistic pluralism may in fact be 
guilty of its own charge by essentialising and romanticising “the local”, which downplay the 
inequalities that may exist within a particular group. Minority groups, claiming to be 
excluded from the democratic process, are not necessarily “benign and progressive”. Their 
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leaders are often guilty within their own groups of the accusations they raise against the 
wider society. Furthermore, the emphasis on difference may underplay the 
interconnectedness of “the local” to its greater social and political context, which constitutes 
its very existence, as cosmopolitan theorists such as Waldron would argue. Therefore, 
Mouffe is accused of celebrating pluralism “without sufficiently problematizing it” (Mohan 
& Stokke, 2000: 249). Without a theory in agonistic pluralism that dictates whether a certain 
decision may be legitimate or not, there is no incentive provided to groups to act in a 
democratic manner. Without such a theory, it seems like the decision is left to the groups. 
They must voluntarily decide whether to engage in a democratic manner or not. The risk is 
that authoritarian practices may be condoned (Kapoor, 2002: 472-473). 
In terms of adjudicating or reconciling difference, Habermas’s proposed deliberative 
democracy is superior to that of Mouffe’s, for it espouses the idea of an “enlarged mentality”. 
The commitment to communicative rationality helps us to obtain distance, if only partially, 
from our own biases and vested interests, see different claims in new light and obtaining a 
better understanding of which claims have a greater basis for validity (Kapoor, 2002: 474). 
Mouffe, on the other hand, claims that there is no objective point from which one can 
adjudicate difference. One can only distinguish between just and unjust within a given 
tradition (Mouffe, 1993: 15). But how does one then adjudicate claims between more than 
one tradition, and, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, why would we want to 
adjudicate differences if we do not share a common value system (Kapoor, 2002: 475)? It is 
for this reason that Benhabib (1996: 71) accuses “antifoundationalist” theories, such as 
agonistic pluralism, of circular argumentation. 
However, Mark Wenman (2013: 6) argues that agonistic pluralism should not be considered 
as antifoundationalist, but rather postfoundationalist. Mouffe’s intention is not to invalidate 
the foundations on which consensus-driven models of democracy are built, but rather to 
weaken them. Mouffe makes us vigilant of the incessant power dynamics in society and 
careful not to naively suppress dissent. Furthermore, Young (1996: 127) also moderates some 
of Mouffe’s claims by elucidating her own criticisms of deliberative democracy by 
suggesting that we need not assume and expect “total” difference in our interaction with 
others. We do share some understandings. The important point is that we cannot assume that 
everyone can be assimilated into the same procedural and value framework or agreement. 
Instead we should focus on learning from others. Listening and not only speaking should be 
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more emphatically valued (ibid. 130). By expecting to encounter difference and being aware 
of those differences, instead of assuming unity or sameness, one is better prepared to 
transform one’s own perspectives (ibid. 127). Furthermore, it is important to stress that 
understanding does not mean identification. A part of the understanding is that there is a part 
of the other’s experience that remains outside of one’s understanding (ibid. 127-128). The 
learning and transformation that need to take place in oneself can be described more 
specifically as follows (ibid. 128): Firstly, confrontation with differences teaches one that 
one’s own perspective is partial. Secondly, by knowing that one is deliberating with others 
who have understandings different from one’s own and who have the right to challenge one’s 
claims, forces one to change one’s arguments from expressions of self-interest to arguments 
for justice. However, it does not follow that one’s arguments need to be expressed as general 
interests. Sometimes justice requires an obligation from the larger society to accommodate 
the particular needs of “uniquely situated persons.” Nevertheless, one still needs to express 
one’s argument in a way that appeals across difference. Thirdly, this whole process 
contributes to the knowledge of participants. People become aware of how claims affect 
others and how everyone’s perspectives are embedded in the wider societal picture. This 
improves people’s ability to deliberate in the future and arrive at conclusions to everybody’s 
benefit. However, these suggestions by Young does not invalidate deliberative democracy, 
but enhances it by giving us a guide for achieving mutual understanding across differences 
and adjusts our expectations for the achievable extent of this mutual understanding. 
Nevertheless, both Mouffe and Young rightly points out that a consensus-driven model has 
the potential of suppressing difference. Ilan Kapoor (2002: 469) agrees that an obsessive 
insistence on consensus can silence the voices of minorities or less dominant groups. 
Consensus runs the risk of simplifying a community, expressing its wishes in a one-
dimensional way. A consensus may have practical benefits in terms of enabling action and 
generating results, but it has the risk of coercing a certain point of view onto dissenters. As 
affirmed earlier by the comment by Cavell, a consensus-driven model may have the illusion 
of democracy, but even when minorities are included, their voices may not be included or 
considered in the consensus, due to procedures that favour a certain way of speaking or 
formulating one’s arguments. Groups that have been historically disadvantaged might lack 
the assertiveness or poise to convincingly voice their opinions. The expectation that 
participants should transcend their cultural particularity or private lives in order to reach a 
consensus may actually perpetuate the problems experienced in those spheres. Cultures that 
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are under threat or under pressure from dominant cultures may be further undermined, since 
this “transcendence” expect them to ignore the very aspects of their lives that are of concern 
to them. Similarly, transcending the private domain may ignore the oppression that women 
experience (ibid. 469-470). 
These are serious concerns that do pose a challenge to deliberative democracy’s ability to be 
basis for solidarity in diverse societies. However, these criticisms can be adequately 
addressed within the deliberative model. In the next section, I will look at why these 
criticisms fail and demonstrate how Habermas, with the help of Benhabib, resolves the 
remaining problems facing the viability of consensus. 
4. Overcoming the criticisms  
4.1. The decentred public sphere 
The concerns about the accommodation of difference in the deliberative process are 
addressed by looking at how Habermas and Benahbib envisage the institutions and processes 
that facilitate deliberative democracy. 
A possible reason for why Young and others may be sceptical about the accessibility of 
discourse is that they may have a limited view of the public sphere in which citizen exercise 
their political powers. Habermas (1996a: 301) argues that popular sovereignty cannot only be 
realised if the citizenry is present in one big legislature to self-legislate, as advocated by the 
traditional republican view, nor can the self-legislative function of citizens be “banished” to 
constitutional structures, in terms of the classical liberal view. Furthermore, Habermas 
recognises that ethical issues cannot be excluded from the public discourse, for then it would 
be impossible to change the attitudes and conditions, pointed out by Young in the preceding 
section, that may be impeding people’s ability to participate in public discourses on equal 
footing. Benhabib (2002: 118-119) also agrees that it is important for minority or less 
dominant groups to be engaged fully in the deliberative process and be able to explain their 
grievances and claims and therefore the public sphere must be designed in a way that 
accommodates and encourages this engagement. 
It is important to keep in mind that private and public autonomy are co-original in 
deliberative democracy. They have a complementary relationship. That means, in turn, that 
the boundary between them is not incontestable. In fact, Habermas (1991: 101) argues that 
the boundary should be continuously redefined. Benhabib (2002: 121) agrees and argues that 
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we cannot shield any domain of people’s lives from public discourse, for that is precisely 
how unequal power relations are maintained. All issues should at least be open for discussion, 
even though we may come to the conclusion not to legislate in response to the issues raised. 
Habermas’s vision of deliberative democracy has a decentred view of the public sphere, 
according to which the latter is not only constituted by the legislature, but also by the 
informal arenas of communication in civil society. “The model no longer starts with the 
macrosubject of a communal whole but with anonymously intermeshing discourses” (ibid. 
505). Therefore, Habermas (ibid. 171) suggests that the legislature is not the only public 
sphere or, put differently, it does not constitute the whole public sphere. There must be 
various other informal public spheres that can influence its decision-making. Benhabib (2002: 
106) calls this view of the public sphere a “dual track approach”. On the one track one finds 
the legislature and judiciary. On the other track one finds social movements, associations and 
other groups in civil society. These “tracks” or spheres must, however, be strongly 
interconnected in order to work effectively. Only then can popular sovereignty be fully 
realised. The legislature would undermine popular sovereignty and thereby its own 
legitimacy if it is to detach itself from the spontaneous contributions by informal public 
spheres (Habermas, 1996a: 183-184). Only if there is a robust interplay and interdependence 
between the institutionalised, formal deliberative procedures in the legislature and the 
informal, spontaneous deliberations in the broader public sphere “could citizenship mean 
more today than the aggregation of pre-political individual interests and the passive 
enjoyment of rights bestowed by a paternalistic authority” (ibid. 506). 
This decentred view allows deliberative democracy to accommodate different types and 
styles of discourses (Habermas, 1984: 42). Benhabib (2002: 115) prioritises the informal 
public sphere, i.e. civil society, as the space for the “articulation, contestation, and resolution 
of normative discourses.” It is in the broader “public sphere, situated in civil society,” where 
multicultural deliberations take place. This is where learning and value transformations occur 
(ibid. 106). This sphere is also less constrained by procedural regulation and thus better suited 
for contests over needs (Habermas, 1996a: 314). It is also therefore better suited for different 
styles of articulation. 
The decentred view has other benefits as well. The two most important considerations 
relevant for this thesis is that the view provides a more realistic model for political 
participation in today’s sizeable and complex polities and thereby also does not place a 
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theoretical limit on the size of the polity. The informal public sphere is closer to the reach of 
the average citizen and there is no particular reason why there needs to be a limit on the 
number of interconnected informal public spheres, thus placing no theoretical limit on the 
size of the polity. 
It is, however, imperative that the different components of the broader public sphere are 
interconnected, not only to ensure that the opinions of citizens reach the legislature and fully 
realise popular sovereignty, but also to ensure that people’s opinions reach each other and 
everyone is included in the process of “enlarging their mentalities”. At the end of his term, 
USA President Barack Obama (NBC News, 2017) called for a “common conversation” that is 
needed to bridge the steep ideological divides between Americans. If all the components of 
the public sphere are not meaningfully connected, they will become echo-chambers for 
partisan viewpoints and undermine the integrative project of deliberative democracy. The 
media may have a crucial role to play in this task, but citizens, themselves, also has the 
responsibility to not insulate themselves. 
In summary, a decentred view of the public sphere would provide less dominant groups with 
the appropriate spaces to voice their concerns in their manner of choosing. This view of the 
public sphere also dispels the criticism raised by nationalists in Chapter 2 that the type of 
political participation necessary to provide a basis for solidarity is not possible in today’s 
territorial and complex societies. In the next section, we will deal with the remaining 
problems of consensus. 
4.2. Consensus and communicative presuppositions 
Given the importance of the discourse principle for deliberative democracy (see the 
discussion under section 2 above), consensus is, of course, an important aim. However, 
Habermas (1996a: 167) agrees with Young and Mouffe that consensus is not always 
appropriate. It may be applicable to all generalizable interests and is essential in determining 
the moral principles that need to guide deliberative process, but when dealing with particular 
interests, bargaining and compromises may be permissible and necessary. As Benhabib 
(2002: 130) writes, we must learn to accept and live with the “otherness of others.” 
Nevertheless, compromises may never stand on their own. They should still be the products 
of a deliberative process which is ruled by principles that have been agreed on through a 
consensus. Those deliberative processes are the source of their legitimacy. In this way, 
compromises are still anchored in consensus (Habermas, 1991: 205; 1996a: 167), although it 
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may be a consensus on a more abstract or general level. A consensus on this higher level is 
achievable, for as we have pointed in the responses to Mouffe’s criticism of deliberative 
democracy (see Section 3.2 above), in order for communication to be possible and to 
understand that there is conflict between claims to begin with, participants must share a 
symbolic space. 
What is more, the arguments raised against the idea of a consensus are often overstated. Most 
topics that are deliberated do not concern issues that are incommensurable but instead 
concern “divergent and convergent beliefs” (Benhabib (2002: 136). The only way to 
determine the depth of these differences is to engage in dialogue and not assume their 
incommensurability beforehand. We need to keep in mind that people’s belief systems are not 
perfect. They are not totally coherent. Likewise, the building of convergence through 
deliberation might not be “perfect” or seamless either (ibid. 136-137). The argument of 
“social positionality”, which Young seems to endorse, which claims that people who do not 
share a certain identity can never really understand the experiences of people of that identity 
is problematic, for it relies on the assumption that those identities and experiences are fully 
coherent, homogenous and can be clearly delineated. It is an essentialist viewpoint. But this is 
a false assumption. As Benhabib (ibid. 137) put it, “there are no such holistic structures of 
consciousness.” The idea of a unitary consciousness is a fiction. It reduces “the contentious 
debates of every human group about itself and its identity to a coherent and easily delineable 
narrative.” Moreover, we understand “the other” not only through translation but also through 
familiarisation. Through translation, we only identify those aspects of another’s belief system 
that already exist in our own. But through familiarisation, we learn about the others’ beliefs 
and practices that do not necessarily have equivalents in our systems (ibid. 137-138). That is 
not to say that difference can be completely overcome, but more of it can be overcome than 
what Young and others might suggest. At least the most relevant and significant parts of a 
difference can be overcome. 
In order to ensure that consensuses and other agreements are not forced upon less dominant 
groups and therefore may indeed claim legitimacy, certain presuppositions need to be 
protected in deliberative processes. Decentring the public sphere is not sufficient. Habermas 
(1996a: 325) recognises that there are multiple asymmetries between citizens that need to be 
taken into account, including unequal access to information, natural cognitive abilities, 
prejudices, etc. In terms of unequal power relations, it is essential that every citizen is 
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liberated from “the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation” in order 
for them to effectively participate in the opinion and will formation processes of the broader 
public sphere and allow cultural diversity to flourish and not be oppressed (ibid. 308). 
Benhabib (1996: 70) suggests that the following presuppositions should govern all discourses 
in order to ensure the validity of decisions: 
1. Participation is governed by the principles of “equality and symmetry; all have the 
same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate.” 
2. Anyone can question the topics to be discussed on the agenda. 
3. Anyone can question the rules of deliberation and their application. 
Habermas (1991: 89) proposes a similar list. It is important, though, that these 
presuppositions are determined and agreed upon through a moral discourse between the 
citizens. There is a danger of circularity here, given that rules and deliberation are co-
original. However, given the decentred nature of the public sphere, one can imagine that 
pressure from informal spaces would build-up and inevitably ensure that the appropriate 
presuppositions are eventually agreed upon in formal bodies. It is important to note that 
Benhabib (2002: 107) expects, as far as it is possible, that the presuppositions listed above 
should seep into the informal public sphere as well. Since the informal public sphere is not as 
strictly regulated as the formal public sphere, the onus rests on citizens to take responsibility 
for their behaviour and voluntarily regular discussions in accordance to these presuppositions. 
Being open to critical feedback from “outside” specific spheres and/or investing in 
experienced, respected and/or “outside” facilitators might be practical means for citizens to 
achieve this. For this reason, Habermas (1996a: 317) suggests that along with a decentred 
public sphere, ideally a liberal culture with appropriate forms of socialisation should also be 
encouraged for deliberative democracy to function optimally.  
Habermas (1991: 91) does, however, acknowledge that it is impossible to obtain complete 
symmetry between citizens. Full compliance with presuppositions is unfeasible. There are all 
kinds of contingent factors that could distort discourses. Persons are not “Kant’s intelligible 
characters but real human beings” (ibid. 92). Therefore, we need to be satisfied with 
approximations. We only need to expect that conditions for a valid discourse have been 
“realised in an approximation adequate enough” (ibid. 91). Habermas is not concerned about 
this practical limitation, however. Habermas (1996a: 301) believes that the fallibility of the 
individual’s ability to reason and of arenas for deliberation to uphold communicative 
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presuppositions are mitigated through the aggregated flow of deliberations in the broader 
public sphere. As long as there are conflicts in society, consensus cannot be considered as 
final – not necessarily because of the exclusion or subjugation of people, as Mouffe might 
suggest, but because life-worlds are constantly in flux. The facts on the ground change. 
Claims may lose value and relevance to the concerned parties. There will however be 
exclusion and subjugation as well. Nevertheless, they are not insurmountable. It may just take 
time to rectify power imbalances and prejudices and overcome these challenges. A good 
example is the gender movements that succeeded in influencing legislation on marital rape, 
domestic violence, child abuse and sexual harassment by broadening the agenda of public 
discourse (Benhabib, 2002: 121). Public “struggle” is necessary for concerns to succeed 
through the different channels of the public sphere and end-up in the legislature (Habermas, 
1996a: 314). 
In summary then, the deliberative model deals adequately with the concerns of difference for 
it allows compromises in order to deal with particularistic needs when necessary, as long as 
these compromises are reached through processes established by consensus. However, as 
Benhabib argues, we should not overstate the obstruction to consensus that difference may 
cause and be too easily discouraged. Identities are not rigid nor completely coherent and our 
understanding of each other need not to be completely coherent either and can be an evolving 
process. Nevertheless, certain presuppositions must be maintained during discourses in order 
to ensure that discussions are accessible, fair and effective, and individual citizens have the 
duty to uphold these presuppositions in less regulated public forums. However, even if some 
forums fail to do so, the greater flow of discourses would mitigate these shortcomings. 
5. A basis for solidarity in diverse societies 
Now that we have a general understanding of deliberative democracy, let us summarise the 
specific characteristics that qualify deliberative democracy as a basis for citizen solidarity. 
Given its respect for the autonomy and dignity of the individual, deliberative democracy 
complies with the political conception of the person. By requiring that the justification of the 
constitution, rights and laws must rest on a consensus by citizens, it imposes no pre-political 
content on the citizen. It also does not draw a rigid line between the private and public 
domain, allowing discussion on any matter concerning the lives of citizens, including 
discussion related to the private identities of individuals. Discriminatory practices have 
nowhere to hide. At the same time, it respects people’s personal identities and mobilises 
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citizens for cooperative action by requiring that agreement on norms should be a consensus. 
The requirement of consensus constrains citizens to engage in a type of discourse that 
promotes mutual understanding. Furthermore, the decentred view of the public sphere allows 
room for ethical discourses in whatever style preferred, makes political participation feasible 
and removes the theoretical limit on the scope of the polity. The maintenance of 
communicative presuppositions helps us to be at least vigilant about power dynamics within 
discourses and gives citizens recourse if they feel suppressed. For example, citizens would be 
able to appeal to the violation of these preconditions when they experience undue exclusion 
or other forms of unfairness. Imperfect compliance with communicative presuppositions in a 
particular space is corrected by the larger back-and-forth flow of discourses in the decentred 
public sphere. 
All these elements are important to ensure that deliberative democracy can be a viable basis 
for solidarity in a diverse, democratic society. However, it is important to grasp that the crux 
of deliberative democracy’s potential to ground solidarity lies in the actual discussion itself; it 
is not a function of the outcome of any particular deliberation. Although outputs are 
important for people to maintain faith in deliberative democracy, they are contingent and 
make them a shifty foundation for solidarity. If we are to heed the warnings of Young and 
Mouffe, we should also be careful of the potential power differentials in any consensus. 
Unlike the living nature of a deliberation, the perceived finality of a consensus has a greater 
smothering effect on hope for recourse. It is important, therefore, that any consensus is 
understood as being at least somewhat provisional. At the same time, it cannot be provisional 
to the degree that any consensus becomes a de facto compromise and loses its power to 
encourage mutual understanding. Some measure of finality, perhaps provided by the 
incorporation of a time clause, is therefore warranted. 
In the longer-run, consensuses are and should however be provisional. Not only to maintain 
the faith and loyalty of those who feel they were unduly excluded, but also for the sake of 
relevance in our ever-changing intersubjective life-worlds. If a consensus loses its relevance, 
it may become a real tool for exclusion and oppression, if it was not already so at the outset. 
Basing our solidarity on consensus could therefore concretise such consensus in a way that 
would ultimately undermine that very solidarity. This danger is the problem with 
constitutional patriotism conceptualised as solidarity based on the particularistic political 
culture of a polity. There are some theorists who argue that constitutional patriotism can be 
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salvaged, however, if reconceptualised to be based on a procedural identity (Hedrick, 2010: 
177). Ciaran Cronin (2003) makes the important distinction that constitutional patriotism is 
not a substantive identity but a procedural one. Jan-Werner Müller (2007: 142) illustrates that 
constitutional patriotism is based on “an ongoing, critical process of attachment, revision, and 
re-attachment.” Conceptualised in this manner the difference between constitutional 
patriotism and liberalism nationalism is not a matter of degree or thickness but of 
fundamental design. We can therefore accept constitutional patriotism as a valid basis for 
citizen solidarity if the target of our patriotism is the process of deliberation and not the 
outcome.  
Consensus is essential to ensure that discourse is cooperative. It is this function that forms the 
core of the basis of solidarity in a diverse and interconnected society. Chipkin (2007: 214-
217) suggests that a public identity built and maintained through a democratic procedure, 
instead of any settled or pre-political content, increases the probability that one judges the 
reasoning and demands of other citizens on their merits, i.e. the underpinning empirical 
evidence and logical soundness of arguments. It opens up citizens to the possibility of 
connections with others that may otherwise be blocked if citizens had substantive, 
preconceived criteria to which their fellow citizens had to conform before they could qualify 
as candidates with whom they can experience solidarity. In contrast, the citizen adhering to a 
nationalist identity or a pre-political set of rights is caught in “a structure of circularity,” in 
which “any opening to the other is closed off.” Chipkin argues that as soon as an individual 
adheres to and upholds a national identity, “he ceases to belong to that world where strangers 
meet as equals and learn to like or dislike each other on the basis of their social qualities 
(common interests, common values, sense of humour, and so on)” (ibid. 2017). The social 
qualities of an individual, which may be truer to his/her character, are trumped by the 
imagined national identity to which he/she belongs. Regardless of how much Person A and B 
may have in common, the fact that they do not share the same national identity, disconnects 
them. Chipkin (ibid. 217) describes the nationalist domain as a place “where people do not 
meet as equals, but always already as representatives of ‘peoples’.” One ceases therefore to 
be an autonomous being and instead measure one’s self and others by the preconceptions 
attached to one’s and others’ respective identities. Confirming Habermas’s claim (discussed 
in Chapter 2) that citizenship attached to a national identity is Janus-faced, Chipkin (ibid.) 
writes that the “[t]he nationalist subject is rigidly caught in a paradoxical structure where his 
or her relation to others is defined in advance, before meeting or experiencing them […] 
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Every encounter is always already closed: it can only confirm what one already knows.” For 
example, black people are expected to be incompetent, white people are expected to be racist 
and Indians are expected to be devious. When engaging with individuals representing these 
“peoples”, one seeks confirmation of these preconceptions instead of focusing on the 
individual in front of one and searching for the aspects that one shares and could potentially 
connect each other (ibid.). “They are indifferent to empirical vicissitudes, because their 
attitude to other persons and things is always already built into their identity as authentic 
national subjects” (ibid.). An identity based on a commitment to deliberative procedure is 
therefore not only more inclusive in itself, but also equips the bearer with a mind-set to 
engage with difference in an open and cooperative manner. We can therefore accept that 
deliberative democracy is valid basis for citizen solidarity in diverse societies. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued in favour of a particular model of political participation, namely 
deliberative democracy, as a basis for solidarity. I first demonstrated that neither the 
aggregative nor the republican model of participation succeeds in providing a basis for 
solidarity. Following this, I turned to the theory of deliberative democracy developed by 
Habermas, Benhabib and others. My aim here was to demonstrate that deliberative 
democracy succeeds as a basis for solidarity where all other candidates screened in this thesis 
have failed. A national identity does not succeed for its imposition violates the autonomy and 
dignity of citizens. Rights alone are not an adequate basis for solidarity, for they are unable to 
address the problems related to the power dynamics and cultural or social differences 
between citizens. Heeding the criticism of Young and Mouffe, I have shown that the 
solidarity-creating potential of deliberative democracy lies primarily in the procedure of 
deliberation rather than in its outcome. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to find the basis for solidarity among a citizenry that is 
characterised by ever increasing diversity. 
In Chapter 1, I started the journey by interrogating the popular assumptions of personhood 
underlying the idea of citizenship in liberal democracies. I demonstrated that an individualist 
outlook on personhood fails to appreciate the social embeddedness of individuals. Therefore, 
we cannot assume that liberalism, as a comprehensive doctrine, should be shared by all 
citizens. Instead, we should look at liberalism’s ability to provide us with a political 
conception of personhood, one that only includes those conditions necessary for citizens with 
diverse belief systems to establish a fair and cooperative political community. 
In Chapter 2, I examined the use of national identity as basis for solidarity among citizens. I 
demonstrated how national identity can bolster the ethical ties of the citizenry and motivate 
them to make sacrifices for each other. I also showed, however, that establishing and 
maintaining a national identity comes at a cost to the citizen’s autonomy that cannot be 
reconciled with the political conception of the person accepted in Chapter 1. Building a 
national identity on the political culture of a polity instead of a substantive culture may 
mitigate the violation of a citizen’s freedoms, but it will remain an obstacle. 
In Chapter 3, I asked whether the distribution of rights could be a basis for solidarity. I 
demonstrated that rights do have a connection to solidarity by contributing to the equal 
dignity of citizens. I argued that it is important that rights are sourced from a political 
conception of justice in order to be reconciled with our political conception of personhood. I 
argued that an equal distribution of rights fails to adequately address the needs and grievances 
of less dominant social groups and explored the possibility of expanding the scheme of rights 
to include special group rights. I demonstrated that differentiated rights will not solve all the 
problems experienced by minorities, for their assumptions are often based on an incomplete 
view of a citizen’s social embeddedness and they may in fact undermine mutual 
understanding. 
Chapter 4 considered whether political participation as a possible basis for solidarity. I 
showed that neither an aggregative nor a classical republican model could succeed in 
generating solidarity in diverse and complex societies. I argued, instead, that deliberative 
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democracy could theoretically succeed in being a basis of solidarity in diverse and complex 
societies in so far as it is inclusive of diversity in all its forms, viable in expansive political 
communities and purposefully orientates citizens to mutual understanding. 
Indeed, deliberative democracy provides us with a good theoretical framework in which 
citizen solidarity can be nurtured. However, as already briefly noted in Chapter 4 Section 4.2, 
Habermas himself argues that it will not work optimally if it is not accompanied by various 
complementary initiatives to equip the citizenry with the knowledge and values that will 
motivate and enable them to participate in a constructive manner. A more practical, evidence-
based investigation is needed to develop the model of deliberative democracy further and 
make it suitable for our society of today. 
The role of the media will probably feature prominently in such an investigation. Arguably, it 
constitutes a significant part of the broader public sphere and has the biggest reach across the 
citizenry. The media needs to help ensure that people are exposed to different sides of issues, 
explaining the deeper, inside and background stories in language and idioms that are 
accessible to average citizens. At the same time, the media cannot fulfil this role if there is 
not sufficient demand for it. Civic education will therefore probably also have to be included 
in the research. If citizens are not educated to be critically minded, recognise the complicated 
nature of contentious issues and be open for and listening to others’ claims, sensational, so-
called “fake news” and partisan media outlets will thrive and play a counter-productive role 
in a deliberative democracy. This scenario is vividly illustrated by the media landscape in the 
United States of America. Given that the media has a profit motive, there must be a demand 
for quality journalism and a broad rejection of conspicuous over-simplifications, 
sensationalism and partisanship in order to encourage the media to be more responsible. The 
implementation of a civic education can be helpful. A civic education can teach civic virtues 
to citizens, preferably from an early stage, helping them to understand the value and master 
the ability of listening to others, changing one’s mind and being reasonable when making 
claims. It may also help citizens to become public-spirited and eagerly participate in civil 
society. 
There should also be a deliberate effort to clear up the confusion between the relation 
between the solidarity that can be experienced as citizens and the solidarities that are 
experienced in other areas of one’s life, like one’s cultural community. People with strong 
ethical attachments, whether they may be cultural or religious, may feel hesitant to fully 
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embrace citizen solidarity if they believe they may consequently need to sacrifice the 
identities of their non-political ethical communities. It must therefore be clear that a 
substantive national identity is not an ingredient of citizen solidarity. The state should refrain 
from practices that might suggest otherwise. Being a proud and active member of a cultural 
or religious community should not in any way be threatened by one’s membership in a state. 
The state is a problem-solving system that we created to address our collective challenges and 
establish and protect the conditions necessary for us to pursue what we hold dear as 
individuals or as cultural and religious communities. A state is there in the first place to make 
life easier and safer for everyone. In this age, we have no alternative arrangement to facilitate 
cooperation between people who are stuck together in society and whose livelihoods are 
closely interwoven. In the past, it might have been possible to overlay the state or political 
society over an ethical, cultural community that has a measure of homogeneity. One’s 
solidarity as a citizen and as a member of such an ethical community would understandably 
have become conflated. Today this is no longer possible or, arguably, even desirable. A 
separation between these solidarities needs to be maintained in order for citizen solidarity to 
be sustainable. That does not mean the particularistic content of our identities in the private 
sphere cannot become the subject matter of the political discourses we have as citizens. If 
particularistic content and power dynamics infringe our status as citizens, or if the state 
becomes complicit in perpetuating injustice related to our personal identities, these matters 
must be deliberated in the public sphere. If this content is not allowed in the public sphere, 
the state fails to serve its purpose. It is nevertheless important that when these issues are 
discussed, we discuss it in a way that our fellow citizens can understand and make claims that 
they can accept. At the same time, we need to be willing to listen to the claims of others and 
be convinced by the force of the stronger argument. If we cannot achieve mutual 
understanding, we cannot achieve solidarity. 
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